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I. INTRODUCTION
You are sweating bullets. It is a few days before trial in the biggest civil case you
have ever handled. You believe the outcome of the trial will hinge upon whether you
can effectively cross-examine your opponent's key witness. As you prepare your
cross-examination outline, you identify a potentially critical area of inquiry that was
not fully covered in the witness's deposition or other formal discovery, due to
circumstances that you could not control.' You are keenly aware of the well-known
trial attorney's maximthatyou should not ask a cross-examination question when you
1. There are many reasons why an issue that an attorney wishes to discuss with a witness
did not come to light until after the close of the discovery period, through circumstances that
the attorney could not control. For example, perhaps an interrogatory answer or other discovery
response served by the opposing party at the end of the discovery period first identified a
question that requires further investigation. Alternatively, a witness who could not be deposed
before the end of the discovery period might testify during the deposition about a new matter.
Also, a witness deposed near the end of the discovery period might change her earlier answer
to a deposition question after the close of the discovery period, thereby raising a new matter.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(e) (giving a witness thirty days from the completion of the deposition
transcript to identify necessary "changes in form or substance"). Any of these circumstances
might lead to follow-up investigation, all of it necessarily coming after the close of the period
for formal discovery, which itself reveals new evidence or new issues that require further
investigation. Many similar circumstances could be imagined.
If the matter requiring further investigation concerns an expert witness, one or more of the
circumstances in the previousparagraph could present the need for fact gathering after the close
of the discovery period. In addition, it is easy to imagine circumstances for experts that are not
likely to exist for fact witnesses. After all, witnesses are experts because they possess special
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." FED. R. EVID. 702. An expert can, and
often does, acquire additional knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education after the
close of the formal discovery period. For example, a scientist might complete her research on
an area related to the matter at issue in a civil suit and publish an article about this research
after the end of the discovery period. Also, an attorney might refrain from identifying an expert
until just before, or even during, trial, thereby restricting her opponent's ability to prepare for
cross-examination. Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, an Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 169, 186-87 (referring to "'SaturdayNight' experts"); James L. Hayes & Paul T. Ryder,
Jr., Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Discovery of Expert Information,
42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1101, 1138 n.235 (1988).
20011
INDIANA LA WJO URNAL
do not know how the witness will answer it.2 But how can you possibly find out what
the witness's answer will be? The court's discovery deadline3 expired three weeks
ago, so you cannot schedule another deposition or send your opponent an
interrogatory. Is there any way out of this mess?
After lots of stewing about the limits of formal discovery, the answer finally hits
you. Why not go straight to the source? You decide to pick up the telephone and call
the witness.4
Something seems a bit odd, though. As an attorney who specializes in civil
litigation, you have come to rely upon formal discovery as the means to acquire
information about your opponents' witnesses.5 Is it okay to call them?
Just as your law school professional responsibility professor taught you to do in
moments like this, you reach for your state's ethics rules, which, like those in most
states,6 are based upon the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Sure enough, there is a provision, Rule 4.2,
that outlines when attorneys cannot contact persons without the consent of opposing
counsel. However, this rule is quite clear: It only prohibits ex parte contact with
persons "represented by another lawyer."8 While the key witness in question will be
called by opposing counsel, she is not represented by her. Therefore, you conclude,
there is no ethical restriction prohibiting you from making the call. In fact, because
you have determined that you will be able to better represent your client at trial if you
do indeed speak with the witness, you are arguably ethically required to make the
phone call. After all, the rules provide that competent representation "requires the...
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation" of your
2. E.g., Peter M. Burke & Gianfranco A. Pietrafesa, An Introduction to Cross-
Examination, N.J. LAW., Dec. 1998, at 28, 29; Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Cross Examination,
UTAH B.J., Nov. 1995, at 35, 36.
3. In most federal civil cases, the court sets a deadline for the completion of discovery.
FED. R. Crv. P. 16(b)(3). Many state courts also set deadlines for the completion of discovery.
See, e.g., Polly Jessica Estes, Preservation of Error: From Filing the Lawsuit Through
Presentation ofEvidence, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 997, 1056 (1999); Garrett P. Hoerner & Stephen
IR Wigginton, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure, 23 S. ILL U. L.J. 859, 875 (1999);
Margo Ahem, Comment, Agreements in Crisis: The Stinging Effects of Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 on Settlement Agreements and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, 31
TEX. TECH L. REv. 87, 88 (2000).
4. As an alternative, an attorney might have an investigator or legal assistant make the
call. See infra note 10 1. For purposes of professional responsibility law, however, directing
someone to make the call will not change the attorney's obligations, because the attorney will
be responsible for actions taken at her direction. See infra note 101.
5. See infra note 293.
6. Lawrence K. Hellman, When "Ethics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say: The
Implications ofStrainedABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. J. LEGALETHICs 317,323 n.1 8 (1996).
7. The state's rule would presumably be based upon Model Rule 4.2 or its predecessor
provision. See infra note 110 (listing state professional responsibility rules).
8. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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client 9 That settles it."0 You pick up the phone and dial the witness's number.
Voila! In the opinion of several courts and other ethics authorities, if that key
witness is an expert" who was retained by your opponent, you have just committed
an ethical breach," and a very serious one at that. You may face substantial
consequences for your supposedly overzealous cross-examination preparation,
including not only disciplinary proceedings against you but also the possible
exclusion of your own expert testimony, the disqualification of you and perhaps your
entire firm from the case, and a variety of other court-enforced sanctions.'3
Remarkably, if that key witness is a fact witness, nobody will suggest that your
mere contacting of her was an ethical breach. 4 This is true even if the fact witness is
someone who is very loyal to the opposing party, such as the opposing party's best
friend, parent, or spouse.' s
When you prepare to defend yourself against allegations of ethical violations, you
9. Id. R. 1.1; see also infra note 202 (discussing an attorney's duty to engage in conduct
permitted by the Model Rules when the attorney has concluded that the conduct may benefit
her client).
10. An attorney considering ex parte communications with an adverse retained expert who
has consulted the Model Rules is arguably not even confronted by an "ethical dilemma." In the
classic sense of the term, an ethical dilemma exists when one ethical mandate suggests one
course of conduct, while another ethical mandate suggests another course of conduct. For
example, the classic ethical dilemma of the client who plans to commit perjury while testifying
often presents a conflict between the duty to keep information about a client confidential under
Model Rule 1.6 and the duty of candor to the court under Model Rule 3.3. MODEL RULE ,
supra note 8, F. 1.6, 3.3. In contrast, an attorney who reviews the Model Rules will find no
provision requiring her to avoid ex parte communications with retained experts. See infra notes
110-17 and accompanying text. Therefore, once she concludes that such communications are
in the best interest of her client, she has but one ethical duty to follow, pursuing those interests.
See supra note 9.
11. Although expert witnesses are often critical both in criminal and civil trials, this Article
will focus upon civil litigation. For a discussion of ex parte contact with adverse expert
witnesses in criminal cases, see Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-131
(1992), summarized in [1991-1995 Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 1001:7121(1996) [hereinafterABA/BNAManual, 1991-199S Ethics Opinions].
12. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
Of course, this does not mean that there are no ethical restrictions whatsoever regarding ex
parte contact with fact witnesses. See infra Part IV. It simply means that such contact is not
unethical per se.
15. This discussion assumes that the witness is not represented by an attorney, because
Model Rule 4.2 does prohibit ex parte contact with persons who are represented by counsel in
the matter at hand. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2. If, for example, the spouse was a
coplaintiff or a codefendant and was represented either by the attorney representing the other
party or by some other attorney, ex parte contact by the opposing attorney would not be
allowed. -
Also, it is perhaps important to note that, although an attorney is free to contact an
unrepresented relative of the represented party, in some circumstances the represented party's
attorney would be allowed to ask the unrepresented relative not to communicate with the
adverse attorney. See infra text accompanying note 341.
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might find yourself scrutinizing your state's professional responsibility rules again,
thinking that you surely must have missed something that says that contact with
retained experts is not allowed. You will search the Model Rules in vain for such a
provision, however, because it does not exist. Neither the "no contact" rule that you
reviewed before you decided to telephone the witness nor any other relevant Model
Rules provision distinguishes between fact witnesses and experts.' 6 How can it be
that ex parte contact with some important witnesses is allowed and perhaps even
required,'7 while contact with other important witnesses 8 is unethical, even though
the rules say nothing about such a distinction?
The answer lies in a common, but nonetheless erroneous, resolution of the inherent
tension between the two roles that expert witnesses occupy in the modem American
trial. To some extent, retained experts are members of trial teams who are expected
to serve as advocates for "their" side's case at trial. 9 On the other hand, experts are
witnesses who will present sworn testimony to jurors, just like fact witnesses. 0 As
a result of an overemphasis on the first of these two roles, several professional
responsibility decisionmakers have incorrectly placed restrictions on attorneys'
attempts to contact their opponents' experts. 2'
This Article examines and critiques the ethical' restrictions that some would
16. With one exception, the Model Rules do not distinguish between fact and expert
witnesses. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text. The only distinction in the Model
Rules between fact and expert witnesses concerns the amount that they can be paid. See infra
note 111.
17. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
18. The key witness in a given civil trial may verywell bean expert, because the outcomes
of trials can hinge upon the jury's determinations about the diametrically opposed opinions of
experts hired by attorneys and the parties they represent. Karn v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639
(N.D. Ind. 1996) ("[T]he impact of expert witnesses on modem-day litigation cannot be
overstated. . . ."); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGEAND THEFEDERALCOURTS 1 (1997) ("In the courtroom, the outcomes of criminal,
paternity, first amendment, and civil liability cases (among others) often turn on scientific
evidence, the reliability of which may be hotly contested."); Stephen D. Easton, "Yer Outta
Here!" A Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1998); James A. Gardner, Agency
Problems in the Law ofAttorney-Client Privilege: The Expert Witness, 42 U. DET. L.J. 473,
475 (1965) ("Despite the weaknesses which exist in this form of evidence, expeit testimony
frequently constitutes the most important item of proof or the decisive element upon which the
case actually turns.').
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
22. The term "legal ethics" itself is subject to several definitions and interpretations. Some
argue that attorneys should not refer to the restrictions upon their practices contained in rules
and other law as ethical constraints, because the term "ethics" should refer to moral values.
Hellman, supra note 6, at 318-19. In this Article, however, the term "legal ethics" will indeed
be used to refer to the constraints placed by law, particularly professional responsibility rules,
upon lawyers' conduct. Id. at 319-21. Therefore, the terms "ethics" and "professional
responsibility" will be essentially interchangeable in this Article.
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place upon an attomey's' ex parte2' contact with an expert who has
been retained by opposing counsel to present testimony at trial.'
23. In some instances, it may be the attorney's client, rather than the attorney herself, who
technicallyretains and pays the expert witness. As a practical matter, however, the trial attorney
still controls the retained expert witness to a significant extent, even if the expert is technically
hired and paid by the client, because it is the trial attorney who usually finds the expert,
chooses to hire her, directs the flow of information to her, controls the stream of money to her
by deciding whether she will continue to serve as an expert witness, brings her onto the trial
team, directs or alters her analysis, and ultimately decides whether she will tesify at trial.
Stephen D. Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun's Hired Gun: A
Proposalfor FullExpert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 465,492-99 (2000). When the
client or a representative of the client takes an active role in managing the litigation, this does
not mean that the trial attorney does not also control the expert. Instead, the presence of an
active client or client representative means that the expert will have to continue to please both
the trial attorney and the client or client representative. Id. at 494 n.88. For purposes of
convenience, this Article will refer to the attorney as the person who retains and controls the
expert witness. The careful reader will want to remember that a reference to an attorney who
retains an expert witness should be read to include the retaining attorney's client.
In addition, trial attorneys often accomplish their work with the assistance of others,
including associates, legal assistants, secretaries, investigators, other aides, and clients or client
representatives. See infra note 101. Therefore, a reference to an attorney, whether an attorney
retaining an expert or an attorney opposing an expert, should be read to include such persons
acting at the direction of, on behalf of, or in concert with, the attorney.
24. In this Article, the term "ex parte" does not refer to communications with the court
outside the presence of opposing counsel. Instead, it refers to communications with witnesses
outside the presence of, and without securing the consent of, opposing counsel.
Because repetition of the phrase "ex parte communications with adverse retained experts"
could rather quickly become annoying to the reader, this Article will sometimes use the terms
"ex parte communications" and "ex parte contact." Except where the context indicates a
discussion of communications or contact with fact witnesses, the reader can assume that these
terms refer to communications or contact with retained expert witnesses.
25. This Article explores ex parte contact by an attorney with experts who have been both
retained and identified as possible trial witnesses by the opposing attorney. If either of these
two conditions is not present, much of the discussion in this Article is not applicable.
If the adverse party did not retain the expert to assist in the litigation, she generally cannot
control access to the witness or attempt to prevent ex parte contact. See infra notes 341-42 and
accompanying text. There is a limited, but not universally recognized, exception. In some
jurisdictions, courts have held that the physician-patient privilege prohibits doctors who have
treated injured plaintiffs from communicating ex parte with defense attorneys in personal injury
cases. John L. Ropiequet, Ex Parte Communications with Defense Counsel: Hidden Dangers
ofthe Physician-Patient Privilege, FORDEF., June 1995, at 16,23. However, courts in roughly
the same number of jurisdictions have allowed ex parte communications between defense
attorneys and treating physicians. Id. at 22. Unlike the issues discussed in this Article regarding
ex parte contact with retained experts, the issues related to ex parte communications between
defense attorneys and treating physicians have received substantial attention from scholars and
practitioners. See, e.g., JacquelineM. Asher et al., ExParteInterviews with Plaintif's Treating
Physicians-the Offensive Use of the Physician-Patient Privilege, 67 U. DET. L. REv. 501
(1990); Tomie T. Green & Winston L. Kidd, Prognosis ofthe Physician-Patient Privilege:
Guarded or Fatal?, 15 TRIAL DIPL J. 243 (1992); William E. Whitfield, III, Mississippi
Medical Privilege: Blessing or Curse?, 12 Miss. C. L. REv. 461 (1992); Elizabeth Eggleston
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Drigotas, Note, Restricting Ex Parte Interviews with Nonparty Treating Physicians: Crist v.
Moffat, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1381 (1991); John Jennings, Note, The Physician-Patient
Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff's Treating
Physicians andDefense Counsel, 59 Mo. L. REV. 441 (1994); J. Christopher Smith, Comment,
Recognizing the Split: The Jurisdictional Treatment of Defense Counsel's Ex Parte Contact
with Plaintif's Treating Physician, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 247 (1998-99); David L. Woodard,
Comment, Shielding the Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Parte Contacts with
a Plaintiff's TreatingPhysician, 13 CAMPBELLL. REV. 233 (1991); Christine L. Companion,
Fairness Demands Equal Access, S.C. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 37; Mary Droll Feighny, The
Physician-Patient Privilege: May Defense Counsel Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with
Plaintiffs TreatingPhysician?, J. KAN. BARASs'N, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 36; Ropiequet, supra;
Colleen K. Schierer, May Defense Counsel Conduct Ex Parte Interviews ofPlaintiffs Treating
Physicians?, Wyo. LAw., June 1998, at2l. As aresult, although much of this Article's analysis
regarding the value of ex parte communications with retained experts might be applicable to
the controversy regarding ex parte communications with treating physicians, the latter
controversy will not be considered here.
With the possible exception of treating physicians, an attorney can communicate ex parte
with other nonretained experts, such as highway patrol officers, medical examiners, and fire
marshals, even if they are identified by opposing parties as probable trial witnesses. Cf.
Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants of Mo., Inc., 584 N.E.2d 963, 969 (111. App. Ct. 1991)
("[TJhe appropriate way to proceed with nonretained experts is to allow the opposing party to
proceed with whatever discovery it deems appropriate once disclosure is made."), affd, 610
N.E.2d 638 (I1. 1993), discussed in Charles W. Chapman, JawsXVI: The Exceptions That Ate
Rule 220, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, 217 (1993); Douglas M. Schwab et al., Scope of
Discovery Against Expert Witnesses Under the Federal Rules, in USE OF EXPERTS IN
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL TECHNIQUES 9, 20 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 345, 1988) ("Courts generally have held that such an
[unretained] expert is an ordinary 'fact witness' .... ".). Therefore, the issues discussed in this
Article are not directly applicable to nonretained experts who will be called as witnesses at
trial.
In the main, this Article also does not deal with experts who are employees of parties, rather
than independent contractors retained to work on a specific case. For a brief discussion of
issues related to employees who are also experts, see infra note 116.
In addition, this Article does not address ex parte communication with (or, for that matter,
formal discovery regarding) experts who are merely consulted by opposing attorneys, but not
listed or called as witnesses. These "consultant only" experts present different concerns that
are outside the scope of this Article. FED. IL CIr. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (addressing discovery
regarding "an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in
anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a
witness at trial"); see also Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 932 P.2d 297,
298-99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing consulting experts in Arizona). For examples of cases
involving consultants and related issues, see Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.
1984); Centennial Management Servs., Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671,684-87 (D. Kan.
2000); Crowev. Nivison, 145 F.R.D. 657 (D. Md. 1993); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493 (D.
Colo. 1984); Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238,1241-43 (Ariz. 1982);Jones &Laughlin Steel,
Inc. v. Schattman, 667 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Ct App. 1984). See also Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing
the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1990) (discussing information disclosed to or acquired by experts who serve
as consultants in criminal cases); Douglas Alan Emerick, Note, Discovery oftheNontestifying
[Vol. 76:647
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Part H explores the expert's dual role from the perspectives of three groups ofpeople
who interact with experts-clients,jurors, and adverse attorneys. It argues that, to the
extent that the expert's role as a trial-teammemberconflicts with her role as a witness
who assists the jury in its quest for the truth, the judicial system should treat the
witness role as the dominant one. Part Ill reviews the law of ex parte contact and
establishes that ex parte contact neither is nor should be prohibited, because a
prohibition of ex parte contact would inhibit the truth-seeking process. Part IV
discusses the ethical restrictions that should and do apply to limit, but not prohibit,
ex parte contact. It argues that the ethical restrictions that apply to an attorney's
contact with fact witnesses are sufficient to control contact with expert witnesses.
Part V discusses a related issue, the professional responsibility limits on attorneys
who wish to advise witnesses not to participate in ex parte communications, and
advocates a modest change that would increase the effectiveness of ex parte
communications with adverse retained experts.
II. THE EXPERT AS TRIAL-TEAM MEMBER AND WriNEss
Experienced trial attorneys tend to place witnesses into two categories: fact
witnesses and experts. A more cynical and perhaps more honest categorization would
differentiate between the witnesses an attorney is stuck with and those she buys on
the open market. While the second categorization appears at first blush simply to be
a repeat of the first with less delicate language, it is not. Although the retained expert
has become so commonplace that attorneys sometimes think of all experts as
witnesses who are retained and paid by one of the parties, experts who are not
retainedby eitherparty do still testify in trials on occasion." Examples ofnonretained
Expert Witness' Identity Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: You Can't Tell the
Players Without a Program, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1985).
Finally, this Article also does not deal with the interesting issues created by the "side
switching" expert who is initially retained by one party who later decides not to call her as a
witness at trial and then objects to the attempt by an opposing party to call the expert as a trial
witness. For a discussion of these issues, see Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and
Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 475-77 (1999).
26. Evidence law does not distinguish between witnesses who are retained and paid and
those who are not retained and paid by either party. Instead, it distinguishes lay witnesses from
experts or, more precisely, because a single witness could present both expert and lay
testimony, see H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 38 (2000), between expert testimony and lay
testimony. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert is "a witness qualified.. . by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" to offer "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact... to determine a fact in issue." FED.
R. EvID. 702. Many states have statutes or rules that are similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
702. See infra note 49.
Those who are not qualified to serve as expert witnesses can testify only to matters within
their own observations. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. Those who qualify as expert
witnesses are entitled to present opinions based upon not only their own observations, but also
upon data outside of their own personal knowledge. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
Forpurposes of convenience, this Article will follow the lead ofthe drafters of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A) and ignore the possibility that one witness could present both
2001]
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expert witnesses include physicians who treat injured plaintiffs and various civil
servants who testify in civil trials between private parties, including highway patrol
officers who investigate traffic accidents,' fire marshals who determine the causes
of fires,29 and coroners and state medical examiners who opine about the causes of
deaths and related matters.3
Notwithstanding the occasional appearance of experts who are not financially and
strategically aligned with parties, however, it is now commonplace for parties or their
attorneys to hire and pay expert witnesses?' These retained experts, who are the
subject of this Article, have two different and at least somewhat conflicting roles.
First, they are members of the trial teams of the attorneys who hire them. Second,
they are witnesses who present testimony for the jury's consideration. Because the
ethical issues presented by attorney contact with adverse experts often result fromthe
conflict between these two roles," each of them should be fully understood. Perhaps
this conflict can be best understood by examining the perspectives of three groups of
people who interact with experts-their clients, jurors, and opposing attorneys.
fact and expert testimony. Following the provisions of Rule 26(a)(1)(A), this Article will refer
to those who "may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence" (or similar state evidence law provisions, see infra notes 45, 49)
as expert witnesses. The Article will use the term "fact witness" to refer to a person who is not
qualified to serve as an expert.
27. E.g., Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Auth., 529 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ill. 1988); Eugene I.
Pavalon & Gary K. Laatsch, Use ofDiscvery in Product Liability Cases, in ILLINOIS PRODUCT
LLALYxPRAcTicE ch. 6 (111. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. ed., 1999); see also supra note
25 (noting controversy regarding ex parte contact between defense attorneys and physicians
who treated injured plaintiffs).
28. E.g., Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., No. CIV. A.97-3754, 1999 WL 4921, at *1 (E.D.
La. Jan. 6, 1999), aff'd, 198 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Scirrilla v. Osborne, 946 S.W.2d 919
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Wyo. 1975).
29. E.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Wade, 544 So. 2d 906, 908-09 (Ala. 1989);
DeYoung v. Alpha Constr. Co., 542 N.E.2d 859, 861 (111. App. Ct. 1989); Parker v. Dubus
Engine Co., 563 So. 2d 355,357 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Kalmn, Inc. v. Empiregas Corp., 406 So.
2d 276,279 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Marketos v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 848, 851
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
30. E.g., Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2000); Russ v. Ratliff, 538 F.2d
799, 805 n.12 (8th Cir. 1976); Touchette v. Dots, Inc., 1995 WL 592475, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Sept. 29, 1995); Osborne v. Cambridge Township, 736 A.2d 715, 716 n.1 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1999); Wangsness v. Aldinger, 598 N.W.2d 221,226-27 (S.D. 1999).
3 1. See infra note I l1.
32. In an article regarding formal discovery issues related to the work product doctrine,
ProfessorKathleen Waits similarly recognized that understanding and properlyresolving these
issues required an understanding and proper resolution of the expert witness's two conflicting
roles. See Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A Critical Analysis of Current Law and a
New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REv. 385,442-44 (1994); see also John S. Applegate,
Witness Preparation, 68 TaX. L. REV. 277,295 (1989) ("The function of the expert witness is
both the most neutral and the most partisan.").
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A. The Client's Perspective: The Expert as
Paid Member of the Trial Team
With regard to the expert's role as an advocate for one party and a member of that
party's trial team, the expert occupies a role that is arguably similar to that of an
attorney, legal assistant, investigator, or legal secretary. From the perspective of the
client who pays the tab for the expert just as she does for the attorney, legal assistant,
investigator, and legal secretary, it may seem like there is and should be little or no
distinction between the expert and other members of the trial team23 If the client
expects to get what she pays for, she may expect the same type of loyalty (with
attendant confidentiality) from"her" expert witness as she does fromher attorney and
the other members of the trial team that will do battle with their adversaries during
the litigation.'
In this Article, the term "trial-team-model advocates" shall refer to those who
believe that the expert's role as a member of the trial team should predominate her
role as a witness at trial.35 Because they value the loyalty of an expert to her trial team
over any possible benefits to the trial process from ex parte contact between the
expert and the adverse attorney, trial-team-model advocates would prohibit such ex
parte contact.' Many trial-team-model advocates also believe that a close and closed
workingrelationship betweenthe retaining attorney and her expert witness is required
for the proper functioning of the adversary system 7
B. The Juror's Perspective: The Expert as Witness
From the jury box," the view is quite different than the view from the chairs
occupied by the client and attorney who retained the expert. From the perspective of
the jurors, the expert's job is to serve as a witness, not an aide to one of the parties.39
Like any other witness, the expert climbs into the witness box, swears to tell the
truth, and presents evidence for the jury's consideration. Like any other witness, she
33. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at
*4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) (noting that defendant argued that its expert should be treated as
"part of the (defense) 'team").
34. See Easton, supra note 23, at 497.
35. On some occasions, a phrase like "ex-parte-contact opponents" will be used to refer to
those holding this view. Neither this term nor the term "trial-team-model advocates" should be
read as implying that those opposing ex parte contact are an organized or coordinated group.
Instead, the various attorneys, judges, and scholars who are trial-team-model advocates have
presumably come to their views independently.
As this Article makes clear, I disagree with trial-team-model advocates. See infra note 55.
Ofcourse, in an area as significant, vast, and varied as expert witnesses and their effect on civil
litigation, there is plenty of room for reasonable and well-informed minds to disagree.
36. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
38. For convenience, this Article assumes that the fact finder is ajury. In a bench trial, the
judge will face issues similar to those faced by the jury in ajury trial.
39. Easton, supra note 23, at 476-77.
40. Witnesses commonly swear to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
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is called to the stand by an attorney who often attempts to suggest that she is both
believable and relatively unbiased41 and hopes that her testimony therefore will
persuade the jurors on one or more disputed issues. Like any other witness (or
perhaps even more so than fact witnesses in many instances)," the expert is cross-
examined bythe attorney representing the other party. As with any other witness, the
jurors will be called upon to evaluate the veracity and knowledge of the expert. The
adverse attorney's success (or lack thereof) in impeaching the expert during cross-
examination is often critical to the jurors' determinations regarding these matters.43
In fact, the expert is not only a witness, she is a "super witness" who is given broad
latitude to attempt to persuade the jurors in ways that are forbidden for factwitnesses.
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow a lay witness to testify about her opinions only
when they are "rationally based on the perception of the witness" and "helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue."
truth." E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2094 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-25 (West
Supp. 2000);FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.605(1) (West 1999); IDAHOCODE § 9-1402 (Michie 1998);
OR. EVID. CODE . 603(2), (3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.03(2), (3) (West 1993).
41. See Easton, supra note 23, at 476; Terry Christovich Gay, Pseudo-scientists at the
Gate: The New FJC Manual Will Help, 63 DEF. COUNs. J. 331, 331 (1996) ("Critics have
objected that.. jurors do not comprehend.. . that the expert witnesses upon whom the system
relies are mercenaries whose biased testimony frequently produces erroneous and inconsistent
determinations."' (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Introduction to FEDERALJUDICIALCENTER,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 2 (1994))); J. Seymour Benson, The Care and
Feeding of an Expert Witness, FLA. BJ., July/Aug. 1996, at 44, 44-45; Tim Hallahan,
Everything You Need to Know About Expert Witnesses, PRAC. LMGATOR, Sept. 1997, at 41,
44, 60; W. Brent Wilcox, Plaintif's Experts: Finding, Preparing and Presenting an Expert
Witness, UTAHB.J., Nov. 1995, at 38,40.
Of course, it is not always actually the case that a witness is unbiased. Both experts, see
infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text, and fact witnesses, see infra notes 315-17,369
and accompanying text, can be quite biased.
42. Wise trial attorneys are reluctant to conduct searing cross-examinations of fact
witnesses, because they realize that jurors often relate more to a person who is on the stand
simply by a twist of fate that made them a witness to important facts than to the trial attorney
who is permitted to cross-examine her. See THOMAs A. MAUETTRIALTECHNIQUES 248-49 (5th
ed. 2000). The same logic does not apply to a retained expert witness, because she, like the trial
attorney who cross-examines her, is in the courtroom to earn money. As a result, trial attorneys
are often more aggressive in cross-examining expertwitnesses than they are in cross-examining
fact witnesses.
43. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 394 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Easton,
supra note 23, at 504-05.
44. FED. R. Evm. 701(a), (b). Pursuant to a 2000 amendment to Rule 701, the opinion
testimony of a lay witness cannot be "based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." FED. R. EviD. 701(c); H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at
8,37 (2000). This new provision was added to eliminate any risk that expert witnesses would
avoid the requirements of Rule 702 by claiming to be offering lay opinions, rather than expert
opinions. FED. R. EviD. 701 advisory committee's note (2000 amendments).
Many states have lay opinion rules that are identical or almost identical to the pre-2000
version of Federal Rule 701. See ALA R. EviD. 701; ALASKA R. EVID. 701; ARIZ. R. EVID. 701;
AR UNIF. R. EVID. 701; COLO. R. EVID. 701; HAW. R. EvID. 701; IDAHO R. EVID. 701; IND.
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R. EVID. 701; IOWA R. EVID. 701; KY. R. EvID. 701; LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art 701 (West
1995);ME.R. EVID. 701; MICH.R. EVID. 701; MINN.R.EVID. 701; MIss.R.EVID. 701; MONT.
R. Evm. 701; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-701 (1995);N.H.R. EVID. 701; N.J. R. EVID. 701; N.M.
R. EvID. 11-701; N.C.R. EvID. 701; N.D.R. EVID. 701; OmOR. EvID. 701; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 2701 (West 1993); OR. EVID. CODER. 701; PA. R. EvID. 701;R.I.R. EVID. 701; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-15-1 (Michie 1995); see also UNIF. R. EVID. 701.
Other states have provisions of evidence law that are quite close to the pre-2000 version of
Federal Rule 701, but with relatively minor differences. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 800 (West
2000) (permitting lay opinions when they are "(a) [r]ationally based on the perception of the
witness; and (b) [h]elpful to a clear understanding of his testimony"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
456(a) (1994) (permitting lay opinions that "(a) [are] rationally based on the perception of the
witness and (b) are helpful to a clearer understanding of his or her testimony"); TEN. R. EviD.
701 (adding subsection (b), which provides that "[a] witness may testify to the value of the
witness's own property or services"); cf. Atwood v. Atwood, 79 A. 59, 60 (Conn. 1911) ("An
opinion ofa nonexpert witness which does not rest upon facts stated by him, or is not acquired
through the use ofhis senses, may not be laid in evidence."); Missouri v. Gardner, 955 S.W.2d
819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). In Missouri, a state that does not have a comprehensive code
of evidence statutes or rules, a court observed:
[L]ay opinion testimony has generally been allowed in two circumstances: (1) to
provide the jury with descriptive facts that otherwise could not be detailed or
reproduced for the jury, and (2) to give ajudgment on matters where [a] witness
is shown to have an opinion which would aid the jury.
Id. at 823.
In three states, the relevant evidence law includes provisions like the one added to Federal
Rule 701 in 2000. In two states, the law provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testimony about what
he or she perceived may be in the form of inference and opinion when:
(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy,
communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of facts without testifying
in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness's use of inferences or opinions
will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and
(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill,
experience, or training.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.701 (1999); accord DEL UNIF. R. EVID. 701. A third state's law more
closely corresponds to the post-2000 version of Federal Rule 701. See S.C. R. EVID. 701
(tracking the language of pre-2000 Federal Rule 701, then adding the restriction that the
opinions or inferences "(c) do not require special knowledge, skill, experience or training").
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is complemented by Rule 602's personal
knowledge requirement for fact witnesses, which states, "A [fact] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter." FED. R. EvID. 602.
Many states have evidence-law provisions that are virtually or wholly identical to Rule 602
of the Federal Rules. See ALA. R. EvID. 602; ALASKA R. EvID. 602; ARM R. EVID. 602; ARK.
UNiF. R. EvID. 602; COLO. R. EviD. 602; DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 602; HAW. R. EVID. 602; IDAHO
R. EVID. 602; IOWA R. EVID. 602; Ky. R. EviD. 602; LA. CODE EvID. ANN. art. 602 (West
1995); ME. R. EVID. 602; MD. R. EVID. 5-602; MICH. R. EVlD. 602; MINN. R. EVID. 602;
MONT. R. EviD. 602; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-602 (1995); N.H. R. EVID. 602; N.J. R. EVID. 602;
N.M. R. EviD. 11-602; N.C.R. EVID. 602; N.D. R. EviD. 602; OmoR. EVID. 602; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2602 (West 1993); OR. EVID. CODE R. 602; PA. R. EVID. 602; R.I. R. EVID. 602;
S.C. R. EVID. 602; TENN. R. EVID. 602; TEX. R. EVID. 602; UTAHR. EvID. 602; WASH. R. EVID.
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In contrast, an expert need not limit her opinions to matters related to her own
observations. Instead, Rule 70315 allows her to base her opinions and inferences upon
602; W. VA. R. EVID. 602; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 906.02 (West 1993); WYO. R. EVID. 602; see
also UNIF. R. EViD. 602.
Other states have somewhat different rule, statutory, or case-law language outlining the
personal knowledge requirement for lay witnesses. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 702 (West
1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.604 (West 1999); Gray v. Mossman, 99 A. 1062, 1065 (Conn.
1917) ('The witness possessed no competent knowledge from which he could testify, and the
court properly struck this out.").
45. Before a recent amendment, Federal Rule 703 provided:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 703, 28 U.S.C. app. (1994) (amended 2000).
Many states have evidence-law provisions identical or substantially similar to the pre-2000
version of Federal Rule 703. See ALAsKA R. EviD. 703; ARM. R. EVID. 703; COLO. R. EviD.
703; DEL- UNIF. R. EvlD. 703; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.704 (West 1999); IDAHO R. EVID. 703;
IND. R. EVID. 703; IOWA R. EVlD. 703; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 703 (West 1995); ME. R.
EVID. 703; MIss. R. EvM. 703; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 490.065(3) (West 1996); MONT. R. EVID.
703; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-703 (1995); N.H. R. EVID. 703; N.J. R. EVID. 703; N.M. R. EVID.
11-703; N.C.R. EVID. 703; N.D. R. EviD. 703; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2703 (West 1993);
OR. EviD. CODE 703; PA. R. EV'D. 703; S.C. R. EvID. 703; S.D. CODFED LAWS § 19-15-3
(Michie 1995); TEX. R. EvID. 703; UTAH R. EVID. 703; VT. R. EVID. 703; VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-401.1(a) (Michie 2000); WASH. R. EviD. 703; W. VA. L EVID. 703; WYO. R. EVID. 703;
see also UNIF. R. Evm. 703; cf. CAL. EviD. CODE § 801(b) (West 2000). In California, an
expert's opinion may be
[biased on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training,
and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known
to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from
using such matter as a basis for his opinion.
Id.
Alabama law is even more favorable for experts, because it does not contain the "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field" requirement. ALA. R. EviD. 703. On
the other hand, Ohio allows only those expert opinions that are based on admissible evidence
or facts or data perceived by the expert. OnHO R. EVID. 703; see also R.I. R. EVID. 703
(containing language similar to Ohio, but also allowing expert opinions based on hypothetical
questions); cf. MICH. R. EvID. 703 ("The court may require that underlying facts or data
essential to an opinion or inference be in evidence.").
Other states have added a provision explicitly giving courts the authority to exclude
unreliable testimony. See HAW. R. EviD. 703 ("The court may, however, disallow testimony
in the form of an opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness."); TENN. R. EVID. 703 ('The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of trustworthiness.").
Under the pre-2000 version of Federal Rule 703, courts disagreed regarding whether
inadmissible data relied upon by experts was itself admissible along with the expert's opinion.
FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note (2000 amendments). As a result, Federal Rule
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facts or data "perceived by or made known to the expert at or before" her testimony.4
Furthermore, the facts or data upon which an expert witness bases her opinions and
inferences do not even have to be admissible in evidence.47 Therefore, it is perfectly
permissible (and quite common) for an' attorney to make inadmissible "facts or data"
known to her retained expert witness in communications that do not involve their
adversaries and for the expert to base her opinions upon these inadmissible "facts or
data."' 8
Furthermore, the Federal Rules allow an expert to "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 9 This expansive outline of
703 was amended in 2000, to add provisions establishing that the authority given to experts to
rely upon inadmissible data did not necessarily render that data itselfadmissible. FED. R. EviD.
703 ("Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect."); H.R. DOc. No. 106-225, at 10, 53-54 (2000).
Two states foreshadowed the controversy that led to the recent amendment to Federal Rule
703 by adopting pre-2000 language, supplemented with additional provisions concerning
whether the party introducing the expert testimony can make the jury aware of inadmissible
bases of the expert's testimony. See KY. R. EvM. 703; MINN. R. EVID. 703.
The 2000 addition to Federal Rule 703 maybe less significant than it first appears, because
a cross-examination attack upon the bases of an expert's opinion "will often open the door to
a proponent's rebuttal with information that was reasonably relied upon by the expert, even if
that information would not have been discloseable initially under the balancing test provided
by this amendment." FED. R. EviD. 703 advisory committee's note (2000 amendments).
46. FED. R. Evm. 703.
47. Id.; see also supra note 45 (citing similar state provisions).
The Federal Rules do contain one "restriction" upon the use of inadmissible facts or data.
Under Federal Rule 703, the expert can base her opinions and inferences upon inadmissible
facts or data only when they are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forning opinions or inferences upon the subject." FED. R. EVr. 703; see also supra
note 45. This would-be restriction is often of little note, because experts commonly bootstrap
themselves past this requirement by testifying that the information is of the type relied upon
by others within their profession. Challenging this proposition is expensive and often futile.
Easton, supra note 23, at 488 & n.70.
48. Easton, supra note 23, at 495-96; Lubet, supra note 25, at 469 ("To one degree or
another, all experts depend upon retaining counsel for the information necessary to do their
work."); Lee Mickus, Discovery of Work Product Disclosed to a Testifying Fxpert Under the
1993AmendmentstotheFederalRulesofCiviProcedure, 27 CREIGHToNL. REV. 773,788-89
(1993-94).
49. FED. R. EVID. 702. Prior to a 2000 amendment, Federal Rule 702 stated:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EviD. 702,28 U.S.C. app. (1994) (amended 2000).
Several states' expert witness provisions mirror the pre-2000 version of Federal Rule 702.
See ALA. R. EVID. 702; ARIZ R. EVID. 702; ARK. UNIF. R. EviD. 702; COLO. R. EvID. 702; DEL
UNiF. R. EvID. 702; IDAHO R. EvID. 702; IOWAR. EVID. 702; KY. R. EVID. 702; LA. CODE EVID.
ANN. art. 702 (West 1995); ME. R. EvIn. 702; MINN. R. EVD. 702; Miss. R. EVID. 702; MONT.
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the scope of allowable expert testimony gives the expert and the attorney who
retained her plenty of room to submit a wide range of testimony "in the form of...
opinion[s] or otherwise."
Finally, the witness presents this testimony with the considerable benefit of the
judge's declaration that she is an "expert" worthy of the jurors' special attention."
Of course, this declaration follows the expert's recitation of her impressive
background and achievements. 2
The well-credentialed retained expert witness (a term that is probably grossly
redundant, given the trial attorney's motivation to hire experts who will impress
jurors) 3 therefore has significant advantages over fact witnesses in her effort to
R. EVID. 702; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-702 (1995); N.H. R. EviD. 702; N.L R. EvM. 702; N.M. &
EvM. 11-702; N.D. R. EVID. 702; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2702 (West 1993); OR. EvID.
CODE 702; RI. R. EVID. 702; S.C. R. EviD. 702; S.D. CODWIMDLAWS § 19-15-2 (Michie 1995);
TEX. R. Evm. 702; UTAHR. EVID. 702; VT. R. EViD. 702; WASH. R. EVID. 702; W. VA. R. EvD.
702; WYO. R. EVID. 702; see also UNui. R. EvID. 702; cf. Siladi v. McNamara, 325 A.2d 277,
279 (Conn. 1973) ("Generally, expert testimony may be admitted if the witness has a special
skill or knowledge, beyond the ken of the average juror, that, as properly applied, would be
helpful to the determination of an ultimate issue.").
Other states have rules that are somewhat similar to the pre-2000 version of Federal Rule
702, with additional provisions not found in the federal rule. See ALASKA R. EVID. 702; FL.
STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 1999); HAw. I EvID. 702; IND. R. EVID. 702; Mo. ANN. STAT. §
490.065(1), (2) (West 1996); N.C. R. EVID. 702; OMO R. EVID. 702; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
401.3 (Michie 2000).
California only allows expert witness testimony regarding matters outside the jury's
knowledge and experience but uses different language in outlining this requirement. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 801 (West 2000). In contrast, the Kansas statute provides that all expert opinions must
be "within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the
witness," but it does not include an explicit requirement that the testimonybe outside the jury's
knowledge and experience. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456(b)(2) (1994).
The 2000 amendment to Federal Rule 702 added provisions stating that expert testimony
was admissible only "if (I) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EvID. 702; H.R. Doc. No.
106-225, at 9, 42 (2000). This provision incorporated, to some extent, the Supreme Court's
holdings regarding the parameters of acceptable expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
149 (1999). FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amendments).
50. FED. R. EviD. 702; see supra note 49 (citing similar state provisions).
51. Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230, 1234
(5th Cir. 1986) (referring to "the imprimatur of the trial judge's decision that he [a witness] is
an 'expert"); Easton, supra note 23, at 480 & nn.43-44.
52. Easton, supra note 23, at 478-79.
In the nomenclature of one experienced trial attorney, an expert is an "academically
endowed superwitness." Terry O'Reilly, Ethics and Experts, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 113, 113
(1993).
53. Selection and retention of impressive expert witnesses is one of a trial attorney's most
important tasks. One somewhat weary, but realistic, trial attorney has described this process as
follows:
Good lawyers "win" cases by obtaining the best result for their clients. Less
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persuade jurors.' Nonetheless, the jurors will be called upon to decide whether the
expert is to be believed. Those who reject the views of trial-team-model advocates
believe that the jurors should be given every reasonable tool to make this
determination, including a cross-examination of the expert that benefits from all
reasonable information-gathering techniques.55
successful lawyers fade from the arena. We accept this as the harsh code of trial
work. Inevitably this requires the search for the most persuasive experts and their
early retention, regardless of the costs. If this is now a lumbering Frankenstein,
the truth is that you and I tightened the screws and turned on the electricity.
O'Reilly, supra note 52, at 117.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that
allegedly scientific (polygraph) evidence "is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near
infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle offDelphi"); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding that expert testimony may "assume a posture of mystic infallibility
in the eyes of ajury of laymen"); White v. Estelle, 554 F. Supp. 851, 858 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(stating when a psychiatrist's opinion "is proffered by a witness bearing the title of 'Doctor,'
its impact on thejury is much greater than if it were not masquerading as something it is not"),
aff'd, 720 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1983).
According to a leading evidence scholar:
Scientific evidence impresses lay jurors. They tend to assume it is more accurate
and objective than lay testimony. A juror who thinks of scientific evidence
visualizes instruments capable of amazingly precise measurement, of findings
arrived at by dispassionate scientific tests. In short, in the mind of the typical lay
juror, a scientific witness has a special aura of credibility.
Edward . Inwinkelried, Evidence Law and Tacticsfor the Proponents ofScientific Evidence,
in ScIENTIFIc AND EXPERT EvIDENCE 33, 37 (Edward J. Inwinkelried ed., 1981), quoted in
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926 n.8 (1983) (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
55. My own rejection of the trial-team model results in part from my experience as a trial
attorney and litigator. Because my biases regarding expert witnesses result at least in part from
those experiences, a brief discussion of those experiences and biases perhaps is appropriate.
Before a relatively recent move to the academic world, I spent almost fifteen years in
practice as a trial attorney. Except for a three-year stint as a prosecutor, my trial and related
experience primarily involved representing defendants in civil trials, arbitration hearings, and
administrative agency proceedings. In my practice, I came into contact with hundreds of
retained expert witnesses (working both for me and against me) in many dozens of cases. As
I cross-examined experts, presented expert testimony on direct examination, deposed experts,
and watched the interaction between experts and attorneys (including me), I came to be quite
suspicious of retained expert witnesses and the testimony they presented in civil cases. In my
view, this often flawed testimony is almost always shaped, and at least sometimes tainted, by
the overly comfortable relationship between expert witnesses and the attorneys who retain and
pay them.
I therefore believe thejudicial system should take reasonable steps to make this relationship
less cozy and to subject the expert's analysis and work to scrutiny whenever possible. Easton,
supra note 23. Because that recently published article concerns an issue closely related to the
issue discussed here, this Article often relies upon and cites that article's discussions ofrelated
matters, instead of repeating these discussions at length. In that recent article, I argued that a
party should be entitled to discovery and disclosure of all materials reviewed by an adverse
retained expert witness and all communications in which the expert participated, including
communications with the attorney who retained her. Id. at 544. That article and the instant one
are shaped by a belief that the flaws in an expert's analysis will be exposed, if at all, only when
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The realities of testimony presented by retained expert witnesses support this
approach. The "opinion[s] and inference[s]"' of an expert witness usually are not
created in a vacuum where an unbiased specialist dispassionately studies
independently gathered, wholly neutral, and entirely relevant evidence and reaches
conclusions unaffected by her patrons. Instead, an attorney who has a very real
interest"' in the expert reaching a predetermined outcome chooses the expert,5" hires
the attorney who will conduct the cross-examination of the expert is given every reasonable
opportunity to acquire information that she can use to establish the problems with the expert's
analysis, including the retaining attorney's influence on that analysis.
In the instant Article, I argue for another process that would make the relationship between
the expert and the attorney who employs her less comfortable and render the expert's work
subject to more scrutiny by opposing counsel. This process is the direct contact by an attorney
of expert witnesses retained by her opponent, without concern that such contact might be
viewed as impermissible. My enthusiasm for this position results in part from my practice
experience. Because I knew that some viewed ex parte communications between attorneys and
adverse retained experts as unethical, I always chose not to engage in such contact, even though
there were several circumstances in which I believed that such contact might have assisted my
preparation for cross-examination of the expert and, therefore, enhanced both my client's
chances of success and the truth-seeking process. I therefore believe that removing the
suggestion that such contact is impermissible would have substantial benefits, because it would
remove a disincentive for such contact by trial attorneys who are aware of this suggestion and
are currently unwilling to risk sanction by making ex parte contact. In light of the recent
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that make it even more clear that ex parte
contact is permissible, see infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text, now is a particularly
good time to remove the taint from ex parte contact.
Those who are less troubled than I about the dollar-stoked loyalty of expert witnesses to the
attorneys who retain them and its effect on their testimony will find the arguments outlined here
unpersuasive, because these arguments are based in significant part upon skepticism about
experts and their relationships with their employers. Also, those who put less emphasis on the
cross-examination aspects of the adversary system than I and believe more than I do that
attorney work product must be zealously protected will be concerned about the possibility that
ex parte communications might invade the attorney's zone of privacy.
56. FED. R. EvID. 703.
57. See STEVEN LUBET, EXPERT TESTIMONY: A GUIDE FOR EXPERT WITNESSES AND THE
LAWYERS WHO EXAMINETIEM 171 (1998) ("After all, advocates typically retain experts with
one purpose in mind: to win the case.").
58. CHARLESW.WOLFRAM,MODERNLEGALETHICS § 12.4.6, at 652(1986) ("Lawyers are
expected to seek out experts whose testimony will favor their side.. . ."); Ellen E. Deason,
Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scien tific Positivism Meets Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L.
REv. 59, 93 (1998) ("[A]n expert selected by aparty [is] someone who will make the strongest
possible statement on the party's behalf .... "); Easton, supra note 23, at 492-94; John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 835 (1985)
("The more measured and impartial an expert is, the less likely he is to be used by either
side.").
An attorney who needs expert testimony to advance a proposition at trial generally can find
an expert to testify to that proposition. See, e.g., Chaulkexrel. Murphyv. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 808 F.2d 639,644 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting) ("'There is hardly anything, not
palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called "experts."' (quoting
Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965, 966 (Minn. 1899))); TV-3, Inc. v.
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her,59 channels selected information about the case to her,6 decides whether the
expert's conclusions are satisfactory enough to continue employing and payingher,6 '
makes the expert amember ofthe party's trial team,62 directs and sometimes alters the
expert's analysis," and decides whether she will testify at trial." These activities
Royal Ins. Co., 193 F.R.D. 490,492 (S.D. Miss. 2000) ("[O]nly the most naive of experienced
lawyers or judges could fail to realize that in our present legal culture money plus the proper
'marching orders' will get an 'expert' witness who will undertake to prove almost anything.');
Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89, 91
(1987) ("It is quite apparent that experts are readily available to present essentially frivolous
theories .... "); Mickus, supra note 48, at 792 n.87 ("Certain experts are willing to advocate,
in court, scientific conclusions that fly in the face of an entire body of scientific literature.");
Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482 (1986) ("An
expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous
.. "); Joel DeVore, The New Discovery Battle, OR. ST. B. BULL., Apr. 1999, at 15, 15
("'[Y]ou can hire a medical expert who will testify to almost anything' ...." (quoting Chris
Ludgate, Doctors for Sale, WiLAMETTE WK., Nov. 13, 1996)).
59. Easton, supra note 23, at 494.
60. LuBET,supra note 57, at 172-73; Easton, supra note 23, at 494-95; Mickus, supra note
48, at 791.
61. Easton, supra note 23, at496; Langbein,supia note 58, at 835 ("Moneychangeshands
upon the rendering of expertise, but the expert can run his meter only so long as his patron
litigator likes the tune.").
The power to influence the expert's opinion that the retaining attorney derives from her
ability to cut off the flow of fees to the expert is perhaps particularly significant when the
expert is one of the many persons who derives a substantial portion of her income from
providing expert testimony. As many courts and commentators have observed, it is not unusual
for "hired-gun" expert witnesses, see, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 12.4.6, at 652, to build
their careers and fortunes by offering to testify to whatever proposition an attorney needs to
"prove," regardless of its lack of foundation. See, e.g., Eymard v. Pan Am. World Airways (In
re Air Crash Disaster), 795 F.2d 1230,1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he professional expert is now
commonplace. That a person spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and
testifying is not a disqualification. But experts whose opinions are available to the highest
bidder have no place testifying in a court of law, before ajury. . .."); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1407 (D. Or. 1996) (finding that an expert's "well-traveled opinions
are no more than educated guesses dressed up in evening clothes"); In re Aluminum Phosphide
Antitrust Litig., 893 F. Supp. 1497, 1506-07 (D. Kan. 1995) ("Dr. Hoyt's analysis is driven by
a desire to enhance the measure of plaintiffs' damages, even at the expense of well-accepted
scientific principles and methodology."); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 740 F. Supp. 921, 924
(D.P.R. 1990) (quoting Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1234 (regarding experts who were "available to
the highest bidder")); REPORT OFTHETORTPOICY WORKING GROUPON THE CAUSES, EXTENT
AND PoLIcY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CuRRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AvAIABIuITY AND
AFFORDABuITY 35 (Feb. 1986) ("It has become all too common for 'experts' or 'studies' on
the fringes of or even well beyond the outer parameters of mainstream scientific or medical
views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from which conclusions may be drawn."),
quoted in Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the
Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 350,351 n.1 (1992).
62. Easton, supra note 23, at 497; Langbein, supra note 58, at 835; Mickus, supra note 48,
at 779.
63. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258,
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shape the testimony ultimately given at trial by the expert. 65 Therefore, the influence
of the trial team and its leader provide a need for additional information-gathering
devices for the adverse attorney, not a justification for further shielding the expert
witness from scrutiny. Cross-examination, after all, is the only realistic opportunity
for the jurors to learn about problems with the expert's testimony.' If the retaining
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2000) (observing that an attorney's consultation with her expert "may
... influence the expert's consideration of the issues in matters of substance as well as form");
Kennedy v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-Booneville, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 520, 521 (N.D. Miss. 1998)
(outlining an attorney's apparently successful effort to change an expert's opinion); Musselman
v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 201 (D. Md. 1997) (outlining an example of attorney guidance to
an expert); Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611, 619 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1999) ("Opinions
or instructions made by an attorney to his expert may include.., suggestions-perhaps strong
suggestions-on what conclusions should be drawn and in what terms.'); Applegate, supra
note 32, at 297 ("Practical guides for litigators emphasize that lawyers must... carefully
prepare experts... to minimize any doubts, uncertainties, or unfavorable views."); Easton,
supra note 23, at 497-99; Mickus, supra note 48, at 790 (recognizing attorneys' "overt or
covert suggestions about how the expert should structure his opinion"); Michael E. Plunkett,
Discoverability of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by Expert Witnesses: Have the 1993
Revisions to the Federal Rules ofCivil/Pocedure ChangedAnything?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 451,
482 (1996) ("Attorneys may seek to... redirect[ ] the expert's emphasis....").
The process by which an attorney directs a witness's testimony is sometimes referred to as
preparing, coaching, or even "horseshedding" the witness. See W. William Hodes, The
ProfessionalDuty toHorseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds oftheLaw, 30 Tax.
TECH L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1999). When conducted properly, witness coaching is not
prohibited. See Musselman, 176 F.R.D. at 201 ("[I]t is not improper for an attorney to assist
a retained expert in developing opinion testimony for trial.... ."); LUBET, supra note 57, at
173-74; Easton, supra note 23, at 502; Richard L. Marcus, ThePerilsofPrivilege: Waiver and
the Litigator, 84 MICH L. REv. 1605, 1645 (1986). Indeed, coaching of important witnesses,
including experts, is arguably a required practice for trial attorneys who must conduct a direct
examination of these witnesses. See Hodes, supra, at 1350; Marcus, supra, at 1645; Richard
H. Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 KY. L.J. 919, 954 & n.122 (1998-99).
Contrary to what trial-team-model advocates might suggest, the fact that coaching is common,
permitted, and perhaps even required does not somehow establish that an attorney should be
free to coach with no fear that a witness will discuss that coaching with opposing counsel.
Instead, an attorney's coaching ofawitness presents the possibility that the witness's testimony
will be influenced by that coaching. See Easton, supra note 23, at 502-04. If the truth-seeking
process is to work, the jurors who must evaluate a witness's testimony deserve to know when
it was influenced by the retaining attorney. Cf Hodes, supra, at 1354 ("[The] algebraic sum
of credibility plays out after the horseshedding has taken place, and we all are entitled to take
that into account and impose a large or a small discount on coached testimony, as we see fit."
(emphasis in original)). Because ex parte communications between the adverse attorney and
the witness create one way for the cross-examiner to make the jurors aware of this influence,
they should be allowed. Perhaps this is at least one reason why ex parte communications
between a future cross-examiner and a witness are allowed under Model Rule 4.2, except when
the witness is represented by counsel. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
64. Easton, supra note 23, at 499.
65. Id. at 499-504.
66. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 394 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Easton,
supra note 23, at 504, 505 n.130.
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attorney has created, changed, or in some way influenced the expert's testimony, the
cross-examining attorney should be given everyreasonable opportunity to illuminate
the retaining attorney's shaping of the testimony for the jurors who must evaluate it,67
including ex parte communications with the expertss
The modem litigation landscape is dominated by trials in which expert witnesses
for opposing parties claim similar expertise, but nonetheless testify to diametrically
opposed opinions based on that expertise.69 In many, if not most, of these trials,
where the question at hand can have only one correct answer, one of these experts is
testifying to an incorrect opinion.70 Ifjurors believe that incorrect opinion, they will
in all likelihood return an incorrect verdict.' The jurors who are required to
determine which of two experts to believe (or, perhaps more precisely, which of two
experts to disbelieve) deserve all information that can be reasonably presented by the
67. See .R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *4; Bama v. United States, No. 95 C
6552, 1997 WIL 417847, at *2 (N.D. I1. July 18, 1997); Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 395-96
(maintaining that the jury "has a right to know who is [really] testifying" (emphasis in
original)); Easton, supra note 23, at 504-08.
68. Mr. Hodes is one of the most prominent opponents of ex parte communications
between attorneys and adverse expert witnesses. See infra text accompanying note 126. At the
same time, he recognizes that when
sitting in a jury box [and in other situations], everyone is called upon to make
judgments about credibility. But that judgment must be based on the totality of
the clues that are available, both positive and negative, rather than the facile
assumption that everyone with an incentive to lie will actually lie.
Hodes, supra note 63, at 1353. On that score, he and I agree. Realistically, however, usually
it is the retaining attorney who will bring forth the "positive" information and the cross-
examining attorney who is responsible for bringing forth the "negative" information. As Mr.
Hodes seems to recognize, that information can reasonably include proofthat the witness is not
"disinterested," including evidence about the coaching of the witness. See id. at 1351-52. Ex
parte communications between the attorney and the expert witness can help the cross-
examining attorney establish that the expert is not disinterested. See infra notes 357-64 and
accompanying text. Therefore, they are a valuable potential source of the negative information
that the jury needs to balance against the positive information provided by the retaining
attorney when making required determinations about the witness's credibility.
69. WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 12.4.6, at 652 ("Lawyers are expected to seek out experts
whose testimony will favor their side, secure in the knowledge that their opponents will
probably find an opposing expert view."); Easton, supra note 23, at 509 & n.145.
There are instances where an expert's testimony is not countered by the testimony of an
expert for the opposing party, even though the opposing party disputes the expert's testimony.
Easton, supra note 23, at 506. Because cross-examination will be the only viable opportunity
for the jurors to learn about problems with the expert's testimony in such a case, it is perhaps
even more important to provide every reasonable opportunity for an effective cross-
examination in these circumstances.
70. See Easton, supra note 23, at 509-26.
Even when the question addressed by the experts is one on which there is arguably more
than one correct answer, see id. at 524-25, the jurors will ultimately be asked to determine
which of the two experts should not be believed, see id. at 526. Jurors who face the task of
making this difficult decision deserve all reasonably available information.
71. Seeid. at 516 &n.160.
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attorneys cross-examining the experts,72 including information acquired through ex
parte communications between a cross-examining attorney and an adverse expert.73
C. The Adverse Attorney's Perspective: The Expert
as Cross-Examination Foe
Because an expert witness has such "wide latitude"'74 and such overwhelming
potential influence,75 including the potential for causing the jurors to return an
incorrect verdict,76 the adverse attorney's cross-examination is even more critical than
the cross-examination of most fact witnesses.77 If an expert testifies persuasively on
72. See lIntermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 394; Easton, supra note 23, at504-08, 517-20,522-23.
Information that can help the cross-examining attorney establish the influence of the
retaining attorney over the expert witness can be particularly helpful to the jurors who must
evaluate the reliability of that expert's testimony. See Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638,
646 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting the importance of a party's opportunity to "determine the extent
to which the opinion of the expert may have been influenced by counsel" in order to prepare
foran effective cross-examination); Musselman v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194,201 (D. Md. 1997)
("[A]llowing the [retaining] attorney to effectively construct the retained expert's opinion
testimony to support the attorney's theory of the case, while blocking opposing counsel from
learning of, or exposing, this influence[,] ... would seriously undermine the integrity of the
truth finding process at trial."); Barna, 1997 WL 417847, at *2 ("[Ejxpert testimony [is]
another way in which counsel places his view of the case or the evidence in front of the jury.
The real danger is that . . . opposing counsel [is] left without a solid basis for cross-
examination.'); Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at395-96; Occulto v. AdamarofN.J., Inc., 125 F.R.D.
611,616 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[A]n expert who can be shown to have adopted the attorney's opinion
as his own stands less tall before the jury than an expert who has engaged in painstaking
inquiry and analysis before arriving at an opinion.'); Christine D. Bakeis, Selecting and
Handling Expert Witnesses in Litigation, FOR DEF., Jan. 1997, at 15, 19 ("[lIt can be very
effective to imply that the expert has tailored his or her testimony to fit the [opposing party's]
needs."). If ex parte communications are allowed, the jurors will often receive some
information about the attorney's influence over the expert, even when the expert decides not
to participate in ex parte communications. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
73. Although ex parte contact between the cross-examining attorney and the expert would
sometimes result in the attorney acquiring new information, see infra text accompanying notes
364-65, this will not always be the case, see infra notes 341-49 and accompanying text. Even
when the attorney initiating ex parte communications with the expert does not acquire new
information, however, the ex parte communications may provide the attorney with cross-
examination questions that will provide the jurors with information about the biases of the
witness that the jurors would otherwise not obtain. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying
text.
74. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993); accord Lamonds v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302,305 (W.D. Va. 1998) (noting that experts "are, in a sense,
privileged').
75. See, e.g., Kam v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Wrobleski v. Nora de
Lara, 727 A.2d 930, 933-34 (Md. 1999) ("Expert opinion testimony can be powerful
evidence.'); KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: ScIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1997).
76. See supra text accompanying note 71.
77. Cf. Johnson v. Grneinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 646 (D. Kan. 2000) (discussing a party's
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a critical issue during direct examination and survives cross-examination with her
credibility intact, the adverse attorney is well on her way to a losing verdict?8 Of
course, preparing for the cross-examination of a well-educated, persuasive, often
highly experienced witness is no easy task."
Given the importance and difficulty of an effective expert witness cross-
examination, it is not surprising that some trial attorneys are willing to take whatever
steps the limitations of professional responsibility allow to prepare for that cross-
examination."0 Indeed, one could argue that any attorney who fails to take ethical,
right "to a full and fair cross-examination of the expert witness'); Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at
394 ("[A]ssertive, probing, coherent, and well-informed cross-examination [is] essential to
equipping the trier of fact to judge the persuasive power and reliability of such testimony and
to determine which of competing expert views should be credited....); Wrobleski, 727 A.2d
at 933.
78. As one commentator has noted, trial attorneys "carefully prepare experts to ensure that
their testimony is comprehensible and to minimize any doubts, uncertainties, or unfavorable
views." Applegate, supra note 32, at 297. If the opposing counsel has done this job well and
also did a good job of selecting an expert in the first instance, an attorney who fails to cross-
examine the expert effectively faces a high probability of an adverse verdict.
79. See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963) ("[lit
needs no citation of authoriiy to say that an expert is the most difficult witness to cross-
examine, particularly if one is unaware until trial of the substance of his testimony.');
Wrobleski, 727 A.2d at 934.
80. For over thirty years, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
recognized the importance of gathering information to prepare for effective cross-examination
and impeachment of expert witnesses. In its notes regarding the 1970 amendments to Rule 26
that first provided for formal expert witness discovery, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
of the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Advisory
Committee") observed:
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation.
The lawyer even with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the
particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which he will
base his judgment on the stand .... Similarly, effective rebuttal requires advance
knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's notes (1970 amendments).
In like fashion, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized the need for
attorneys to arm themselves with as much information as they can to conduct an adequate
cross-examination. In defending the 1972 changes in Rule 702, which eliminated the
hypothetical question requirement for expert testimony and allowed an expert to testify about
her opinions and inferences "without first testifying to the underlying facts or data," FED. R.
EVmD. 705, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence stated:
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the
supporting data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he is under no compulsion
to bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer
assumes that the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for
effective cross-examination.
FED. R. EVIn. 705 advisory committee's notes (1972 amendments).
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence is not alone in its views
regarding the importance ofproviding attorneys access to the information they need to prepare
for expert witness cross-examination. Applegate, supra note 32, at 349 ('The more we accept
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reasonable, cost-effective steps to prepare for cross-examination is not giving her
client the representation she deserves."' Therefore, the boundaries of permissible
cross-examination preparation are a matter of substantial interest to trial attorneys.
In addition, the proper ethical boundaries of contact with adverse experts should
be of significant academic and systemic interest. Given the importance of expert
witness testimony and cross-examination in many trials, any unnecessary ethical
restrictions that limit the effectiveness of cross-examination undermine the
effectiveness of the judicial systeni. If, in Wigmore's well-worn words, cross-
examination "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth,"8' anything that unnecessarilylimits the effectiveness of the cross-
examination engine limits its ability to lead jurors to the truth."
To adopt another well-known phrase, a trial is designed to be a "search for the
truth. s" 5 If so, anything that interferes with the ability of the jurors to find the truth
the idea that scientific conclusions are not inevitable, the more important it is to know precisely
how experts reach their conclusions-only then can opponents effectively challenge them.").
81. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; infra note 202.
82. See Kam v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633,639 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (stating "full, effective cross
examination [of expert witnesses] is critical to the integrity of the truth-finding process");
Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493 (D. Colo. 1984); Emergency Care Dynamics v. Superior
.Court, 932 P.2d 297,300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
83. 2 JOHNH. WIGMORE, ATREATIsEONTHE SYSTEMOFEViDENCEINTRIAISATCOMMON
LAW 1697-98 (1904), quoted in FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN
LEGAL QUOTATIONS 103 (1993). Wigmore went on to assert that "cross-examination, not trial
by jury, is the great and permanent contribution of the Anglo-American system of law to
improved methods of trial-procedure." Id.
84. See Applegate, supra note 32, at 349. "Whatever its faults, cross-examination is the
main tool for achieving the accuracy goals of the advocacy system. Accordingly, there is no
sound reason to protect factual information provided to testifying experts from early and
complete disclosure." Id.
85. See Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 90 (D.S.C. 1991); see also, e.g., Musselman v.
Phillips, 176.F.R.D. 194, 201 (D. Md. 1997) (noting "the integrity ofthe truth finding process
at trial'); Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611, 619 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1999) (discussing
"the integrity and reliability of the truth finding process in a case"); Reilley v. Keswani, 350
A.2d 74, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("Fundamental to, if not the sole purpose of, the
administration of our system ofjustice is the search for truth."); DaisyHurst FloydA "Delicate
andDifficult Task": Balancing the Competing Interests ofFederal Rule ofEvidence 612, the
WorkProduct Doctrine, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 101, 101 (1996).
The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves echo the view that a trial is a truth-seeking
mechanism. Rule 102 states that the rules should be applied "to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EviD. 102. Another Rule tells judges
to manage the presentation of evidence "so as to ... make the interrogation and presentation
effective for the ascertainment of the truth." FED. R. EVD. 611.
Although statements about the truth-seeking goal of trials are common, they are not
universally accepted. Some commentators believe that trials are more properly characterized
as vehicles for assertion of individual rights than as searches for truth. Applegate, supra note
32, at 324-26. It could also be argued that a trial cannot hope to ascertain the entire truth about
a past event. See Hodes, supra note 63, at 1360 (noting that the "'courtroom truth' need not
match every chapter and every verse of objective truth"). Those who do not share the belief that
a trial is or should be a search for the truth may not find the arguments in this Article
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detracts from the fundamental purpose of the trial. Such hindrances should be
tolerated only if they are needed to protect another fundamental value of the justice
system. In other words, the search for truth is most effective when all parties and their
attorneys are free to use reasonable means to attempt to acquire information for trial,
including information that will lead to forceful impeachment of expert testimony.8 6
While formal discovery is one way to gather information about an expert who has
been retained and identified as a likely trial witness, it has significant limitations.
Chief among these limitations is the involvement of the other attorney.88 An attorney
persuasive, because these arguments stem from a belief that the civil justice system should
enhance the truth-seeking process.
On the other hand, even those whose view of the trial is based more upon the adversaries'
rights than upon the correctness ofthe outcome might find some value in the arguments pressed
here. If a chief concern in a trial is the opportunity of each party to present her best argument,
that concern can be met, with respect to cross-examination of expert testimony, only when the
cross-examiner is given everyreasonable opportunity to acquire information that will make her
cross-examination effective. See id. (observing that each party is responsible for bringing forth
evidence that weakens the case made by the opposing party); infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
86. See Kaveney v. Murphy, 97 F. Supp. 2d 88, 95 (D. Mass. 2000) (barring ex parte
communication with witnesses would frustrate the search for truth); Frey v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ex parte interviews with witnesses "will
aid in the search for truth"); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30,36 (Mich. 1991) (similar); cf.
Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing criminal conviction
due to prosecutor's advice to witnesses that they should avoid speaking to defense counsel
outside the prosecutor's presence). According to one circuit court, the "quest [for truth] will
more often be successful if both sides have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who
have the information from which the truth may be determined." Id.
87. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(aX2) advisory committee's note (1993 amendments)
(noting that disclosure requirements are designed to give "opposing parties... a reasonable
opportunityto prepare for effective cross examination"); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66,
70 (9th Cir. 1968); Musselman, 176 F.R.D. at 200; Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 41
F.R.D. 234, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Oneida, 43 Fed. Cl. at 618-19.
88. Cf. Kaveney, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (formal discovery is an "inadequate substitute" for
ex parte interviews, because the presence of opposing counsel will influence the witness's
responses); Felder, 139 F.R.D. at 90 (ex parte interviews would allow aparty to explore factual
issues "without [the opposing party] unnecessarily intruding into the process and exerting
undue pressure upon witnesses to censor their speech"); David L. Lillehaug, Ex Parte
Interviews with "Two-Hatted" Witnesses, 21 TORT&INS. L.J. 441,444-45 (1986) ("[1]nformal
discovery is easier [than formal discovery and] is conducive to spontaneity and candor....
Also, it promotes fairness because the party not directly connected to the witness has, at least
theoretically, an equal chance to speak with the witness."); Lubet, supra note 25, at 480
("Discoveryrequeststo experts are channeled through retaining counsel."); BruceP. McMoran,
ExParte Contacts, in 28THANNUALINsTITU oN EMPLoYMENT LAw 989, 991 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-615, 1999) (noting that an attorney might
prefer ex parte interviews of fact witnesses over depositions because the lawyer "may also
avoid the chilling effect the presence of opposing counsel may have on the witness"); Feighny,
supra note 25, at 38 ("[I]nterviews [of doctors] are conducive to more candor and spontaneity
than depositions .... ').
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prepares answers to interrogatories about the experte9 and responses to requests for
production relating to the expert ° An attorney almost always "assists" in the
preparation of expert witness reports.9 An attorney prepares the witness for her
deposition and then attends and "defends" the deposition.93 In performing these
89. Graham, supra note 1, at 174 (quoting an attorney who stated that expert witness
interrogatory answers are "drafted by opposing counsel" to "conceal more than they disclose");
Hayes & Ryder, supra note 1, at 1123 & n.1 16, 1138 (noting that the evasive expert witness
interrogatory answers were often written in the language of lawyers, rather than experts);
Robert Matthew Lovein, Note, A Practitioner's Guide: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)-Automatic Disclosure, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 258 (1996) ("Prior to the 1993
amendments, information concerning expert witnesses and their opinions [was] made available
through the use of interrogatories. However, the information obtained through interrogatories
was consistently vague ... "); c. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil
Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (1978)
("There are many standard devices used by litigators to resist the disclosure of information and
to mislead the opponent through theirresponses to interrogatories, requests foradmissions, and
demands for documents.").
90. See Brazil, supra note 89, at 1323-25; Lubet, supra note 25, at 481.
91. See Hayes & Ryder, supra note 1, at 1138 ("[E]vasiveness is encountered in the [pre-
1993] discovery of expert reports. Expert reports often progress through a series of changes by
the expert and the attorney. Therefore, there is an obvious temptation to purge the report of any
information that may be unfavorable to the client's case."); cf. Saul Nirenberg, Getting the
Most Out of Your Expert Witness, in 2 SECUTRES ARBrrRATION 49, 53 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 782, 1992) (advising attorneys to have expert witness
reports "tailored" to their presentations).
Attomeyparticipation in the preparation of an expert's report is permissible. The Advisory
Committee, which promulgated the 1993 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendments
requiring expert witness reports, stated, "Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does not preclude counsel from
providing assistance to experts in preparing the reports, and indeed, with experts such as
automobile mechanics, this assistance may be needed." FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(2) advisory
committee's note (1993 amendments).
92. In an observation that still rings true, one scholar noted:
Aggressive litigators can also limit and distort the flow of information during
discovery through the manner in which they prepare their clients and witnesses
to be deposed. The adversarial objective of attorneys whose clients or witnesses
are being deposed is to limit to the greatest extent possible the information
divulged.
Brazil, supra note 89, at 1330-31.
93. See Kaveney, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (the presence of opposing counsel at depositions
inhibits the attorney's open discussion with the witness); John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil
Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REv. 505, 525 (2000) (listing techniques used by
attorneys at depositions to limit the information acquired by the attorney taking the deposition,
including instructing the witness not to answer questions and "coaching witnesses by making
as extensive 'speaking objections' as the attorney defending the deposition "can get away
with'); Brazil, supra note 89, at 1331 (discussing the "many... devices" used by counsel "to
regulate and restrict the evidence their client or witness provides during deposition"); Lubet,
supra note 25, at 481-85 (discussing the efforts of retaining counsel at depositions of expert
witnesses); cf A. Darby Dickerson, The Law andEthics of CivilDepositions, 57 MD. L. REV.
273 (1998) (discussing several tactics employed by attorneys at depositions, including tactics
employed byattorneys defending depositions who seekto limit the information received by the
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tasks, the attorney will often do everything she ethically can do to limit the amount
of information that flows to her opponent' 4 She will be especially attentive to
anything that might be used to successfully impeach the expert on cross-
examination.95 Formal discovery is also quite expensive," because it requires
deposing attorney).
94. See Kaveney, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (suggesting that "any lawyer" will "want to control
the flow of information" to her opponent); c. Brazil, supra note 89, at 1299 ("Minimal
reflection reveals a fundamental antagonism between the [formal discovery system's] goal of
truth through disclosure and the protective and competitive impulses that are at the center of
the traditional adversary system of dispute resolution.'); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing? ",46 HASTiNGS
L.J. 679, 699-700 (1995) ("Among the more commonly mentioned activities used to resist
legitimate discovery are refusing to provide information, hiding information, raising frivolous
privilege claims, disingenuously construing discovery requests narrowly, destroying
documents, assisting in perjury, coaching witnesses to avoid disclosing information, and
providing deliberatelyevasive answers to discovery requests."); Kathleen Waits, WorkProduct
Protection for Witness Statements: Time for Abolition, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 305, 339 (stating
"the adversary system is a lousy method of information development"); infra note 356.
Professor Beckerman enumerated several of the techniques used by lawyers to limit the
information disclosed in response to discovery requests:
Proficient advocates... minimiz[e] information and admissions obtained by
or given to the adversary. Lawyers endeavor to achieve this end in many ways
including: ... asserting all possible objections in response to adversaries'
requests, including those of irrelevance, excessive scope and undue burden;
construing all of the opponents' requests narrowly and excluding everything not
directlyresponsive to them; asserting on the client's behalfall available privileges
as excuses for non-production of documents, failure to answer interrogatories or
instructions notto answerquestions on depositions; and seeking protective orders
to validate any decisions not to answer or produce. Unscrupulous lawyers go
further, crossing into rule violations and illegal behaviors. Examples are. .. "dirty
tricks" such as scrambling the order of documents produced for inspection and
copying and hiding critical documents in unrelated files, to say nothing of
downright falsification of discovery responses, or suppression or destruction of
relevant evidence.
Beckerman, supra note 93, at 525.
The Advisory Committee, which is responsible for reviewing and proposing amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, observed a phenomenon well known to litigating
attorneys when it noted that information provided in formal discovery before 1993 "was
frequently... sketchy and vague." FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's notes (1993
amendments).
95. See Hayes & Ryder, supra note 1, at 1138 (discussing the efforts of attorneys to remove
potentially unfavorable information from expert reports); Waits, supra note 94, at 339
("[W]hen assembling information, advocates do not merely attempt to expose all the evidence
which is good for their side; they work equally hard to suppress negative information.").
96. In summarizing the comments on the proposed amendments to Rule 26 that were
ultimately adopted in 2000, the Advisory Committee said:
[D]iscovery was often thought to be too expensive, and concerns about undue
expense were expressed by both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys. The
Committee learned that the cost ofdiscoveryrepresents approximately50% ofthe
litigation costs in all cases, and as much as 90% of the litigation costs in the cases
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somewhat formalized drafting of requests9' and, in many instances, motions to
compel production and related legal research, negotiations, and brief writing.9" In
addition, substantial time may pass between the request for information and the
acquisition of that information." Finally, when the court's discovery deadline has
passed, formal discovery is probably not even an option for an attorney who seeks
information relating to an expert."°
As a result of these and other limitations of formal discovery, trial attorneys 0'
where discovery is actively employed.
H.R. Doc. No. 106-228, at 53 (2000); cf. Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience:
Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 809
(1991) ("The prevalent critique of civil discovery under the federal rules is that it is inefficient,
wasteful, costly, and subject to precisely the kind of gamesmanship that the drafters of the rules
sought to eliminate.").
Formal discovery is often a more expensive means to acquire information than attorney-
initiated independent efforts to gather information. See Frey v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32,36 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ex parte interviews are more viable forparties with
limited resources than "costly discovery procedures"); Companion, supra note 25, at 38 (citing
an unpublished state court decision where the court "found that requiring all contact be made
by formal discovery methods would increase substantially the costs of litigation"); Feighny,
supra note 25, at 38; Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 444; McMoran, supra note 88, at 995 (noting
that ex parte interviews with fact witnesses are often "easier and more economical" than formal
discovery); C. Evan Stewart, General Thoughts to Inform a Party's Deposition Strategy, in
TAKING AND DEFENDING DEPosroiNs IN COMMERCIAL CASES 23, 26 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-61 1, 1999) ("Depositions, especially these days, are
an extremely costly and often inefficient way of getting information .. . .).
97. Interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions must be drafted
and served upon parties, see FED. R. Civ. P. 33,34,36, or, in some instances, upon nonparties,
see FED. R. Cxv. P. 34(c), 45.
Depositions require the drafting and service of a formal notice, see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b),
and the preparation of either written questions, see FED. R. Civ. P. 31, or, more commonly, an
outline of questions to be asked by the attorney orally at the deposition, see FED. P. Civ. P.
30(c). Depositions may also entail other expenses, including the fees of a court reporter or
other officer, see FED. R. CrV. P. 28, travel or telephone expenses, see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7),
subpoena expenses and witness fees for nonparty witnesses, see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(g)(2), 45,
and considerable attorneys' fees for preparation and participation in the deposition. See
Graham, supra note 1, at 186.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (outlining procedures for motions to compel discovery); Lubet,
supra note 25, at 481 (noting that discovery requests can lead to objections and efforts to quash
subpoenas); Mullenix, supra note 96, at 803 (quoting the observation of the Advisory
Committee Reporter's observation that "[d]iscovery practice has become encumbered with
excess motion practice").
99. The Federal Rules give parties thirty days to respond to interrogatories, requests for
admissions, and requests for production. FED. R. CIv. P. 33(b)(3), 34(b), 36(a). The parties can
agree to extend this time period. FED. R. CIrv. P. 29, 33(b)(3), 34(b), 36(a). Even if there is no
such agreement, the court can lengthen the time for discovery responses. FED. R. Crv. P.
33(b)(3), 34(b), 36(a).
100. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
101. Of course, interviews of experts and other witnesses will often be conducted not by
attorneys themselves, but by legal assistants or investigators working for attorneys. See
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sometimes believe it is in the best interest of their clients 0 2 for the attorneys to
contact adverse experts directly. 3 In almost all circumstances, the attorney's goal in
contacting an expert (or a fact witness), like her aim in conducting formal discovery
regarding an expert (or a fact witness),"° is the acquisition of information that will
help her to learn more about the witness's testimony, so she can evaluate the case for
settlement 5 or better prepare for a cross-examination of the witness that will limit
the impact of the witness's testimony."° Given the difficulties confronting attorneys
McMoran, supra note 88, at 991. If an attorney conducts an interview, the attorney runs the
risk of becoming a witness in the case. If a person other than the trial attorney conducts or at
least observes the interview, that person can testify, if necessary, regarding statements made
by the witness. One commentator observed:
A problem that may be encountered when a lawyer interviews any potential
witness is the avoidance ofthe necessity for the lawyer-interviewer to appear later
as a witness in order to impeach the witness if the witness changes stories in trial
testimony. The major complication is the rule that a lawyer may not conduct a
trial if the lawyer should be called as a witness .... In order to avoid the problem,
a sound practice is to conduct interviews (at least with hostile or evasive
witnesses) through an investigator or with a third person present who can be
called as an impeachment witness at trial.
WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 12.4, at 646.
The fact that an investigator or legal assistant conducts an interview does not absolve the
attorney of ethical restrictions on the interview. As the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibilitynoted with respect to the restrictions upon contact with represented
parties, "Whether in a civil or criminal matter, if the investigator acts as the lawyer's 'alter-
ego,' the lawyer is ethically responsible for the investigator's conduct." ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-
1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, 1001:290, :304. The same reasoning would presumably
apply to ethical restrictions upon contact with expert witnesses, because the Model Rules make
an attorney responsible for conduct of subordinates acting within the attorney's direction.
MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 5.3, discussed in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics
Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:303-:304; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5(2) & cmt. f(2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
102. Cf. David S. Day, Expert Discovery Under FederalRule 26(b)(4): An Empirical Study
in South Dakota, 31 S.D. L. REV. 40,56 (1985) (stating that "in order to advance the interests
of clients, attorneys will" use informal discovery to acquire information about expert
witnesses).
103. See Lubet, supra note 25, at 480; cf. Companion, supra note 25, at 37 (asserting that
an ex parte interview can be "[t]he most efficient and cost effective method of learning about
a witness's intended testimony"); Garrett Hodes, Ex Pare Contacts with Organizational
Employees in Missouri, J. Mo. B., MarJApr. 1998, at 83, 87 ("The plaintiff's attorney must be
ableto investigate his case and minimize the costs and expenses oflitigation. ... '); McMoran,
supra note 88, at 991 ("Many lawyers prefer informal ex parte interviews [of fact witnesses]
to depositions.").
104. See infra note 186.
105. See Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 444.
106. There are several ways in which direct communications with an adverse expert witness
could help an attorney prepare to cross-examine the expert. First, by acquiring information
about a matter that might be in issue, the attorney could avoid asking questions that have
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in preparing for cross-examination of experts, reasonable efforts to gather
information for this task, including ex parte contact, should not seem unusual and
should not be prohibited.
Those responsible for drafting, interpreting, and applying the professional
responsibility rules respect the goal of information gathering, as well as the resultant
benefits to the adversarial truth-seeking system that result from effective cross-
examinations, enough to allow ex parte contact with unrepresented fact witnesses,
even when they are very loyal to a represented party. 7 In fact, adverse attorney
contact with unrepresented, but loyal, fact witnesses is valued so highly that the
attorney for the client to whom a fact witness is loyal is not allowed to interfere with
her opponent's opportunity to communicate ex parte by advising the witness not to
engage in such communications, except in limited circumstances.'0° The same
principles should control when the witness is an unrepresented, but highly loyal,
expert. 109
]II. THE LAW OF Ex PARTE CONTACT
Although no Model Rules provision prohibits ex parte contact with adverse
retained experts, several couits and other professional responsibility authorities have
attempted to stretch inapplicable provisions to ban such contact. Examined carefully,
none of these provisions can legitimately be the basis for such a ban. Professional
responsibility law does not, and should not, ban ex parte contact.
A. The ABA Model Rules: No Prohibition
of Ex Parte Communications
An attorney reviewing the Model Rules would presumably conclude that ex parte
contact with adverse, retained expert witnesses is permissible. One of the Model
Rules deals explicitly with persons that an attorney may not contact without the
consent of opposing counsel. Model Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte contact with persons
who are represented by counsel,"0 but it does not prohibit contact with retained
answers that had been unknown to her. See supra text accompanying note 2. After discussing
the matter with the expert, the attorney could decide to either not ask certain questions and
thereby not dispute certain issues or to structure her questions about an issue that she does
dispute in a way that is helpful to her client. In addition, the attorney may acquire information
that will help her to impeach the expert by creating doubt about the validity of her analysis. The
attorney might also acquire information that will help her to establish that the attorney retaining
the expert has exerted too much influence over the expert's work.
Even if the expert witness refuses to communicate with the adverse attorney, the attorney
may be able to use her attempts to communicate ex parte to establish the retaining attorney's
influence over the expert. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
109. See infra Part III.B.3.b.
110. Model Rule 4.2 states, "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by
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law to do so." MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2.
This Model Rules provision was preceded byDR 7-104(A)(1) of the ABA's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2, Model Code
Comparison. These two provisions are "substantially identical," except that the Model Rule
provision refers to a "person" represented by a lawyer, while the Model Code provision
referred to a "party" represented by a lawyer. Id. But see Hellman, supra note 6, at 351-59
(noting the significance ofthe difference between "person" and "party" in some circumstances).
In the civil litigation context that is the subject of this Article, there is often little or no practical
difference between the Model Code's reference to a represented party and the Model Rule's
reference to a represented person. In litigation, although it is certainly possible for nonparty
witnesses, including experts, to be represented regarding the case that is the subject of the
litigation, this is rather unusual. Most represented persons in civil cases are parties. In the
relatively unusual circumstance where a retained expert witness is herself represented by an
attorney, an attorney representing one of the parties to the underlying case would be required
to acquire the consent of the expert's attorney, but Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) still
would not require the consent of the attorney retaining the expert, because that attorney would
not be the one representing the ekpert. See infra note 115.
Every state has adopted some form of Model Rule 4.2 or DR 7-104, and no state has added
a provision prohibiting contact with adverse expert witnesses. See ALA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1997); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); AIZ. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT ER4.2 (1994); ARK. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); CAL RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 2-100 (1999); COLO. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); CONN.
RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (2000); DEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); D.C.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2 (1999);
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2001); HAW. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
(2000); IDAHO RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); ILL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.2 (2000); IND. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); IOWA CODE OF PROF'L
REoNsimirTYDR7-104 (2000); KAN. RUL sOFPROF'LCoNDuTR. 4.2 (1999); Ky. RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1998); LA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1997); ME. CODE
OFPROF'L RESPONSJBnILIYR. 3.6(f) (1999); MD. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000);
MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); MicH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2
(1998); MINN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.2 (1999); MO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2 (2000); MONT. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCTR. 4.2 (2000); NEB. CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBILITYDR 7-104 (2000); NEV. SUP.
CT. R. 182; N.H. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.2 (1998); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-402 (2000); N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSMIBITYDR7-104 (1999); N.C. RULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1999); N.D.RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); OHIO CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBMY DR 7-104 (2000);
OKLA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1998); Op. CODE OF PROF'LREsPONSiBrYDR 7-
104 (2000); PA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1998); R.I. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR.
4.2 (1998); S.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1998); S.D. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT
R. 4.2 (1999); TENN. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBmrY DR 7-104 (2000); TEX. RULES OF
PROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.02 (1998); UTAH RULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 4.2 (1999); VT. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1999); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000); WASH.
RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1998); W. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1998);
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:4.2 (2000); Wyo. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1997).
The Ethics 2000 Connission that proposed possible changes in the Model Rules suggested
changing the last phrase in Model Rule 4.2 from the current "or is authorized by law to do so"
to "or is authorized to do so by law or a court order." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.2 (Final Draft Nov. 2000), http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rule42.html [hereinafter MODEL
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expert witnesses.' Indeed, neither Model Rule 4.2' nor any other Model
Rules provision... prohibits contact with nonparty witnesses.' 4 In most
circumstances, expert witnesses are working with and for attorneys, but
they are not parties who are represented by attorneys." 5 Therefore, as long as
the expert is not a represented party,"6 the Model Rules do not contain any
RULES (Final Draft)].
111. With one exception, the Model Rules do not distinguish between fact and expert
witnesses. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993),
reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions,supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208
("No Model Rule... explicitly treats expert witnesses differently from fact witnesses.").
The one provision of the Model Rules that does result in a distinction between the treatment
of experts and the treatment of fact witnesses is Model Rule 3.4(b), which provides that a
lawyer cannot offer "an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law." MODEL RULEs,
supra note 8, R. 3.4(b). State law generally bans payments other than standard appearance fees
and expenses for fact witnesses, but experts can receive more substantial fees, often paid on an
hourly basis, as long as the fees are not contingent upon the outcome of a case. See id. R. 3.4
cmt. [3]; J. Anthony McLain, Payment of E&pert and Lay Witnesses, ALA. LAW., Jan. 1998, at
55; Curtright C. Truitt, The Rising Cost of Discovery fro: Expert Witnesses: Problems and
Solutions, FLA. BJ., Mar. 2000, at 89, 90.
112. See ABA Comn. on Ethics and, Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993),
reprinted in ABA/BNAManual, 1991-1995 EthicsOpinions,supranote 11, at 1001:207, :208-
:209 ("Rule 4.2 only prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a party who is represented
by another lawyer in the matter without consent. No Model Rule extends this protection to
witnesses....').
113. The recent Restatement similarly does not prohibit contact with expert witnesses,
except when they are represented by counsel. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, § 99. In
relevant part, the Restatement provides, "A lawyer representing a client in a matter may not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a nonclient whom the lawyer knows
to be represented in the matter by another lawyer or with a representative of an organizational
nonclient so represented as defined in § 100. .. ." Id. § 99(l).
114. Courts and other ethics authorities haverepeatedly found that ex parte communications
with fact witnesses are permissible. See, e.g., United States er rel. O'Keefe v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 961 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (E.D. Mo. 1997), affid, 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir.
1998); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Private interviews by attorneys
have been recognized as a 'time-honored' method for conducting discovery.'); McKitty v. Bd.
of Educ., Nyack Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 86 Civ. 3176 (PKL), 1987 WL 28791, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987); Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Md. Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36, 40 (D.
Mass. 1987) (noting that even a "critical" witness may be interviewed ex parte); Trans-World
Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 35
(Mich. 1991) (referring to ex parte interviews as "routine practice"); Flamma v. Atlantic City
Fire Dep't, 573 A.2d 158,161 (N.J. 1990); EthicsDigest, PA.LAw., Sept. 1994, at 10, 94-48;
see also Hodes, supra note 103, at 87 (stating that fact witnesses can be contacted ex parte);
Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 446; McMoran, supra note 88, at 995, 998.
115. See Lubet, supra note 25, at 485 ("Retaining counsel is not the [expert] witness's
lawyer.... Since the expert is not a party to the case, the expert is not represented by either of
the attorneys.').
116. If the witness is both an expert and an employee of the opposing party, Rule 4.2 may
treat her as a represented party and therefore prohibit an attorney from contacting her without
the consent of the opposing party's counsel. Ex parte contact is not allowed when the contacted
employee is a manager, agent, or a member of the group that controls or is able to bind the
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represented party. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2 crnt. [4]. The comment states:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by alawyer
for another person or entity concerning the matter in representation with persons
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any
other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose
statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
Id.; see also O7Keefe, 961 F. Supp. at 1292 (opposing counsel cannot contact employees
"whose acts or omissions could be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil liability");
McKitty, 1987 WL 28791, at *1-*4; Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994)
(attorney disqualified for obtaining sworn statements from managers for potentially adverse
corporation); Dent v. Kaufman, 406 S.E.2d 68, 72 (W. Va. 1991) (allowing nonmanagerial
employees to be informally interviewed); Mo. Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op.
960085 (1997), summarized in [Manual] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
1101:5227 (2000) [hereinafter ABA/BNA Manual]; Hodes, supra note 103, at 87. The Ethics
2000 Commission has proposed the following change to the language in the relevant comment
to Model Rule 4.2:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with
a constituent ofthe organization who supervises, directs orregularly consults with
the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the
organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability.
MODELRULES (Final Draft), supra note 110, R. 4.2 cmL [7], http://www.abanet.orgfcpr/e2k-
rule42.html.
If the witness is a former employee of the opposing party, rather than a current employee,
the permissibility of ex parte contact is unclear. Amarin, 116 F.R.D. at 39. Some ethics
authorities have determined that restrictions on contact with managers, agents, and control
group members are essentially the same for former and current employees. Kan. Bar Ass'n
Ethics/AdvisoryServs. Comm., Op. 92-07 (1992),discussedin ABA/BNA Manual 1991-1995
Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:3803; Mo. ChiefDisciplinary Counsel, Informal Op.
960085 (1997), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, supra, at 1101:5227; Mo. Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op. 960099 (1997), summarized in ABA/BNAManual,supra,
at 1101:5227; S.C. Bar Ethics AdvisoryComm., Op. 97-36 (1997),summarizedin ABA/BNA
Manual, supra, at 1101:7906; S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 92-31 (1992), discussed
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7911. However,
other ethics authorities have reached the opposite determination. In their view, once a person
leaves the employment of a party, any restrictions related to her former status as an employee
end and attorneys are free to contact her to discuss nonprivileged matters. Valassis v.
Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118 (E.D. Mich. 1992); West Virginiaex rel. Charleston AreaMed. Ctr.
v. Zakaib, 437 S.E.2d 759, 763 (W. Va. 1993) (finding that former employees are
distinguishable from current employees, because former employees cannot bind the corporation
with their statements); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 88-3 (1988), summarized in
[1986-1990 Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:1303 (1991)
[hereinafter ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions]; Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of
Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 96-1 (1996), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual,
supra, at 1101:6851; Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1670 (1996),
summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, supra, at 1101:8707; see also Hodes, supra note 103, at
86-87 (discussing ex parte contact with former employees). Under the comment to Model Rule
4.2 proposed by the Ethics 2000 Commission, attorneys would be allowed to communicate ex
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provision that expressly prohibits an adverse attorney from contacting her.'1 7
B. Bans on Ex Parte Communications: Flawed Reasoning
Despite the absence of any such prohibition, a United States Court of Appeals,""
parte with former agents and employees. MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 110, R. 4.2
cmt. [7] ("Consent of the organization's lawyer is not required for communication with a
former constituent."), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule42.html; see also RESTATEMENT,
supra note 101, §§ 99, 100; Sherman L. Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client
Privilege and the No-ContactRule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739,770-81 (1997) (discussing
the Restatement and related subjects).
Ethics authorities are also split regarding whether attorneys can contact employees of
government agencies. There is some support for the proposition that government agency
employees can be contacted ex parte, because citizens have the right to petition their
government. Ky. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 332 (1988), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual,
1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra, at 901:3905 (attomeyrepresenting government agencymay
not impede opposing counsel's efforts to contact agency employees). Other ethics authorities
have opined that restrictions upon contact with a represented party's managers, control-group
members, and agents apply to represented government agencies. ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-408 (1997), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, supra, at
1101:139, :143; cf Ass'n ofthe Bar of the City ofN. Y. Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 1988-8 (1988) (opining that attorneymust notify opposing agency's attorney and
provide her with copies when submitting comments to head of agency), discussed in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra, at 901:6409. For discourse regarding
contact with government employees, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, §§ 99, 101; ABA
Comm on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Foril Op. 97-408 (1997); Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1991-4 (1991), discussed in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:6401-02.
117. John Freeman, ExParte Contacts with Potential Witnesses, S.C. LAW., Mar./Apr. 1997,
at 11 ("No express ethical rule prohibits ex parte contact with the other side's expert witness.');
cf Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 33, 42 (6th Cir. 1979) ("[Attorney malpractice defendant]
Tomlin did not even interview Col. Dawson, claiming it would be unethical for him to
interview defendant's expert witness. We see nothing unethical for a lawyer to interview a state
police officer.').
118. On three occasions, three-judge panels of the Ninth Circuit have held that ex parte
contact with an adverse expert is impermissible. Two of these opinions remain final decisions.
Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298,302 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell Indus. v. MIV Gemini,
619 F.2d 24,27(9th Cir. 1980). The third decision was withdrawn after it was initially entered,
upon the panel's determination that the district court order appealed from was not a final
judgment and therefore not subject to appellate review. Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand
Hotel-Las Vegas, Inc., 765 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawing 748 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir.
1984); cf. Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *1 & n.1
(summarizing original Ninth Circuit opinion in MGM Grand).
Another circuit reached a similarresult in a case involving an expert that had been identified
as a"probable witness." Durflingerv. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984). However,
the Tenth Circuit's holding rested upon a finding that, despite a party's listing of the expert as
a probable witness, the expert was a nontestifying consultant for purposes of Rule 26. See id.
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit case probably should be considered a "consultant only" decision
that is outside the scope of this Article. See supra note 25.
A third circuit indicated that it was "troubled" by ex parte contact. Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer
[Vol. 76:647
CAN WE TALK?
a state supreme court,1 9 two state appellate courts,1 20 and two state bar 2' ethics
committees' " have determined that any attempt to contact experts retained by the
opposing party outside of formal discovery is improper." In addition, no less an
ethics authority"2 than the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility has suggested that, in some circumstances, these determinations are
correct."2  Two prqminent legal ethics scholars concurred in their leading
L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1996).
119. In re Firestorm, 916 P.2d 411, 419 (Wash. 1996) (holding that attorney's ex parte
interview with expert who consulted with opposing counsel was impermissible, but reversing
sanction of disqualification of counsel and remanding to trial court for determination of an
appropriate remedy).
120. Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693, 699 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 607, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
121. Most state bar associations, and even some local bar associations, have ethics
committees that are responsible for issuing advisory opinions concerning ethical issues. See
TedFinman &Theodore Schneyer, TheRole ofBarAssociation Ethics Opinions in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 UCLAL. REV. 67,69 n.4 (1981) (explaining the work of state and local bar
ethics committees); Hellman, supra note 6, at 324-25.
122. Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273; Or. State Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics
Opinions, supra note 116, at901:7106; see also Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op.
96-6 (1996) (finding that it is acceptable for an attorney to write an adverse expert a letter
outlining his client's position, as long as the attorney did not seek information from the expert),
summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 1101:2025.
The Oregon committee initially determined, categorically, that ex parte contact with adverse
experts in all civil cases was impermissible. See Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530
(1990); accord Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 1991-118 (1991),
superceded by Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132 (1992). Two years
later, the Oregon committee revised and refined this position by stating that ex parte contact
was impermissible in federal civil cases, but not in state civil cases. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 3-4 (1992), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995
Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; accord Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comr.,
Formal Op. 1998-154 (1998), 1998 WL 717729, at *1-*2 (ex parte contact allowed in state
worker's compensation case, but not allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); see
also infra note 219.
123. Lubet, supra note 25, at 473, 480 ("[T]he majority view is that such contacts are
prohibited in the case of... testifying experts.").
124. Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121, at 71 ("The country's most important ethics
committee is the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. .. ");
Hellman, supra note 6, at 325 ("Because most states' ethics rules are derived from an ABA-
promulgated document, either the Model Rules or the Model Code, state ethics authorities
frequently rely on the ABA Ethics Committee's construction of the rules.").
125. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993),
reprintedin ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995"Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :209.
At least one state ethics authority has reached a conclusion similar to that of the ABA
committee. See Mo. Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op. 960286 (1997), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 1101:5235.
In their important article regarding the work ofthe ABA committee, Professors Ted Finman
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professional responsibility handbook.'"
Although these determinations are not universally accepted,"V their existence is
and Theodore Schneyer bemoan the lack of scholarly criticism of the committee's opinions and
the committee's resultant lack of accountability for rendering opinions inconsistent with the
ethics rules it is charged with interpreting. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121, at 150,
discussed in Hellman, supra note 6, at 334. In a small way, this Article attempts to respond to
this challenge by highlighting an ABA committee opinion that misconstrues the Model Rules.
Because it also critiques the opinions of state bar ethics committees, it also responds in a small
way to the observation by Professors Finman and Schneyer that the work of all ethics
committees has been "largelyneglected" by scholars. See Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121,
at 70-71.
126. See I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WLLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.4:402, at 637-3 8 (2d ed.
Supp. 1998).
Although this Article disagrees with the opinion of Professor Hazard and Mr. Hodes
regarding the permissibility of ex parte communications with expert witnesses, it concurs in
and relies upon Mr. Hodes's more general views about a lawyer's duties to engage in conduct
beneficial to her clients. See infra note 202.
127. See Lubet, supra note 25, at 473, 480.
At least two state bar ethics committees have determined that attorneys may communicate
ex parte with experts retained by their adversaries. See Md. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics,
Op. 85-29 (1984), summarizedin [1980-1985 Ethics Opinions] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 801:4352 (1986) [hereinafter ABA/BNA Manual, 1980-1985 Ethics Opinions];
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 577 (1986), 1986 WL 68786, at *1; accord
Pa. BarAss'n Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility Comm., Informal Op. 99-30 (1999), 1999
WL 516432, at *2 ("In the event the mediator is deemed, however, to be wife's expert witness,
there also does not appear to be any express prohibition in contacting the expert witness of an
opposing party, directly."). But see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 577
(1986), 1986 WL 68786, at *2 (declining to render an opinion regarding whether ex parte
contact was prohibited by New York or federal discovery rules).
In Wisconsin, the State Bar Committee on Ethics originally determined that ex parte contact
is permissible, but later revised this determination to reflect ajudicial decision that prohibited
ex parte contact with treating physicians. Compare Wis. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op.
E-83-13 (1983), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1980-1985 Ethics Opinions, supra, at
801:9110, with Wis. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. E-91-4 (1991), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:9101. But see Terry
E. Nilles, Ex Parte Contacts with Expert Witnesses, Wis. LAW., Dec. 1994, at 18, 20. Mr.
Nilles contends:
In Wisconsin, and in most other jurisdictions, the lack of an express ethical
prohibition on ex parte contacts with an adversary's expert should not be viewed
as an invitation to engage in such activities. Discovery rules will prohibit such
contacts in most cases and violating those discovery rules usually will constitute
an ethical violation. Even if the discovery rules permit the contact, an attorney is
likely to violate other ethical rules unless extreme caution is exercised.
Id.
In Virginia, the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics discussed ex parte contact by attorneys
in an opinion that directly addressed the issue of whether an attorney could retain an expert
from the same medical firm as the opposing expert and, if so, whether the attorney would be
required to instruct the expert not to cause the opposing expert to withdraw from the case. See
Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1678 (1996), summarized in ABA/BNA
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enough to give an ethical trial attorney serious concern about the propriety of any
attempt to contact retained adverse experts." This concern is magnified by the
severity of sanctions imposed against attorneys who contacted adverse experts ex
parteY2 Three courts excluded expert testimony as a sanction for an attorney's ex
parte contact.!" The Ninth Circuit reversed ajudgment because an attorney engaged
in an ex parte conversation with an adverse expert, then remanded the case for retrial
and for a determination of sanctions to be entered against the contacting attorney.'
A California state court disqualified not just the attorneys who made ex parte contact
with experts, but their entire law firm, even though the contacted expert was not even
retained by opposing counsel, but instead was merely interviewed as a potential
expert in a one-hour meeting.' Given these decisions, an ethical trial attorney who
Manual, supra note 116, at 1101:8703. In a statement that would be considered dicta in a court
opinion, because it did not directly decide the issues before the committee, the committee
said, "Mat is not to say ... that a lawyer is barred from interviewing witnesses where
permissible...."Id. at 2.
Finally, a widely consulted but now somewhat out-of-date professional responsibility
hornbook suggests that "the general view [is] that it is permissible for an advocate to contact
without consent an expert witness retained by an adversary." WOLFRAM, supra note 58, §
12.4.6, at 652-53. However, this hombook was written before several of the cases and ethics
committee opinions cited in this Article. To support his conclusion about the "general view,"
Professor Wolfram cited an ethics canon written in 1908 and a 1929 ABA formal opinion. See
id. at 653 n.31. While Professor Wolfram's statement is consistent with the position advocated
in this Article, his assessment that this position reflects the "general view," while presumably
accurate at the time it was published, is now out of date.
128. Even in a jurisdiction where an ethics committee has determined that an attorney can
contact adverse experts ex parte, a trial attorney cannot make such contacts without risking a
later finding that the contacts were unethical. In Alaska, the Bar Association Ethics Committee
initially concluded that ex parte contact with adverse experts was permissible. See Alaska Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 84-8 (1984), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1980-1985 Ethics
Opinions, supra note 118, at 801:1203. After the Ninth Circuit's decisions to the contrary, see
supra note 118 and accompanying text, the ethics committee reconsidered its finding, and
issued an opinion stating that ex parte contact with adverse experts is unethical. See Alaska Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *2 ("[UJpon reconsideration in
light of subsequent events, Ethics Opinion 84-8 is vacated. Ex parte contacts should not be
made with expert witnesses retained by an opposing counsel or party."). Therefore, the
existence of holdings by courts and other ethics authorities disallowing cx parte contact with
adverse experts could significantly chill atrial attorney's enthusiasm for making such contacts,
even if the attorney can point to a finding allowing such contacts in her jurisdiction.
129. Cf. Lubetsupra note 25, at 473 ("Atthe extreme, unauthorized contactwith an adverse
party's expert may be'considred witness tampering, perhaps leading to disqualification of the
lawyer or witness, or other sanctions.").
130. Koch Ref. Co. v. Jennifer L. Boudreaux MV, 85 F.3d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1996);
Campbell Indus. v. MV Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 404
S.E.2d 607, 611-12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). In each of these cases, the excluded expert was
initially retained by the attorney's adversary, but the contacting attorney later wished to call the
witness at trial. Except for ex parte communications matters, issues related to "side switching"
experts are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 25.
131. Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 304 (9th Cir. 1996).
132. Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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undertakes even a preliminary cost-benefit analysis"' ordinarily will not be willing
to risk the adverse consequences that could result from an effort to contact an expert
retained by her opponent."
An examination of the determinations forbidding such contact reveals that they are
based upon a flawed reading of the rules of discovery, an overemphasis on
confidentiality concerns that are best addressed by other means, and an implicit belief
that an expert's loyalty to one party supercedes the search for truth.
Other courts have reached similar results, though these results have not survived the
appellate process. The Ninth Circuit originally held that a law firm could be disqualified for
engaging in ex parte contacts, but later withdrew its opinion on the ground that the order of
disqualification was not appealable. See Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel-Las Vegas,
Inc., 765 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawing 748 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1984); Alaska Bar
Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *1 (summarizing original Ninth
Circuit opinion in MGM Grand); I HAZARD &HODES, supra note 126, § 3.4:402 n.1. 1 (noting
that the"offending lawyers" in the MGM Grand case were disqualified). The withdrawal ofthe
initial Ninth Circuit opinion provided precious little comfort to the law firm, because the order
that was left intact disqualified it from representing its client. For other attorneys, the original
opinion's statement that trial courts should resolve doubts in favor of disqualification, see
Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *1, may chill any
desire they would otherwise have to engage in ex parte contact.
In a Washington case, the trial court disqualified an attorney who engaged in an ex parte
interview with an expert who had previously consulted with the attorney's adversary, even
though the expert initiated the contact and the attorney advised his adversary of the interview
the day after it occurred and provided the adversary a transcript of the interview. In re
Firestorm, 916 P.2d 411, 412-13 (Wash. 1996). On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's determination that the ex parte contact was impermissible, but
reversed the disqualification of the attorney and remanded for a determination of the
appropriate sanction. Id. at 419. Although the reversal of the disqualification sanction was
undoubtedly welcomed by the attorney, he had to endure an appeal to acquire this result, and
he faced sanctions even after obtaining the reversal of his disqualification. Given these results
in a case where the expert initiated the contact with the attorney, it is unlikely that a
Washington attorney or an attorney in another jurisdiction who was aware of this decision
would be willing to initiate ex pate contact with an expert.
133. An analysis of the risks and potential benefits associated with contacting adverse
experts should factor in the reality that ex parte contact with an adverse expert will sometimes
result in the acquisition of little or no new information. See infra notes 350-56 and
accompanying text. Given the often limited probability of substantial gain from ex parte
contact, the potential costs in the form of sanctions will often lead to a decision not to attempt
such contact. When the costs can be as severe as removal from the case in a published opinion
impugning the integrity of the attorney, see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text, few
attorneys will be bold enough to attempt contact. Therefore, the current state of the law,
although it is not unanimous, acts as a major deterrent to ex parte communications.
134. See Freeman, supra note 117, at 11 (warning lawyers not to attempt to communicate
ex parte with adverse experts, because such attempts could result in charges of witness
tampering and sanctions). But cf. Hodes, supra note 63, at 1366 ("Professional lawyers must
not only have the courage to make hard and close choices, but also the courage to stand up for
the choices that they made.").
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1. The "Discovery as the Sole Source of
Expert Information" Supposition
As noted above, 3 s the Model Rules explicitly identify the persons that an attorney
cannot contact outside the presence of opposing counsel. Indeed, an entire rule is
dedicated to this subject. Model Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney from contacting
persons who are represented by counsel, 3 but it does not prohibit an attorney from
contacting adverse expert witnesses.'37 Many states have adopted this rule, sometimes
with some revisions but always without provisions prohibiting ex parte contact with
adverse expert witnesses.' In the absence of provisions adding expert witnesses to
Model Rule 4.2's list of persons who cannot be contacted, which this Model Rule's
drafters could have easily included if they intended to ban ex parte contact with
expert witnesses,'39 this Model Rule does not ban such contact.
a. The Search for a Nonexistent Prohibition
Because the Model Rules' explicit outline of "offlimits" persons does not prohibit
exparte contact with adverse experts, those who seek to prohibit ex parte contact with
experts must try to find some other, less directly applicable, provision of the Model
Rules to support their position."4 This search for an arguably applicable rule has
135. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
136. MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2.
137. ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 61:717. The authors state:
Model Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte interviews with witnesses who are represented
by counsel, but the Model Rules do not extend the protection against ex parte
interviews to witnesses who are not represented by counsel. Therefore, ex parte
communications between a lawyer and an opposing party's expert generally do
not violate Rule 4.2.
Id.
138. See supra note 110.
139. The predecessor to the Model Rules, the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code"), did include provisions that explicitly referred to expert
witnesses. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY EC 7-28, DR 7-109(C)(3) (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. In addition, the comments to one of the Model Rules also make
specific reference to expert witnesses. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R 3.4 cmt. [3].
Therefore, those who drafted Model Rule 4.2 were certainly aware of how to draft a model rule
or comment provision that covered expert witnesses when they so desired.
140. Unfortunately, this effort by ethics authorities to tryto stretch an inapplicable provision
of ethics law beyond its provisions is not unique or even particularly unusual. Almost two
decades ago, Professors Finman and Schneyer studied opinions by the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and found that on seven occasions the
committee essentially determined that the ethics rules (from the then-prevalent Model Code)
the committee was interpreting "did not actually mean what they said." Hellman, supra note
6, at 333 (summarizing Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121). In his update of this study, Dean
Hellman thoroughly analyzed four such instances and observed:
[Tihe last fifteen years have not witnessed any decrease in the Committee's
penchant for concluding that the words used in the influential model codes do not
always mean what they say. The Committee is still producing opinions that, rather
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focused upon Model Rule 3.4(c), which states that a lawyer shall not "knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules ofa tribunal.""' The professional responsibility
authorities who maintain that ex parte contact is unacceptable' 42 often claim to be
basing this determination upon this prohibition or its predecessors.' 43
than engaging in a straightforward exercise of interpretation according to accepted
canons of statutory construction, set forth the Committee's view of what the rules
should say or were meant to say.
Hellman, supra note 6, at 334 (emphasis in original).
141. Model Rule 3.4(c) provides, "A lawyer shall not... knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists." MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 34(c).
An ex parte contact, by its very nature, will not ordinarily involve an "open" assertion that
a right to an ex parte contact exists, because such an assertion would often destroy the
opportunity to make the ex parte contact. An attorney who advised her adversary that she
planned to contact an expert witness ex parte because she thought she had the right to do so
would be announcing her intention to make the contact. In many instances, the opposing
attorney would immediately instruct her expert not to discuss the case with the attorney who
planned to make the contact. See Hodes, supra note 103, at 87; infra notes 341-45 and
accompanying text (discussing an attorney's right to advise her experts not to discuss matters
with opposing counsel).
142. Erickson v. Newmar, Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 301 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying the
Nevada version of Model Rule 3.4(c)); Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990)
(applying Oregon DR 7-106(C)(7), which provided, "[i]n appearing in the lawyer's
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not... [i]ntentionally or habitually
violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence"), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual,
1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106; Nilles, supra note 127, at 19 ("As
the ABA opinion notes, ABA Model rule 3.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly and secretly
violating the rules ofa tribunal."); cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note
11, at 1001:207, :208 ("Rule 3.4(c) requires a lawyer to conform to the rules of a tribunal
before which a particular matter is pending, and it is under this Rule that the matter of expert
witnesses comes into particular focus.").
143. The Model Code contained a "substantially similar" provision, DR 7-106(A). See
MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4, Model Code Comparison; MODELCODE, supra note 139,
DR 7-106(a) ("A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule of
a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he may take
appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling.").
Every state has adopted some form of Model Rule 3.4 or Disciplinary Rule 7-106. See ALA.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1997); ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c)
(2000); ARa. RULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTER 3.4 (1994); ARYL RULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR.
3.4 (2000); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-200 (1999); COLD. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); DEL RULES OF
PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (1999); D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); FLA. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.4 (1999); GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2001); HAW.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); IDAHO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1999);
ILL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); IND. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (1999);
IOWACODE OFPROF'LRESPONSlBILTY DR 7-106 (2000); KAN. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR.
3.4 (1999); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1998); LA. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.4 (1997); ME. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBnrTY IL 3.6(d) (1999); MD. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); MICH. RULES OF
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Following this reasoning to its core, one would expect that there is some court rule
stating that attorneys cannot make ex parte contact with adverse expert witnesses.
Except in one state,'" no such rule exists. None of the courts that have outlawed ex
parte contact, or the ethics authorities that have found such contact impermissible
have been able to quote a rule stating that attorneys cannot contact adverse experts
without notifying opposing counsel.'45
b. Stretching Discovery Rules
Beyond Recognition
Instead, these decisionmakers have been forced to try to expand provisions of
discoveryrules that saynothingwhatsoeveraboutwhat contacts an attorneycanmake
outside the formal discovery process. This attempted expansion has stretched the
formal discovery rules well beyond their proper scope.
Trial-team-model advocates have focused their efforts upon the pre-1993 version
of the federal expert witness formal discoveryrules and upon identical or similar state
provisions. Prior to the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993,
Rule 26(b)(4)'s provisions regarding formal discovery of certain information
regarding testifying experts stated:
Trial Preparation: [E]xperts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be
obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify
each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to
state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and
a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
PROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.4 (1998); MINN.RULESOFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.4 (2000); MIss.RULES
OFPROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.4 (1999); Mo. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 4-3.4 (2000); MONT.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000); NEB. CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBIUTY DR 7-106
(2000); NEv. Sup. CT. R. 173; N.H. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (1999); N.J. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1998); N.M. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-304 (2000); N.Y.
CODE OF PROF'L REspONSIBImrY DR 7-106 (1999); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4
(1999); N.D. RULES OFPROF'LCNDUCTR. 3.4 (1999); OmO'CODEOFPROF'LREPONSmmBn
DR 7-106 (2000); OKLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1998); OR. CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBIIrry DR 7-106 (2000); PA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (1998); R.I. RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.4 (1998); S.C. RULEs OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.4 (1998); S.D. RULES
OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.4 (1999); TENN. CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBLITYDR 7-106 (2000);
TEx. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.04 (1998); UTAH RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4
(1999); VT. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1999); V.. RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4
(2000); WASIL RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT R. 3.4 (1998); W. VA. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCT
R. 3.4 (1998); Wis. SUP. Cr. R. 20:3.4; WYO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1997).
The Ethics 2000 Commission did not propose any changes to the text of Model Rule 3.4.
See MODEL RULES (Final Draft), supra note 110, R. 3.4, http://www.abanetorgcpr/e2k-
rule34.html.
144. See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 118-20.
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(ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means,
subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to
subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may
deem appropriate. 46
Before 1993, many states first adopted formal discovery rules patterned after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and several states still have formal expert witness
discovery provisions that parallel the "pre-1993" version of Federal Rule 26(b)(4)
quoted above. 47 As a result, if the pre-1993 formal discovery provisions quoted
above somehow prohibit ex parte contact, that prohibition would remain intact in
several states.
Trial-team-model advocates have seized upon the rule's declaration that
"[d]iscovery... may be obtained only" through the specified means, which consist
146. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993) (emphasis omitted),
quotedin 8 CHARLESALANWRIGHTETAL,FEDERALPRACTICEANDPROCEDURE 14-15 (2d ed.
1994).
147. The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resulted in several
changes regarding expert witnesses. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text. These
amendments eliminated the language in pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) cited in the text regarding
discovery of expert witness information and replaced it with a provision granting parties the
right to depose expert witnesses. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A). In addition, the 1993
amendments require parties to disclose certain information regarding experts without waiting
for their opponents to issue requests for this information. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
The states have not universally embraced the 1993 changes. Several states retain expert
witness discovery provisions that mirror the pre-1993 versions of Federal Rules 26(a) and
26(b)(4). See AIA. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); DEL CT. C.P.R. 26(a),(bX4); D.C. SCR-CIL 26(a), (b)(4); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-26(a), (b)(4) (Supp. 1998); HAw.
R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); I.R.C.P. 26(a), (b)(4) (Idaho); IND. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); KY. R. Civ.
P. 26.02(1), (4); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); MASS. R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); MINN. R. Civ. P.
26.02(a), (d); M.R.C.P. 26(a), (b)(4) (Mississippi); MONT. R. Civ.P. 26(a), (b)(4); NEB. R. Civ.
P. 26(a), (b)(4); N.H. L Civ. P. 35(a), (b)(3); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-026(A), (B)(5); N.C.R. Civ.
P. 26(a), (b)(4); OHIo R. Civ. P. 26(A), (B)(4); PA. R.C.P. 4003.5; SuPER. R. Crv. P. 26(a),
(bX4) (Rhode Island); S.D. RCP § 15-6-26(a), (b)(4); UTAH R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); VA. R.
Crv. P. 4:1(a), (b)(4).
A few states have adopted the 1993 amendments to Federal Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(b)(4).
See ALASKA R. Civ. PRoc. 26(a)(2), (b)(4); CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 2034 (West 1998);
C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2), (b)(4) (Colorado); WASa R. Crv. P. 26(a), (b)(4).
Some jurisdictions have provisions that track some, but not all, of the 1993 amendments to
Federal Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(b)(4). Most of these jurisdictions allow depositions of expert
witnesses as in Federal Rule 26(b)(4), but do not require expert witness reports as in Federal
Rule 26(a)(2). See ARIz. ST. R. C. P. 26(a), (b)(4); CONN. R. Civ. P. §§ 13-2, 13-4; FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1-280(a), (b)(4); IOWA R. Civ. P. 125; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(a), (b)(5) (West
1997); LA. CODE CIrv. PROC. ANN. art. 1422, 1425 (West 1998); MD. RULE 2-401(a), (e); M.
C. R. 2.302(A), (B)(4) (Michigan); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(a), (b)(4); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:10-2(a),
(d); N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (b)(4); OKI.A STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3226(A), (B)(3) (West 1993);
S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (bX4); TENN. Cv. PRoc. RuLE 26.01, 26.02(4); TX. R. C. P. 195.1; VT.
R. CIV. P. 26(a), (b)(4); Wis. R. Crv. P. 804.01(1), (2)(d); W. VA. R. Cirv. P. 26(a), (b)(4); WYO.
R. Civ. PRoc. 26(a), (b)(4). In contrast, two states now provide for expert witness reports, but
not expert witness depositions. See NEV. R. C. P. 26(b)(5); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 (d) (McKinney
1991 & Supp. 1999).
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of limited interrogatories and other discovery specifically ordered by the court.
According to the courts" and other ethics authorities"" who have determined"S that
ex parte contact is impermissible, any such contact constitutes expert "discovery" that
is outside pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) and, therefore, impliedly forbidden by this rule.15S
148. Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1996); Campbell Indus. v.
M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24,26-27 (9th Cir. 1980); Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 607,611
(Ga. Ct. App. 1991) ("OCGA § 9-11-26(b)(4) clearly sets forth the procedures a party must
follow to obtain discovery from any expert .... Cross-appellants did not attempt to follow
these procedures and should not now be allowed to circumvent them by engaging in ex parte
communications with the opposing party's expert.... ."); see also Plasma Physics Corp. v.
Sanyo Elec. Co., 123 F.R.D. 290,291-92 (N.D. 111. 1988) (holding that Rule 26(b)(4) limited
ex parte contact, but finding that contact did not violate this Rule because evidence did not
establish that party discussed prohibited issues with experts).
Interestingly, the first and often-cited court determination that ex parte contact was
impermissible by the Ninth Circuit in Campbell Industries, see Erickson, 87 F.3d at 302;
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410,412 (D. Utah 1999); Xtraman, 404 S.E.2d
at 611-12; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993),
reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207;
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 577 (1986), 1986 WL 68786, at *2,
resulted from a contacting party's concession that the ex parte contact was impermissible.
CampbellIndus., 619 F.2d at 27. Perhaps ifthe contacting party had analyzed the issues more
carefully and vigorously defended its attorney's actions, the line of cases and decisions
erroneously determining that ex parte contact is prohibited by the discovery rules and is
therefore an ethical violation would have never developed, or would have developed in a
different fashion.
149. AlaskaBar Ass'n Ethics CommrL, Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *2; Or. State
Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990
Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106; Nilles, supra note 127, at 19; cf. Or. State Bar
Legal Ethics Comr., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 5-6 (1992) (finding ex parte contact impliedly
impermissible in federal civil litigation, while only strongly cautioning practitioners against ex
parte contact in state civil litigation), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics
Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122.
150. At least one ethics authority, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, has refrained from making a definitive determination, but has strongly
suggested that the existence of a formal discovery rule similar to the pre-1993 version of
Federal Rule 26(b)(4) would render ex parte contact ethically impermissible. See ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted in ABA/BNA
Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 1 1, at 1001:207-:209; see also N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n Conm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 577 (1986), 1986 WL 68786, at *2 (declining to determine
whether ex parte communications violated formal discoveryrules "[b]ecause matters of law are
beyond the authority of this committee"); Mo. Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Op.
960286 (1996) ("The Rules of Professional Conduct do not prevent an ex parte contact with
the expert as long as such contact does not violate the rules of discovery."), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 1101:5235; Mo. Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal
Op. 960190 (1996) ("Ifacase is pending, theRules donotprohibit Attomeyfrom interviewing
the expert as long as such an interview does not violate the rules of discovery."), summarized
in ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 1101:5232.
151. According to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Mr. W. William Hodes, "Since
existing rules of civil procedure carefully provide for limited and controlled discovery of an
opposing party's expert witnesses, all other forms of contact are impliedly prohibited." I
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c. A Call for a Careful Reading of
the Discovery Rules
Any reading of pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) that includes ex parte contact within the
term "discovery" stretches that term beyond its proper scope and ignores the realities
of litigation practice. Therefore, unless the pre-1993 expert witness formal discovery
rules are modified significantly, they cannot legitimately be used to prevent ex parte
contact.
The analysis of trial-team-model advocates is, at best, tenuous. After all, pre-1993
Rule 26(b)(4) applies only to expert "discovery.""ln Therefore, it applies to ex parte
communications only if these communications are expert "discovery." They are
not.
15 3
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 126, § 3.4:402. They also suggest, "Furthermore, since this
practice norm is well established and well-known, [an attorney who conducted ex parte
interviews] may be said to have violated [Model] Rule 8.4(d) as well (conduct prejudicial to
the administration ofjustice)." Id. The suggestion that the "practice norm" of not making an
ex parte contact is "well established" is at least somewhat at odds with the existence of contrary
determinations finding that ex parte contact is acceptable. See supra note 127. Nonetheless,
Professor Hazard and Mr. Hodes have been cited by ethics authorities in support of the
proposition that ex parte interviews are prejudicial to the administration of justice. See
Erickson, 87 F.3d at 302; Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106.
Another commentator also concluded that pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) forbade informal
discovery efforts regarding adverse expert witnesses. See Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 441-42.
152. As noted previously, see supra note 25, this Article does not address issues related to
experts who are used only as consultants by one of the parties and not as witnesses expected
to testify at trial. In the pre-1993 version of Rule 26, subsection (b)(4)(B) dealt with such
witnesses, while subsection (b)(4XA) concerned experts who were expected to testify. FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(B), 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993), quoted in 8 WRIGHT ETAL, supra
note 146, at 22 n.2. Although the introductory "[d]iscovery... may be obtained only as
follows" language presumably applied to both subsections, subsection (b)(4)(B) included a
similar, and therefore possibly redundant, phrase:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only
as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or
opinions on the same subject by other means.
Id. (emphasis added). In 1993, Rule 26(bX4)(B)'s"[a] party may discover... only" language
was changed to "[a] party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, discover... only."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993); see also Supreme Court
of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401,
616 (1993) (identifying changes to Rule 26(bX4)(B)). For cases applying the pre-1993 Rule
26(b)(4) language in the context of consultants who were not expected to testify at trial, see
Good v. OAF Corp., 1989 WL 54017, at *-*3 (4th Cir. 1989); Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d
888, 891-92 (10th Cir. 1984).
153. The pre-1993 version 9f Rule 26, along with the remaining formal discovery rules,
simply did not deal with informal discovery. See Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 446 ("IT]he fact
that there is no specific provision in the rules suggests that their drafters did not intend to
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i. The Many Ways to Gather Expert
Information Outside of Formal Discovery
Ex parte contact with expert witnesses is a means for attorneys to gather
information about the expert. It is far from the only such method, however. To
prepare for cross-examination of adverse experts, attorneys engage in a wide variety
of information-gathering endeavors." They contact other experts in the same field
who may know about the expert, her experience, her research, or her reputation."5
They talk to other attorneys who have faced the expert in other cases." They search
electronic'" and paper' databases for articles, books, speeches, and reports by and
about the expert."5 9 They collect and read deposition and trial transcripts documenting
the expert's previous testimony." They investigate whether the credentials claimed
by the expert on her curriculum vitae are legitimate and sufficient. 6' They ask public
licensing agencies whether the expert has been the subject of professional
discipline. 62 If they are bold enough to overcome the chilling effect of the decisions
outlined above," they may even call or write the expert herself."
Although there can be secondary purposes in some instances,16s attorneys often
undertake these and other information-seeking tasks for one basic purpose: gathering
information that will help them impeach experts on cross-examination.' 66 While
formal expert discovery is also undertaken for the same purpose, it is distinct from
prohibit a traditional, inexpensive method of discovery.').
154. Cf Stewart, supra note 96, at 26 ("There are innumerable other [nondeposition]
methods for fact gathering (e.g., informal interviews, use of private investigators, etc.) that
should be considered.").
155. See STEPHEN D. EASTON, How TO WIN JURY TRLs: BUILDING CREDILITY WITH
JUDGES AND JURORS § 12.01(c) (1998).
156. See id.
157. See Mark J. Heley & Jay A. Kopp, Internet Resources for Lawyers Who Represent
Design Professionals, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Jan. 2000, at 12, 14.
158. See MAUET, supra note 42, at 378.
159. See EDwARD J. IMWINKELRIED, TEE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §
9-8(a), at 258 (3d ed. 1997); MAUET, supra note 42, at 378 (advising attorneys to "obtain a
copy of everything the expert has ever published").
160. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 159, § 9-8(a), at 258; MAUET, supra note 42, at 378;
Heley & Kopp, supra note 157, at 14.
161. See EASTON,supra note 155, § 12.04(a); IMWINKELRIED supra note 159, §§ 9-11 to 9-
12 (discussing cross-examination attacks based upon lack of adequate education and
experience).
162. See EASTON, supra note 155, § 12.04(a).
163. See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
164. Although this Article argues that an attorney should be allowed to initiate ex parte
contact with adverse retained expert witnesses, an attorney initiating and pursuing such contact
is nonetheless subject to several professional responsibility restrictions that prohibit certain
practices during such contact. See infra Part IV.
165. See supra text accompanying note 105 (regarding the use of informal discovery to
obtain information for evaluation of a case for settlement).
166. See Day, supra note 102, at 52.
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nondiscoveryinformation gathering (which is sometimes imprecisely 67 and therefore
somewhat confusingly referred to as "informal discovery"'") in one important
respect. In formal discovery, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party or
some other person or entity to respond to the opposing party's demands for
information.' 9 In contrast, an attorney engaged in informal information gathering
cannot force the opposing party or, for that matter, anyone else, to provide
information. In fact, many informal information-gathering efforts are undertaken by
an attorney who does not even advise her opponent of her efforts to gather
information.
°70
Ofcourse, it is also possible to engage in informal discovery that does depend upon
the cooperation of opposing counsel. In such informal discovery, however, one
attorney cannot demand the production of information by her adversary. Instead,
production of expert information byparties in informal discovery is always voluntary
and, therefore, usually mutual.'7' Examples include voluntary exchanges of expert
witness reports" and oral agreements to permit depositions of experts."
167. Formal discovery and informal discovery both involve efforts to obtain information.
However, informal discovery is not a subset of "discovery," as that term was used in pre-1993
Federal Rule 26(b)(4). Unlike the formal discovery referred to in pre-1993 Federal Rule
26(b)(4), informal discovery efforts do not necessarily require or even request a response from
the opposing party. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
168. E.g., Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983); Trans-World Invs. v.
Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Alaska 1976); McMoran, supra note 88, at 995; Daniel J.
Lanahan & Cynthia Ribas Rosen, Defendants' Indemnity Pact Enhances Cooperation in L-
Tryptophan Litigation, INSIDE LING., May 1992, at 18, 21.
169. Parties and their attorneys can use formal discovery to require persons and entities other
than their opponents to provide documents and information. Through subpoenas and other
formal discovery mechanisms, attorneys can force nonparties to provide documents and other
things, see FED. R. Civ. P. 34,45, to allow access to property, see FED. R. Civ. P. 34,45, and
to answer questions at depositions, see FED. R. Civ. P. 27, 30, 31, 45. For an example of
discussions ofmatters related to aparty's power to use formal discovery to demand information
from nonparties, see Jay C. Carlisle, Nonparty Document Discovery from Corporations and
Governmental Entities Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
9 (1987); Sarah N. Welling, Discovery of Nonparties' Tangible Things Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 110 (1983); David P. Brooks, Note, In re
United States Catholic Conference: Considering Non-Party Rights, 1988 BYU L. REV. 89;
Mark Labaton, Note, Discovery and Testimony of Unretained Experts: Creating a Clear and
Equitable Standard to Govern Compliance with Subpoenas, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140.
170. Cf Mullenix, supra note 96, at 809 (describing informal discovery steps taken by
attorneys that do not require contact with opposing counsel, in addition to informal discovery
requests that do require the cooperation of opposing counsel).
171. See Day, supra note 102, at 46-47; Mullenix, supra note 96, at 809.
172. Under the post-1993 Federal Rules, expert witnesses must write reports and send these
reports to opposing counsel. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); infra note 207. Prior to the 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules, experts were not required to write reports, but parties
occasionally agreed to exchange expert witness reports. See Day, supra note 102, at 50;
Graham, supra note 1, at 175; cf. Drobny, 554 P.2d at 1151-52 (noting the "voluntary
exchange of medical information by the parties"); Lanahan & Rosen, supra note 169, at 21
(noting the voluntary provision of information in informal discovery).
173. In jurisdictions where the 1993 changes to the Federal Rules or equivalent state formal
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ii. The Inapplicability of Formal Discovery
Rules to Informal Information Gathering
For trial-team-model advocates to be correct, pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4)'s prohibition
of "discovery" outside the formal discovery required by the rule must prohibit all
informal expert discovery in the absence of a written stipulation altering the rules for
formal discovery,174 including both voluntary information exchanges between parties
and all independent information gathering about an expert witness by one party.17
After all, while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure say nothing about ex parte
communications with adverse experts, they also say nothing about any other informal
discovery rules are in effect, parties are allowed to demand expert witness depositions as apart
of the formal discovery process. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). Before the 1993 changes,
attorneys often agreed to allow depositions of experts. See infra note 178.
174. Rule 29 does provide a mechanism for turning informal discovery into formal
discovery:
Unless otherwise directed by the court, the parties may by written stipulation
(1) provide that depositions may be taken before any person, at any time or place,
upon any notice, and in any manner and when so taken may be used like other
depositions, and (2) modify other procedures governing or limitations placed
upon discovery, except that stipulations extending the time provided in Rules 33,
34, and 36 for responses to discovery may, if they would interfere with any time
set for completion of discovery, for hearing of a motion, or for trial, be made only
with the approval of the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules, Rule 29(2) stated that "stipulations
extending the time provided in Rules 33, 34, and 36 for responses to discovery may be made
only with the approval of the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 29, 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended
1993).
Attorneys at least occasionally have provided information in informal discovery, without
always memorializing their arrangements in written stipulations. See Day, supra note 102, at
50 (referring to "demands" for expert witness reports and regular expert depositions); id. at 51
(noting that "practitioners regularly use othermethods" of expert witness discovery); Graham,
supra note 1, at 176 (explaining that in over half of the cases in which expert witness reports
were produced, they were "[p]rovided, pursuant to local custom, in response to an informal
request for a copy of the expert's report"). Therefore, although Rule 29 provides a mechanism
for changing the rules of formal discovery, at least some informal discovery arrangements are
not within the scope of this rule, if the rule is to be strictly interpreted. The rules contain no
provisions governing these informal discovery arrangements that are not memorialized with
written stipulations. If Rule 26(b)(4) prohibits all informal discovery, this prohibition applies
to oral informal discovery agreements and even arrangements that may be discussed in
documents, but not memorialized in formal written stipulations signed by all parties.
175. Trial-team-model advocates might initially be tempted to respond by arguing that the
prohibition of other "discovery" applies more narrowly to efforts that request the participation
of the opposing party, but not to one party's wholly independent attempts to acquire
information. There are two problems with such a position for ex parte contact opponents,
however. First, pre-1993 Federal Rule 26(b)(4) contains no language suggesting this
distinction. More significantly, even ifthis distinction could bemade, ex parte communications
with adverse retained expert witnesses are not within the suggested scope of the term
"discovery," because they do not involve requests for the participation of the opposing party.
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discovery efforts regarding experts. Because there is no distinction between ex parte
contact with experts and all other informal discovery, if pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4)
prohibits ex parte contact, it also prohibits all other informal expert discovery.
Therefore, if trial-team-model advocates are correct in their analysis of the
professional responsibilityrules, whenever attorneys verbally or otherwise informally
agree to exchange expert information, they are agreeing to a knowing and therefore
unethical disobedience of the rules of the tribunal. This suggestion flies in the face
of common practice and thwarts the verypurpose of the rules of formal discovery. 76
In many cases involving expert testimony under the pre-1993 version of Rule
26(b)(4), attorneys informally agreed to exchange expertwitness reports'" orto allow
depositions of experts. 78 If those opposing ex parte contact are correct, these
agreements were unethical. This would be both unrealistic and downright capricious,
because agreements to exchange information promote the speedy exchange of
information, at reduced cost to each of the parties. 79 If, as Rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states, the rules "shall be construed... to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action,"'8 ° pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4)
should not be construed to prohibit such exchanges.' Indeed, the 1993 amendments
to Rule 26 were designed, in part, to formalize the common practice of expert witness
depositions.8" If this practice was an outlaw conspiracy whereby attorneys were
176. See Drobny, 554P.2d at 1152; Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30,35-36 (Mich. 1991).
177. See supra note 172.
178. See Day, supra note 102, at 50; Laurence H. Pretty, The Boundaries of Discovery in
Patent Litigation: Privilege, Work Product and Other Limits, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 101, 115 (1990)
("There is no ight... to take a deposition of an expert witness.... Nonetheless, in patent
litigation, it is fairly common for experts who will testifyattrial to be deposed. Sometimes, this
is by agreement. ... ."); Graham, supra note 1, at 175.
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 29 advisory committee's notes (1993 amendments) ("Counsel are
encouraged to agree on less expensive and time-consuming methods to obtain information, as
through voluntary exchange of documents, use of interviews in lieu of depositions, etc.");
Drobny, 554 P.2d at 1152 ("This court has... stressed that ... information should be
exchanged and requests complied with in a manner demonstrating candor and common
sense."); Mullenix, supra note 96, at 810 ("[P]erceptions of [problems with] formal discovery
have prompted a few judges, magistrates, academicians, and law reformers to propose that
attorneys use informal discovery procedures more extensively to acquire fact information
needed for trial.'); cf. S.D. CAL. CIVLR 83.4(a)(1)(f) ("An attorney in practice before this court
shall .... attempt to establish ... voluntary exchange of non-privileged information."); E.D.
OKi.A. L.L 26.1(D) ("[P]arties are encouraged to cooperatively exchange materials and
information clearly relevant to disputed facts at the earliest practical time .... ).
180. FED. R.Cr.P. 1.
181. See Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 36.
Prohibitions of informal discovery agreements also run counter to the Advisory
Committee's suggestion that "[c]ounsel are encouraged to agree on less expensive and time-
consuming methods to obtain information, as through voluntary exchange of documents, use
ofinterviews in lieu of depositions, etc." FED. R. Civ. P. 29 advisory committee's notes (1993
amendments).
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee's notes (1993 amendments) ("The
information disclosed under the former rule in answering interrogatories about the 'substance'
of expert testimony was frequently so sketchy and vague that it rarely dispensed with the need
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engaging in rampant unethical conduct, it is doubtful that it would have been adopted
into the formal discovery process through an amendment to the Federal Rules."~
to depose the expert.... 2).
183. Even if the term "discovery" in the pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4) could be read as
expansively as trial-team-model advocates suggest, the Rule would not prohibit all ex parte
communications with adverse experts. In other words, even if all of the analysis in this
subsection is incorrect, the formal discovery rules do not preclude ex parte communications
with experts.
Assuming arguendo that the "discovery" that pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) limits includes
independent information gathering, the Rule does not outlaw independent gathering of all
expert-related information. Instead, the Rule applies only to "facts known and opinions...
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), 28
U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993), quoted in 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, at 416.
Therefore, even if the Rule applies to independent information gathering, by its own terms it
only applies to the gathering of some, but not all, information known to experts.
In a frequently cited opinion, see Easton, supra note 18, at 37 n.139, the Ninth Circuit
indicated that the extent of an expert's research outside of the litigation arena was a critical
factor in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising that an attorney
looking for an expert witness will often try to find someone who already has significant
knowledge and experience in the relevant field. See Eliasen v. Hamilton, Ill I F.R.D. 396,
403 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Experts are hired as experts because they know facts and hold opinions
in a specific field prior to being retained."); Mark S. Geraghty, Some Thoughts on the
Care, Feeding, and Preparation of Experts, in FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
SUPERCOURSE419, 423 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H4-5185,
1994) (recommending that trial attorneys looking for experts "[find someone already familiar
with issues").
At the time that the expert is first contacted by the attorney who eventually retins her, none
ofthat knowledge and experience was developed by her in anticipation of the litigation at hand.
Therefore, as several courts have noted, pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) itself does not even limit
formal discovery about matters known to the expert before she was retained. See Eliasen, 11
F.R.D. at 403 (allowing depositions for discovery of facts known and opinions held by a
nontestifying expert before being retained); Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co.,
641 F.2d 984, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (permitting formal discovery of expert's pre-suit
information); Norfin Inc., v. Int'l Bus. Mach., Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 532 (D.C. Colo. 1977)
("In the instant case, the facts sought to be discovered are other than those developed in
anticipation of litigation.... Defendant has clearly indicated that it desires no information
which was obtained in anticipation of litigation, but only seeks to question the expert on his
'experience' prior to being retained by Plaintiff.'); Hayes & Ryder, supra note 1, at 1173-78
(discussing information not acquired for litigation); Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 442-43
(discussing cases distinguishing between pre- and post-retention information); c. Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 184 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D. Utah 1999) (stating that an expert's
"information... developed independent of this or other litigation based on his previous expert
activities" is "outside the governance of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) or any other provision ofthe Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure"). But see Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 424,428 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(questioning the Marine Petroleum holding).
In Plasma Physics Corp. v. Sanyo Elec. Co., 123 F.R.D. 290 (ND. Ill. 1998), a federal
district court held that the pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4) limited a party's ex parte contact
with adverse expert witnesses. Id. at 292. Although this finding is at odds with this Article's
interpretation of pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4), it is important to note that even this court found that
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A more reasonable interpretation of pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) would limit the term
"discovery" to formal discovery that requires a response by the opposing party.'"
Furthermore, given that the formal discovery rules were adopted to increase the
information available to each party and to provide eachpartywith evidence that could
be usedat trial," including information used to cross-examine adverse witnesses,"
it would be rather counterproductive to interpret a formal discovery rule in a fashion
that would restrict a party's other means of access to information and evidence.'
pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) only limited the proper scope of ex parte contact, without prohibiting
such contact in all instances. Id. The court held that ex parte contact communications between
a party and adversarial expert witnesses concerning pre-suit facts and opinions were not
precluded by pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4). Because the partyrequesting sanctions failed to establish
that the experts had any information developed in anticipation of litigation, as opposed to pre-
suit information, the court denied the request for sanctions. Id.
In summary, even if the term "discovery" applies to independent information gathering by
attorneys, including ex parte contact with expert witnesses, it does not prohibit all such efforts.
Instead, the most that pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) can even arguably do is limit the scope of
information that the attorney can discuss in her ex parte interviews with the expert witness. Ex
parte contact opponents have not recognized this inherent limitation in pre- 1993 Rule 26(b)(4)
and its equivalent state counterparts.
184. See Corleyv. Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc., 142 F.3d 1041, 1053 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit a party from taking sworn statements
from witnesses); Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D.S.C. 1991) ("Nothing in [the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure] prohibits informal inteviews .... .'); Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99
F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983), discussed in Companion, supra note 25, at 38; cf. Domako,
475 N.W.2d at 36 (similar result under Michigan formal discovery rules); Brazil, supra note
89, at 1315 ("The first major component of the pretrial process of gathering and organizing
evidentiary data consists of private investigations by counsel. The conduct of such
investigations generally is not governed by the formal rules of discovery.").
185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note(1946 amendments) ("T epurpose
of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters
which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case.').
186. The evidence that can be gathered legitimately through formal discovery includes
evidence that will be used for impeachment of adverse witnesses. Norfin, 74 F.R.D. at 533
(."In fact, one of the purposes of discovery is to obtain information for use on cross-
examination and for the impeachment of witnesses."' (quoting United States v. Int'l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974))); Steven N. Peskind, Investigation and
Discovery, in CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION § 2.13 (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal Educ. ed.,
1998); see also Musselman v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 200 (D. Md. 1997) ("[T]he very
purpose ofthe comprehensive disclosures required from retained experts by [Rule] 26(a)(2)(B)
is to afford opposing counsel sufficient information to prepare for cross-examination."); Floyd,
supra note 85, at 106 ("[I]n many instances disclosure of documents used to refresh memory
is necessary to allow full cross-examination ... "); Hayes & Ryder, supra note 1, at 1121
("[T]he very purpose of allowing the discovery of expert information is to allow the opponent
ofthe witness to prepare for cross-examination at trial."); Jan W. Henkel & 0. Lee Reed, Work
ProductPrivilegeandDiscoveryofExpert Testimony: Resolvingthe Conflict Between Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4), 16 FLA. ST. U. L.REv. 313,334 (1988) (stating
that knowledge of items reviewed by an expert witness is "information necessary for a thorough
cross-examination on the issue of witness credibility'.
187. Cf Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 35 ("It would be a regression to conclude that the
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Perhaps as a result of a realization of the drawbacks of such an application of the
discoveryrules, courts have explicitly rejected suggestions that the formal discovery
rules prevent parties from independently gathering information without using the
discovery rules.'S
In the same manner, if trial-team-model advocates are correct in their analysis of
the professional responsibility rules, whenever an attorney independently attempts to
gather information about experts, whether by ex parte communications or any of the
myriad of other techniques commonly available, her efforts are sanctionable. Again,
this is rather capricious. Independent information gathering has many benefits. It is
often less expensive than formal discovery. It can be more effective than formal
discovery."8 9 In addition to the acquisition of information that is potentially helpful
on expert cross-examination, it sometimes leads to the acquisition of information that
causes parties to attempt to settle cases. ° In other words, to borrow a phrase from
Michigan Court Rules of 1985 operated to preclude a method of discovery acceptable under
the [prior] General Court Rules.").
188. See Corley, 142 F.3d at 1053 ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit
[the plaintiff's] chosen investigative method of taking sworn stenographic statements from
potential non-party witnesses.'); Felder, 139 F.R.D. at 91 ("Cases implying that the methods
of evidence gathering in the Rules are the sole means of conducting discovery find no support
in the text of the Rules.'); Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. at 128 ("[W]hile the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have provided certain specific formal methods of acquiring evidence from
recalcitrant sources by compulsion, they have never been thought to preclude the use of such
venerable, if informal, discovery techniques as the ex parte interview of a witness who is
willing to speak.'); Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 36 ("The omission of[ex parte] interviews from
the court rules does not mean that they are prohibited, because the rules are not meant to be
exhaustive."); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1985) ("The rules regulating
pretrial discovery do not purport to set forth the only methods by which information pertinent
to the litigation may be obtained.'); Companion, supra note 25, at 38 (discussing Eli Lilly &
Co.); Feighny, supra note 25, at 38.
The Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Committee summarized the relevant case lawas follows:
Current Oregon and federal statutes and court rules ofprocedure and evidence
do not expressly prohibit an attorney engaged in investigation from making ex
parte contact with unrepresented fact witnesses. Oregon and federal appellate
cases have not interpreted existing statutes or rules so as to prohibit such contact.
Rather, it is generally understood that the availability of formal civil discovery
mechanisms does not impliedly prohibit attorneys from attempting, as part of the
investigation of fact witnesses, to obtain information from such witnesses, such
as signed witness statements that could be used for impeachment at trial.
Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 2 (1992) (citations omitted),
summarized in ABAIBNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122.
Unfortunately, the Oregon committee went on to suggest that experts could not be contacted
in federal cases, apparentlybecause federal "formal civil discovery mechanisms [do] impliedly
prohibit" attorneys from engaging in independent information gathering when the information
gathered concerns experts rather than fact witnesses. Id. at 2-3. This distinction between fact
witnesses and expert witnesses cannot bejistified.
189. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
190. Trans-World Invs. v. Drobny, 554 P.2d 1148,1152 (Alaska 1976) ("In our opinion...
informal methods are to be encouraged, for they facilitate early evaluation and settlement of
cases, with a resulting decrease in litigation costs, and represent further the wise application
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Rule 1, it can lead to "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of cases. 9' These
results can flow from all forms of informal discovery, including ex parte contact with
adverse experts.'9
Indeed, an interpretation of formal procedural rules that would prohibit
independent information gathering by attorneys interferes with, or at least restricts,
a party's basic right to the assistance of counsel.'93 Attorneys engage in independent
information gathering because it helps them represent their clients1" effectively by,
inter alia, increasing their effectiveness on cross-examination. If the formal discovery
rules, which contain no prohibition of ex parte or other independent information
gathering regarding experts, are nonetheless stretched into an unstated but potent ban
of these activities, some parties might claim that they do not have effective
representation. 95
iii. The (Almost Complete) Absence of Rules
Banning Ex Parte Communications
This does not mean that it is inconceivable that ethical or discovery rules
prohibiting certain informal discovery efforts, including ex parte contact, could be
enacted. Although this Article contends that ex parte communications enhance the
truth-seeking process, trial-team-model advocates can make legitimate arguments
against them 9'6 and urge the adoption of rules of ethics or discovery that explicitly
ofjudicial resources.'); Domako, 475 N.W.2d at 36; Feighny, supra note 25, at 38; Lanahan
& Rosen, supra note 168, at 21; Lillehaug, supra note 88, at 444; see also Franks v. Nat'l
Dairy Prods. Corp., 41 F.R.D. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (referring to formal discovery
regarding experts) ("[U]nless the position of each party is known along with the basis for
taking such position, no intelligent evaluation can be made for settlement purposes.").
191. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
192. In the view of a state bar ethics committee that had indicated opposition to ex parte
contact, see Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990), summarized in ABA/BNA
Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106, independent gathering of
information about experts is at least arguably consistent with the policy behind formal expert
witness discovery. The committee noted:
Indeed, the same policies favoring formal discovery of expert witnesses, including
facilitating the informed and effective cross-examination of expert witnesses at
trial, are arguably advanced by ex parte investigation of adverse experts who have
been formally designated as witnesses.
Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 4 (1992) (citations omitted),
summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122.
193. See Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D. Mass. 1989) (describing "the
function of interviewing witnesses without the presence of opposing counsel in order to gain
information" as one of"two important functions which counsel traditionallyplay in litigation").
194. SeeKaveneyv. Murphy, 97 F. Supp. 2d 88, 89 (D. Mass. 2000) (noting that attorneys
"conduct an informal investigation" for various purposes).
195. Cf. Coppolino v. Helpem, 266 F. Supp. 930, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (suggesting that
disallowing ex parte interviews interferes with a criminal defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel), quoted in Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37,44 (2d Cir.
1975) (adopting the Coppolino view in a civil case).
196. Ex parte contact with adverse experts is arguably unseemly, because it involves an
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ban ex parte contact.
In fact, one state has adopted just such a discovery rule. Idaho has an expert
witness formal discovery rule that tracks the language of pre-1993 Federal Rule
26(b)(4). 97 At the end of its Rule 26(b)(4), however, Idaho has added a provision
stating, "No party shall contact an expert witness of an opposing party without first
obtaining the permission of the opposing party or the court."19 Idaho's rule
establishes that it is simple enough for a jurisdiction to outlaw ex parte contact by
adopting an explicit b.an in its procedural rules or its professional responsibility code.
If such contact is to be banned, it should be, and it certainly can be, explicitly
banned.' 9
In the absence of a rule that bans ex parte communications, however, the existing
rules of professional conduct and discovery injurisdictions other than Idaho should
not be stretched beyond recognition in a backdoor effort to ban a practice that these
rules permit.2° Every attorney should have the right to consult the rules of
professional conduct and rely upon them to define acceptable and unacceptable
behavior. When those rules contain a provision specifically identifying the persons
that an attorney may not contact ex parte, an attorney should not have to locate a
different rule and anticipate an effort to stretch it to ban conduct the no-contact rule
seems to permit If the Model Rules and the states' adaptations of them are to have
any beneficial effect,20 ' it should be that an attorney who desires to operate within
attempt to acquire information from the person against whom this information will be used. As
noted below, ex parte contact involves some concerns about previously confidential items. See
infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. Perhaps the often limited effectiveness of ex parte
contact, see infra notes 341-56 and accompanying text, make such contacts unworthy of
attorney resources.
197. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) (Idaho).
198. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(iii) (Idaho).
199. It seems reasonable to assume that at least some of the opponents of ex parte contact
in Idaho believed that aversion of Rule 26(b)(4) that did not include an explicit ban on exparte
contact did not ban such contact. It appears that Idaho's Rule 26(b)(4) provisions regarding
discovery of expert witness information were at one time identical to the pre-1993 version of
Federal Rule 26(b)(4). See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4), Federal Rules comparison note (incorrectly
stating, apparently based upon an outdated comparison between the Idaho and Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, that "[t]his [Idaho] rule [26(b)(4)] is identical to the introductory paragraph
and subdivision (A) of Federal Rule 26(b)(4)"). Idaho Rule 26(b)(4) was then apparently
amended to add the language explicitly prohibiting ex parte contact with an adverse expert. Id.
(noting amendments in 1995 and 1997). If the pre-amended Idaho Rule 26(bj(4) provision
mirroring the pre-1993 Federal Rule 26(bX4) language stating that discovery "maybe obtained
only as" outlined in the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) had been enough to ban ex parte
contact, the Idaho amendment adding the provision explicitly banning this conduct would have
been superfluous.
200. Cf. Hellman, supra note 6, at 362-65 (criticizing the ABA committee for creatively
interpreting ethics rules to reach conclusions desired by the committee, rather than suggesting
amendments to the rules); Finman & Schneyer, supra note 121, at 95 ("At the outset, one
should note [the ABA committee's] limited authority: the Committee's mandate is not to
legislate or develop common law rules, but, rather, to test lawyer conduct against the rules laid
down in the [Model] Code.").
201. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 366 (concluding that efforts to stretch ethics rules beyond
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their restrictions can consult them and conform her conduct to them with
confidence.2°
d. The Demise of the Life-Support System for
an Incorrect Supposition
Recent developments have not included adoption of a ban on ex parte contact or
even debate about such a proposal. Instead, the most significant recent development
has been the elimination of even the thin support in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for such a ban.
By tying their decisions banning ex parte contact to the pre-1993 version of Rule
26(b)(4) instead of attempting to enact an ethics or discovery rule prohibiting such
contact, trial-team-model advocates tied the fate of their analysis to the language of
Rule 26(b)(4). If the "[d]iscovery... may be obtained only as follows" language
critical to their argument was everremoved fromRule 26(b)(4), the argument of trial-
team-model advocates would expire with the critical language.
their terms may "[weaken].. . the commitment of some lawyers to make the effort required to
understand the regime sought to be established through the 'ethics codes' .... [and] undercut]
the ability of rule enforcement agencies to mete out strict sanctions, thus weakening the
deterrent effects sought to be generated by the disciplinary process").
202. See Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 n.l (D. Mass. 1989) ("The rules
serve the important function of defining permissible conduct on the part of an attorney.");
Hellman, supra note 6, at 317 (declaring that "ABA ethics opinions tak[ing] strained positions
that flout the language of the rules they purport to interpret .... threaten[] to undercut the
Bar's respect for the legitimacy of the 'ethics rules' as binding constraints on the practice of
law"); id. at 335-36 (noting the difficulty placed upon ethical lawyers by ethics authorities
promulgating opinions that do not adhere to the ethics rules).
If an attorney has reviewed her state's version of the Model Rules and determined that a
particular course of conduct that would benefit her client is not prohibited by their provisions,
she may be ethically required to engage in that course of conduct. One leading ethics scholar
has observed:
Legal ethics is hard. You must try to find the line between what is permitted
and what is not, and then get as close to that line as you can without crossing over
to the bad side. Anything less is less than zealous representation-which already
leaves you on the bad side of the line.
Hodes, supra note 63, at 1366 (emphasis in original); see also W. William Hodes, Rethinking
the Way Law Is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer Professionalism by Teaching Hired Guns
to Aim Better?, 87 KY. L.J. 1019, 1032 (1998-99) ("'Zealousness within the bounds of the law'
is still the watchword that young lawyers ought to adopt as amantra from their law school days
and hold constant throughout their legal careers.").
If Mr. Hodes is correct, and I for one believe that he is, a lawyer trying to determine where
the line lies will have to look somewhere for guidance. It seems entirely reasonable for her to
rely upon her state's M~fodel Rules provisions to draw the line for her. Cf. Finman & Schneyer,
supra note 121, at 95 ("We will consider the holdings [of the ABA committee] to be correct
if they follow logically from the unambiguous meaning of the [Model] Code....'). When the
line drawn by the applicable Model Rules provision does not prohibit conduct that will, in the
attorney's judgment, advance the interests of the client, the attorney should engage in that
conduct, even when doing so requires courage and a willingness to risk the future wrath of
those who would prefer that attorneys avoid that conduct. See Hodes, supra note 63, at 1366.
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This language was indeed removed from Rule 26(b)(4) in 1993.203 In its current
form, Rule 26(b)(4) contains no language stating that even formal discovery is limited
to the listed methods. 4 Instead, the 1993 amendments eliminated the pre-1993 Rule
26(b)(4) language outlining expert witness interrogatories, 0 5 replaced it with a
provision allowing depositions of expert witnesses,2" and added a "disclosure"
systemrequiring parties to provide information regarding expert witnesses, including
expertwitness reports, without waiting for interrogatories or other discoveryrequests
from their opponents.' 7 Thus, the 1993 amendments destroyed any opportunity for
203. In 1993, all of the introductory language was removed from Rule 26(b)(4). Prior to
1993, the now-eliminated introduction to Rule 26(b)(4) stated, "Discovery of facts known and
opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision b)(1b) of
this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained
only as follows... ."FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993), quoted
in 8 WRIGHTETAL,supra note 146, at 21-22 n.2; see also supra text accompanying note 146.
When this language was removed in its entirety, it perhaps reduced the import of the cases that
relied upon the "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial" provision to
hold that even pre- 1993 Rule 26(b)(4) did not prohibit formal discovery of information known
to the expert before she was retained. See supra note 183. In contrast to the elimination of the
"maybe obtained only as follows" language, the elimination of the "acquired or developed in
anticipation of litigation or for trial" language is not significant for disputes regarding
independent information gathering like ex parte communtications with experts, rather than
formal discovery.
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
In its current form, Rule 26(b)(4) still concerns discovery of expert related information, but
it is not the only portion of Rule 26 that outlines information parties must provide about expert
witnesses. See infra note 207. The portion of Rule 26(bX4) dealing with experts expected to
testify at trial states, "A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert
whose opinions may be presented at trial. If a report from the expert is required under
subdivision (a)(2)(B), the deposition shall not be conducted until after the report is provided."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A). Rule 26(b)(4) contains no language suggesting that discovery
regarding experts is limited to its provisions.
205. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's notes (1993 amendments).
206. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
207. Following the 1993 amendments, Federal Rule 26 compels a party to make "[r]equired
[d]isclosures," even in the absence of specific requests from the party's opponent. With regard
to experts, the required-disclosures provisions include the following:
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A)... [A] party shall disclose to the other parties the identity of any person
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide
expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the partyregularly
involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and
signed by the witness. The report shall contain a complete statement of all
opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore; the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; . . . the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by the
witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study
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trial-team-model advocates to suggest that the formal discovery rules prohibit these
communications. 0
Although some federal district courts attempted to avoid or minimize the 1993
changes regarding expert witnesses by adopting arguably invalid2" court orders or
and testimony, and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified
as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B).
When one compares the list of information now required in disclosures to the information
parties were required to provide in interrogatory answers concerning expert witnesses before
1993, there is some overlap. Under both the pre-1993 and the post-1993 versions of Rule 26,
parties are required to provide their opponents with a list of experts expected to testify, a
statement of the expert's opinions, and information about the bases of these opinions. See FED.
R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. (1992) (amended 1993). On the
other hand, the 1993Pnendments added required information about the expert that a party did
not have to provide in formal discovery before these amendments. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2)(B). This new required information includes the expert's exhibits, the expert's
qualifications, the expert's publications, and cases in which the expert testified previously. Id.
This is precisely the type of information that attorneys have been gathering in informal
discovery for years, with or without the cooperation of opposing counsel. Seesupra notes 157-
61 and accompanying text. Ifan attorney's gathering of such information actually was unethical
conduct that violated the formal discoveryrules, as the reasoning oftrial-team-model advocates
suggests, see supra notes 174-75, it is unlikely that the Advisory Committee would recognize
and authenticate such brazen behavior by requiring parties to disclose this information.
208. The elimination of any opportunity for a party to argue that pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4)
implicitly proscribed ex parte communications is consistent with the general purpose of the
1993 amendments to the federal discovery rules, which a leading federal procedure treatise
described as "a large step ... in the direction of unlimited discovery of expert witnesses." 8
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, § 2029, at 417-18.
209. Although several federal district courts attempted to opt out of some or all of the 1993
amendments that added Rule 26(a)(2)'s expert witness disclosure requirements, see infra note
210, these district courts probably never had the authority to adopt these opt-out rules.
While the 1993 version of Rule 26 included language authorizing limited "opt outs" of
some of the disclosure requirements, this language did not apply to the expert witness
disclosure requirements. The opt-out language appeared not in the introductoyportion of Rule
26(a) applicable to all of Rule 26(a), but in the introductory language in subsection (a)(1).
Between 1993 and 2000, subsection (a)(1) began with the phrase, "Except to the extent
otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule. .. ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), 28 U.S.C.
app. (1994) (amended 2000). The remainder of subsection (a)(1) outlined "[initial
[d]isclosures" that parties were required to make, in the absence of an order or local rule
absolving them of this responsibility. Id.
Subsection (a)(2) of Rule 26 contained a separate set of disclosure requirements regarding
"[e]xpert [t]estimony." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. (1994) (amended 2000).
Subsection (a)(2) was not changed in the 2000 amendments to Rule 26. See H.R. Doc. No.
106-228, at 15 (2000). Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) did not and does notcontain
any language allowing district courts to opt out of its disclosure requirements through court
orders or local rules. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). According to the Advisory Committee,
subsection (a)(2) "do[es] not authorize departure by local rule." Memorandum from Paul V.
Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Hon. Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 7 (June 30, 1998), reprinted in Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, 181
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local rules "opting out" of the expert witness disclosure requirements,210 these local
rules did not preserve the pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) "[d]iscovery. . maybe obtained
only"2" language relied upon by trial-team-model advocates.2 2 In the absence of this
language, there has been no formal discovery rule or other "rule[] of a tribunal 213
that, even stretched beyond its ternis, suggests that ex parte contact cannot take place
in federal cases since 1993. Even if one assumed arguendo that an implied ban on ex
parte contact was nonetheless somehow preserved by local rules opting out of the
1993 expertwitness disclosure requirements, the mostrecent changes to Rule 26 have
terminated this assumption.2 4 If federal district courts possessed the option to opt out
F.R.D. 19, 30 (proposed Aug. 1998).
210. See DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL Cm, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1998), reprinted in 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 146, at
XI-XXXVIII (2d ed. Supp. 2000) (charting each federal district's rules, as of the date of
publication).
Some of these local rules opted out of all of the expert witness disclosure requirements in
Rule 26(a)(2). E.g. General OrderNo. 42 (E.D, & W.D. Ark. Feb. 22,1994), ARK. CODEANN.
(COURT RULES) (2000) (withdrawn 2001); S.D. CAL. CivLR 26.1(f), CALIFORNIA RULES OF
COURT-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); S.D. FLA. L.R. 26.1(A), FLORIDA RULES OF
COURT-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); M.D. GA. L.L 33.2.1, GEORGIARULESOFCOURT
ANNOTATED (2000) (withdrawn 2001); D.ME.R. 26(d), MAINERULESOFCOURT-STATEAND
FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); E.D. OKLA. L.R. 26.3(A), OKLAHOMA COURT RULES AND
PROCEDURE-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); W.D. TEX. R. CV-16(c), TEXAS RULPS OF
COURT-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); Order (E.D. Wis. Jan. 7, 1994), WISCONSIN
COURTS RULES AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001).
Other district courts left Rule 26(a)(2)(A)'s requirement of an identification of expert
witnesses intact, but opted out of Rule 26(aX2)(B)'s expert report requirement and/or Rule
26(a)(2XC)'s provisions regarding the timing of expert witness disclosures. See E.D. CAL. R.
26-252(b) (opting out of Rule 26(a)(2)(B)), CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT-FEDERAL (2000)
(withdrawn 2001); N.D. & S.D. IowA L.R. 26.1(b) (opting out of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) & (C)),
IOWA RULES OF COURT-STATE AND FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); D.S.C. L.R. 1.03,
16.01 (opting out ofRule 26(a)(2)(B) & (C)), SOUTH CAROLINARULESOFCOURT-STATEAND
FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001).
211. See supra text accompanying note 146.
212. Some of the district courts opting out of the expert witness disclosure requirements
adopted local rules allowing parties to demand interrogatory answers containing expertwitness
information similar to that required by pre-1993 Rule 26(bX4), but these local rules did not
contain provisions suggesting that interrogatories requesting this information were the only
available means of formal discovery regarding expert witnesses. E.g. S.D. FLA. R. 26.1 (G)(2),
FLORIDA RULES OF COURT-FEDERAL (2000) (withdrawn 2001); M.D. GA. L.R. 33.2.2(4),
33.2.3(8), GEORGIA RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED (2000) (withdrawn 2001); D. S.C. L.R.
26.02, .03(D), .06(F), SOUTH CAROLNA RULES OF COURT-STATE AND FEDERAL (2000)
(withdrawn 2001).
213. MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(c);seesupra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
214. According to those responsible for proposing the 2000 amendments to Rule 26, these
amendments resulted largely from a desire to return to national uniformity in formal discovery
and disclosure, byeliminating anyauthoritythe district courts possessed to opt out of Rule 26's
requirements. See H.R. Doc. No. 106-228, at 53, 118-19 (2000); see also Lauren K. Robel,
Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory of Optional Rules, 14
REV. LrnG. 49, 59 (1994) (criticizing lack of national uniformity).
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of the 1993 expert witness disclosure requirements before December 1, 2000," ' the
amendments that went into effect on that date eliminated this option.216 Therefore,
there is no longer any basis for arguing that the formal discovery rules somehow
prohibit ex parte contact in federal cases.
Some states, however, still have formal discovery rules that include language
similar to the "[d]iscovery... may be obtained only as follows" language in the pre-
1993 version of the Federal Rules. In these states only, ex-parte-contact opponents
can cling to this language critical to their position and continue to try to promote their
flawed analysis. Even in these states though, the trend may be against them,217
because many states eventually adopt rules or statutes that mirror the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Evidence.2 Perhaps the slow death of even the opportunity
to try to stretch a nonauthoritative phrase in the formal discovery rules simply
underscores the dangers of trying to invent an ethical restriction based upon aninapplicable provision of law, instead of openly enacting an applicable professional
responsibility rule.21
9
215. Supra note 209.
216. Following the 2000 amendments, no portion of Rule 26(a) contains a provision
authorizing district courts to adopt local rules opting out of any disclosure requirement. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a); H.R. Doc. No. 106-228, at 101, 118-19 (2000).
Rule 26(a) does now exempt certain proceedings from the initial disclosure requirements
of subsection (a)(1), but this provision does not affect the expert witness disclosures required
under subsection (a)(2). FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(1)(E).
217. The Alaska experience maybe instructive. In 1985, the Alaska Bar Association Ethics
Committee opined that Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(4), which was similar to Federal Rule 26(bX4),
impliedly prohibited ex parte contact. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985),
1985 WL 301273, at *2. This provision of Alaska law was eliminated when Alaska adopted
expert witness disclosure and discoveryprovisions paralleling the post- 1993 version of Federal
Rule 26(a)(2). See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2), (b)(4). Therefore, in Alaska, as in the federal
system, the language that purportedly implied a prohibition on ex parte contact no longer
exists.
218. Supra notes 44,45,49, 147.
219. Professor Hazard and Mr. Hodes, two opponents ofex parte contact whose zeal on this
issue, like mine, see supra note 55, might stem in part from personal experience, apparently are
not willing to abandon their opposition to ex parte contact entirely. See 1 HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 126, § 3.4:402. Although their view of ex parte contact as unethical conduct is
based upon pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4)'s alleged implied prohibition of all "forms of contact"
outside of formal discovery, theyare unwilling to concede that the 1993 amendments removing
this language removes the heart of their position. Id. § 3.4:402 n.1. Instead, they contend,
"Although the new rules contemplate that parties will voluntarily disclose most information
about their experts and the opinions they hold, they still do not contemplate 'free form'
interviews...." Id. What Professor Hazard and Mr. Hodes fail to mention is that the revised
Federal Rules also do not prohibit ex parte interviews, be they "free form" or some other
variety. Without the formal discovery limiting language that previously was found in Federal
Rule 26(b)(4), one can no longer argue that only those informal discovery efforts
"contemplated" by the Rules are permissible.
Indeed, another opponent of ex parte contact of relatively long standing, the Oregon State
Bar Legal Ethics Committee, admits that the presence of language outlining formal expert
witness discovery provisions and identifying these provisions as the "only" acceptable methods
of discovery is critical. In 1990, the Oregon committee opined that ex parte contact was
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2. The "Protecting Information That Used to
Be Confidential" Concern
As a secondary rationalization forbanning ex parte contact, courts and other ethics
authorities often discuss concerns for communications and materials that were
confidential before the attorney hiring the expert revealed them to her.' 0 It is
undoubtedly correct that materials that had been protected by the work product
doctrine and communications that had been protected by the attorney-client privilege
occasionally are disclosed to expert witnesses by the attorneys who retain them.
Under the current rules, this voluntary sharing of these items does not mean that ex
impermissible in civil cases. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Conum, Op. 530 (1990), summarized
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106. Two years
later, the Oregon committee reexamined the issue and refined its position. In the 1992 opinion,
the committee determined that Federal Rule 26(b)(4)'s identification of interrogatories as the
"only" means of expert witness discovery rendered ex parte contact impermissible in federal
civil cases. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 3 (1992), summarized
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; accord Or.
State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1998-154 (1998), 1998 WL 717729, at *1.
Oregon's state formal discovery rules contain no provisions for expert witness discovery, see
Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 3-4 (1992), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122, and, therefore,
no statement that is available to be stretched to forbid informal discovery. As a result of the
absence of such provisions, the committee found that ex parte contact was permissible in
Oregon state civil cases. See id at 5-6; accord Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Cormn., Formal Op.
1998-154 (1998), 1998 WL 717729, at *1 ("Because there is no statute, administrative
regulation, or court rule that restricts ex pare contact with an adverse expert in a workers'
compensation proceeding, there is no ethical limitation on doing so, except as discussed below
[regarding discussion of privileged and work product items]."). This differentiation between
federal and state cases in Oregon demonstrates that the "ex parte contact as ethically
impermissible" argument cannot be credibly advanced without at least a rule limiting formal
discovery.
In the same manner, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility opined that whether cx parte contact was impermissible turned upon whether
the relevant jurisdiction had a provision like the pre-1993 version of Rule 26(b)(4). The
committee summarized its findings as follows:
The Committee ... concludes that, although the Model Rules do not specifically
prohibit a lawyer in a civil matter from making ex parte contact with the opposing
party's expert witness, such contacts would probably constitute a violation of Rule
3.4(c) if the matter is pending in federal court or in a jurisdiction that has adopted an
expert-discoveryrule patterned after Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(A). Conversely, ifthe matter
is not pending in such ajurisdiction, there would be no violation.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :209 (emphasis
in original).
220. The issues discussed in this and related sections are considered in greater depth in
Easton, supra note 23, at 576-605.
221. To avoid repeating the phrase "materials that bad been protected by the work product
doctrine and communications that had been protected by the attorney-client privilege," this
Article will sometimes use the phrase "work product materials and attorney-client
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parte communications are impermissible. It also does not justify enactment of a ban
on ex parte communications.
a. Using Confidentiality Concerns to Attempt
to Justify Bans on Ex Parte Contact
Perhaps in recognition of the tenuous nature of the alleged discovery-rules-
violation justification for decisions banning ex parte communications, several courts
and ethics authorities have attempted to justify this ban with references to concern for
attorney-client communications and attorney m work product material.'
b. Understanding the Limits of Confidentiality
Given the attention that the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege
have received from trial-team-model advocates, one might conclude that expert
witnesses are commonly inpossession of material protected by one of these doctrines.
This is not, or at least should not be, the case. While attorneys occasionally disclose
communications and materials to experts that would otherwise be protected by
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, the limited reach of these
doctrines makes them generally inapplicable to data forwarded by an attorney to her
expert, at least when the attorney is careful in forwarding that data.
i. The Work Product Doctrine and the
Attorney-Client Privilege Usually Do Not
Apply to Data Disclosed to Expert Witnesses
In many instances, the data communicated by an attorney to her expert witness is
notprotectedby either the workproduct doctrine orthe attorney-clientprivilege. Both
doctrines apply only in limited circumstances, and neither protects information just
because that information is included in protected materials or communications.
Instead, the work product doctrine outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
merely places "documents and tangible things" ' outside the scope of discovery,
communications" or the word "items."
222. See infra note 225.
223. See Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 404 S.E.2d 607, 612 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing
expert's communications with attorneywho originallyretained him); Or. State Bar Legal Ethics
Comm., Op. 530, at 627 (1990) (opining that an attorney who directly contacted adverse
experts "interfered with the obligation of [opposing] counsel to maintain confidences and
secrets of the client"), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra
note 116, at 901:7106; cf. Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693,
700-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (concerning experts who were interviewed briefly by attorneys,
but not retained by them).
224. FED. IL CIrv. P. 26(bX3). Although Rule 26(b)(3)'s outline of the work product rule
refers to "documents and tangible things," the work product doctrine has also been applied to
communications that have not been reduced to writing or to another tangible format. In an
example that is particularly relevant to the discussion at hand, courts have applied the work
product doctrine and related waiver principles to conversations between attorneys and their
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absent a showing of substantial need, when the documents and things were prepared
by attorneys in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. 6 Most states
expert witnesses, even when these conversations have not been recorded anywhere but the
memories of the attorneys and experts. Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289,
295-96 (W.D. Mich. 1995). Similarly, the work product doctrine has been applied to an
attorney's thoughts and recollections. 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 146, § 2024, at 337-38.
Therefore, the references to work product "materials" in the Article should be read to
include materials, communications, and thoughts that have not been recorded in tangible form.
Given the need to use the term "communications" in references to both attorney-client
communications and ex parte communications, the shorthand term "materials" has been
adopted simply for the sake of clarity.
225. As outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the work product doctrine covers
materials prepared "by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative," not
simply materials prepared by or under the direction of an attorney. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); 8
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, at 14-15. However, for purposes ofthe debate about whether
work product protection has been waived and the work product materials are therefore
obtainable in formal (and therefore informal, see infra-notes 268-70 and accompanying text)
discovery, work product issues often concern whether formal or informal discovery would
result in "disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
In almost every dispute about whether work product protection has been waived by disclosure
to an expert, the work product materials at issue were prepared by or under the direction of an
attorney, and the concern is whether discovery of these materials by the opponent would
expose an attorney's mental impressions or opinions. Therefore, for purposes of this section
of the Article, the terms "attorney work product" and "work product" are essentially
interchangeable.
226. The scope of the work product doctrine is defined by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and similar provisions in state discovery rules, statutes, and case law. Federal Rule
26(b)(3) states:
TrialPreparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other
party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3).
It is significant that the provisions of this federal work product rule are explicitly "[s]ubject
to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this Rule," id., which outlines the scope of discovery
regarding testifying experts. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4); see B.C.F. Oil Ref., Inc. v. Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 171 F.R.D. 57, 66-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("ITihe drafters of the rule
understood the policies behind expert disclosure and the work product doctrine and have
decided that disclosure of material generated or consulted by the expert is more important.");
Applegate, supra note 32, at 297 ("By providing for discovery of expert opinions 'developed
in anticipation of litigation,' [pre-1993] rule 26(b)(4) carves out an exception to rule 26(b)(3)
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have similar work product rules .17 In a similar manner, the attorney-client privilege
protects some communications between an attorney and a client from disclosure, but
only when several conditions are met.' Given the limited circumstances in which
for ordinary (nonopinion) work product. Some courts have interpreted rule 26(b)(4) as simply
overriding rule 26(b)(3) for experts who will testify."). Furthermore, it is arguably significant
that the list of party representatives in Rule 26(b)(3) does not include the term "expert." These
indications suggest that the work product doctrine should have little or no application to
materials prepared by the expert or forwarded to the expert.
Rule 26(b)(3)'s outline of the work product doctrine traces its origin to the well-known
Supreme Court case that first articulated the doctrine, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
For discussions of Hickman and its effect on work product law, see generally 8 WRIGHT ETAL.,
supra note 146, § 2022, at 318-26. According to the authors, Rule 26(b)(3) "was designed as
a largely accurate codification of the doctrine announced in the Hickman case and developed
in later cases in the lower courts." Id. § 2023. There is some room to argue that Hickman
continues to define the scope of the work product doctrine in some situations not covered by
Rule 26(b)(3). See generally Easton, supra note 23, at 541 n.235 (citing Maynard v. Whirlpool
Corp., 160 F.R.D. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (stating that contours of the work product doctrine
outside of those found in Rule 26(b)(3) are found in Hickman)). Others suggest that Hickman
has been replaced by Rule 26(b)(3) as the outline of work product law for federal civil cases.
See Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Techs., Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The law
relating to work product began with Hickman v. Taylor .... However, since 1970, all of the
standards and procedures for making claims of work product are embraced in [Rule] 26(b)(3)."
(citation omitted)); Seal v. Univ. ofPittsburgh, 135 F.R.D. 113, 114 (W.D. Pa. 1990) ("[T]he
protection of work product arising from the case offHickman v. Taylor has been supplanted by
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . ." (citation omitted)); see also
Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917,
921 (1983) ("The [Hickman] work-product doctrine was codified and incorporated in rule 26
of the revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'); Plunkett, supra note 64, at 454.
227. According to Professors Wright, Miller, and Marcus, "34 states have adopted verbatim
copies of Rule 26(b)(3), and ten others have provisions that differ but appear very similar in
operation." 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, § 2023, at 334-35 (citations omitted).
228. In 1950, a federal judge outlined the attorney-client privilege in a passage that,
according to a popular procedural treatise, has since been "widely quoted":
The privilege applies only if(l) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357,358 (D. Mass. 1950), quoted in 8
WRIGHT ETAL, supra note 146, § 2017, at 256 &n.6 ("Though favored by many courts, Judge
Wyzanski's formulation is only one of several.").
Dean Wigmore articulated another popular outline of the attorney-client privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
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these doctrines apply, it can be safely assumed that most items considered by expert
witnesses were not at any time protected by either the work product doctrine2 or the
attorney-client privilege.20
It is important to remember that a given piece of information cannot be rendered
either "work product information" or "attorney-client information" simply by
incorporating that piece of information into work product materials or attorney-client
communications, because the law does notprotect the underlying information that is
included within work product materialsnl or attorney-client communications. " 2
waived.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvIENCE § 2292, at 554 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961) (emphasis
omitted), quoted in Beal v. Washton, 472 A.2d 812, 813 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983); see also E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 718 A.2d 1129, 1138 (Md. 1998) (citing
Wigmore).
For examples of discussions about the attorney-client privilege, see William V. Dorsaneo
III & Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Time Present, Time Past, Time Future: Understanding the
Scope ofDiscovery in Texas Courts, 29 Hous. L. REv. 245,284 (1992); Easton, supra note 23,
at 592-97; Adam M. Chud, Note, In Defense ofthe Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 84
CoRNEaLL. REv. 1682 (1999); JasonMarin, NoteInvokingthe US. Attorney-ClientPrivilege:
Japanese Corporate Quasi-Lawyers Deserve Protection in U.S. Courts Too, 21 FoRDHAm
INT'L L.J. 1558 (1998).
229. See Easton, supra note 23, at 577-79.
230. See id. at 594; Marcus, supra note 63, at 1605 ("[A]ttorney-client privilege is available
only when an elaborate series of requirements is satisfied . ..
231. B.C.F. Oil Ref., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 171 F.R.D. 57, 62-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("There is ample authority that any facts provided to an expert, even if
provided by an attorney, are required to be disclosed."); cfi 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146,
§ 2023, at 330-32, § 2024, at 337 ("Rule 26(b)(3) ... does not bar discovery of facts a party
may have learned from documents that are not themselves discoverable.').
Even the lead decision in the line of cases holding that disclosure of work product materials
to an expert does not constitute a waiver ofwork product protection recognizes that the factual
information contained within work product materials is discoverable. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984). The Bogosian decision states:
Of course, where the same [work product] document contains both facts and
legal theories of the attorney, the adversary party is entitled to discovery of the
facts. It would represent a retreat from the philosophy underlying the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure if a party could shield facts from disclosure by the
expedient of combining them or interlacing them with core work product.
Id.; see also Haworth, Inc. v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289, 295 (W.D. Mich. 1995)
(following Bogosian) ("[A]il factual information considered by the expert must be disclosed
in the [expert] report.").
Professor Sherman Cohn outlined the scope of the work product doctrine with a similar
caution:
The work-product concept applies only to "documents and tangible things."
Thus, a party's mental information is not protected by the work-product doctrine,
even if that information was obtained by means that would normally fall under
work-product protection. Obviously, whatever a party did, saw, heard, or felt may
be investigated ifrelevant. Moreover, information known by a party, but acquired
from another person, may be discovered, assuming, of course, that it is relevant
and not privileged.
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Cohn, supra note 226, at 923.
Work product decisions and commentary often distinguish between "core" or "opinion"
work product materials-meaning those portions of materials reflecting an attorney's "mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)-which are not
discoverable absent a waiver of work product protection, and the portions of work product
materials that contain factual information, which may be discoverable even without a waiver
of work product protection. See, e.g., Smith v. Transducer Tech., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 260, 262
(D.V.I. 2000); Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191 F.R.D. 638, 644-45 (D. Kan. 2000); Haworth, 162
F.R.D. at 292 (referring to "attorney opinion work product" and "core work product"); 28
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTORJ. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6188, at 482
(1993 & Supp. 2000); Dorsaneo & Thornburg, supra note 228, at 274 (referring to "pure
opinion work product"); Gregory P. Joseph, Emerging Expert Issues Under the 1993
Disclosure Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 164 F.R.D. 97, 102 (1996)
(referring to "core work-product"); Waits, supra note 32, at 385 (discussing "opinion work
product"); George E. Lieberman, Experts and the Discovery/Disclosure of Protected
Communication, R.I. BAR J., Feb. 1995, at 7 ('This type of material has been referred to as
'core' or'opinion work product."'). This Article is not primarily concerned with whether work
product materials are discoverable absent a waiver under the provisions of Rule 26(b)(3)
allowing for such discovery upon a "showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Instead, this section of the Article focuses upon those situations where an
attorney has shown an expert witness "core" or "opinion" work product disclosing the
attorney's mental impressions and thereby, in some jurisdictions, waived work product
protection.
Of course, the line between "fact" and "core"/"opinion" work product is not always easy
to draw. Materials prepared by or under the direction of attorneys often include both facts and
mental impressions of attorneys or their subordinates. Examples include statements taken from
witnesses, attorneys' notes of conversations with witnesses, attorney-authored excerpts of
records or documents, and other "attorney-prepared compilations of facts." Joseph, supra, at
102. As noted above and in the text, when the underlying facts are documented in sources other
than materials prepared by or on behalf of an attorney, work product issues will generally not
arise, because facts can be communicated to the expert witness without disclosure of work
product materials. However, there may be instances when the fact is established only by the
work product material, and the attorney cannot communicate it to the expert without exposing,
at least to some extent, the attorney's mental impressions. It is these circumstances when core
work product must be disclosed to communicate underlying facts to an expert that are the sole
legitimate concern in the ex parte communication debate. It is these circumstances that are
explored, under the admittedly somewhat imprecise rubric of "work product materials," in the
remainder of this section of the Article.
232. An attorney cannot render information privileged simply by including it in a
communication with her client. See Magida ex rel. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Continental Can
Co., 12 F.R.D. 74,76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (stating that an attorney cannot claim attorney-client
protection by including independently obtained information in advice given to a client); cf
Attorney General v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (D.D.C. 1977) (stating
that because attorney-client privilege does not extend to information obtained by attorneys,
attorneys who were lobbyists for foreign governments could be required to provide such
information); J.P. Foley& Co. v. Vanderbilt, 65 F.R.D. 523,526-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding
that when an attorney obtains information from a source other than client and then conveys it
to the client, the information is "not based upon the confidential communications of the client"
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Indeed, it is somewhat misleading to use the term "confidential information" when
discussing concerns about work product materials and attorney-client
communications, because the law does not give any protection to the underlying
information contained in work product materials or attorney-client communications.
Instead, in some instances, materials or communications that include underlying
information, but not the information itself, may be protected by the work product
doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. To clarify this potentially confusing matter,
assume that a client tells her attorney "the light was already red before I got into the
intersection," and assume further that the attorney writes a file memorandum that
memorializes this statement If all of the conditions of the attorney-client privilege
under the law of the relevant jurisdiction have been met, 3 the fact that the client told
her attorney that the light was red will be protected by the attomey-client privilege,
unless and until there is a waiver.' The attorney's file memorandum may be
protected by the work product doctrine," s unless and until there is a waiver."6
However, the underlying information (i.e., the client's memory regarding the status
of the light when she entered the intersection) is not protected by either the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine, and the opposing party is entitled to
obtain this information through discovery. 7 Therefore, except in the relatively
unusual circumstances where the work product material or the attorney-client
communication is the only source ofa particular piece of information,3 8 the attorney
and therefore not privileged); Jerald David August, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine in Federal Tax Controversies, 83 J. TAx'N 197, 198 (1995) (stating that the
attorney-client privilege "does not apply to information received by the attorney from third
parties").
In a similar vein, a client cannot render a piece of information privileged simply by
including it in a communication with her attorney. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed:
[P]rotection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to the facts.
A fact is one thing and a communication concerning the fact is an entirely
different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, "What did
you say or write to the attorney?" but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact
within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into
his communication to his attorney.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (emphasis in original); see also 8
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, § 2017, at 269 ("A document, which would be subject to
discovery in the client's possession, does not become privileged because the client sends it to
the attorney.').
233. See supra note 228.
234. See infra notes 248-70 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 226.
236. See infra notes 248-70 and accompanying text.
237. The most apparent discovery devices for obtaining this information would be an
interrogatory asking the party to state her recollection regarding the light at the time she entered
the intersection under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a deposition question
asking for the same information under Rule 30 or Rule 31.
238. Circumstanceswhere attorney-clientcommunications orworkproductmaterials are the
only items documenting a particular piece of information are rare, but not difficult to imagine.
For example, one could create such a scenario by assuming, in addition to the facts in the
hypothetical outlined in the text, that the only time that the client ever told anybody about the
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can make the expert aware of the underlying information without disclosingthe work
product material or attorney-client conmunication to the expert. 9
Even in the relatively rare circumstances where an attorney must disclose work
product materials or attorney-client communications to an expert witness to make her
aware of some underlying information, there is no need to ban ex parte
communications with the expert. After all, the only work product materials or
attorney-client communications that an expert could possibly pass on to opposing
counsel during ex parte contact are materials or communications that the expert
received from the attorney or party that retained her.' Once an attorney passes
materials or communications on to a testifying expert, the materials and
communications can no longer truly be called confidential."' The attorney's actions
in passing the previously confidential materials and communications on to her expert
does and should have consequences.
status of the light was the time she told her attorney and that the client is no longer able to state
her recollection, due to death, amnesia, or some medical condition that renders her unable to
communicate.
239. See supra note 231.
In many circumstances, the underlying fact will even be included in something other than
(or, more precisely, in addition to) attorney-client communications or work product materials.
For example, the client's recollection regarding the status of the light might be included in a
police report regarding the accident, in her postaccident conversation with the other driver or
someone else at the accident scene, in her conversations about the accident with various
acquaintances, in her answers to interrogatories, and in her answers to deposition questions.
240. If a third party (i.e., a person other than the client, the attorney, and persons working
for the attorney) is present when an attorney communicates with a client, the attorney-client
privilege generally does not attach to the communication. See supra note 228. If portions of
the information obtained in a privileged communication are disclosed to third parties in a
nonprivileged communication, a waiver of the attorney-client privilege is generally found. 8
WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, § 2016.2, at 248-49; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 101,
§ 79. Therefore, if a third party has a certain piece of information, it is not protected by the
attorney-client communication. In order for the attorney-client privilege to attach to a certain
communication and still exist at the time that the expert is made aware of the communication,
the expert must be notified of the communication by the client, her attorney, or persons
working with the attorney. If any other person is aware of the communication, as such a person
would have to be in order to disclose it to the expert, the attorney-client privilege would have
already been waived by virtue of the disclosure of the communication to this third person. See
supra note 228.
241. At a minimum, the information is no longer as confidential as it was before the attorney
passed it on to her expert. Therefore, it is not persuasive for trial-team-model advocates to
simply label the materials passed on to expert witnesses "confidential" and then argue that a
concern for the confidentiality of this material overrides the potential benefits of ex parte
communications. As this section of the Article argues, work product and attorney-client law
neither can nor should protect information about the formation of the expert's opinions from
the cross-examiner and the jurors.
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ii. The Model Rules Do Not Prohibit Informal
Information-Gathering Efforts That Might
Result in Disclosure of Previously
Confidential Materials and Communications
Concern for the possibility that a witness, fact or expert, who has been advised of
previously confidential materials or communication might disclose them to an
attorney other than the one who disclosed them has not resulted in any ethical rule
banning informal discovery that could lead to such disclosures. In the absence of such
a rule, ex parte communications are ethically permissible.
While it is true that attorneys or parties may forward previously confidential
materials and communications to expert witnesses, it is also true that attorneys or
parties may forward previously confidential materials and communications to fact
witnesses. Despite this possibility, courts and other ethics authorities have
consistently determined that attorneys can conduct ex parte interviews of
unrepresented fact witnesses. There is no ethics rule prohibiting such contact'u3
With regard to an attorney's right to conduct ex parte interviews, the Model Rules
and their state incarnations do not contain any distinction between fact witnesses and
expert witnesses. Instead, the only distinctions are between witnesses who are
represented by counsel and unrepresented witnesses. 2' In the absence of a distinction
inthe ethical rules between fact and expert witnesses, the repeated decisions allowing
apartyto interviewwitnesses exparte are controlling, despite thepossiilitythat such
interviews could possibly result in disclosure of materials and communications that
were confidential before the attorney forwarded them to the witness. 5
242. See supra note 114.
243. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
In fact, the most relevant Model Rules provision regarding ex parte communications with
witnesses restrains the conduct not of the attorney conducting the ex parte communications,
but of the attorney who might consider asking witnesses not to participate in thenm. See infra
Part V.
244. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
As an aspect of the distinction between persons, including entities, represented by counsel
and unrepresented persons, some employees of represented entities are within the group of
persons that an opposing attorney cannot contact. See supra note 116.
245. Courts haveheld that doctrines allowing apartyto refrain fromdisclosing certain items,
like the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege, should be narrowly confined
and strictly construed. For example, the Fourth Circuit quoted Wigmore's warning about the
privilege:
"Mhe [attorney-client] privilege remains an exception to the general duty to
disclose. Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and
concrete... . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is
nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly
confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle."
N.L.R.B. v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900,907 (4th Cir. 1965) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 228,
§ 2292).
Even Professor Richard Marcus, who argues thatwaivers ofprivileges should be found only
in substantially more limited circumstances than those outlined in current law and advocated
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In reality, given the latitude that experts, but not fact witnesses, possess to form and
testify to opinions based upon inadmissible data made known to them outside the
trial, 2' it is even more important for attorneys to be able to pursue reasonable efforts
to obtain information about the data made known to experts than it is for them to
pursue such efforts with regard to fact witnesses. 7
iii. Disclosure of Previously Confidential
Materials and Communications to Testifying
Experts Should Be, and Often Is, Considered a
Waiver of Work Product and Attomey-Client
Protection
Although the law regarding waiver of work product and attorney-client protection
is far from uniform,'" the precedent in some, though not all, 9 jurisdictions
here, concedes, "Because the 'sacred' privileges contravene the maxim that the law has a right
to every person's evidence, American law has set its head against them since the mid-
nineteenth century." Marcus, supra note 63, at 1605.
For examples of similar statements about other privileges, see United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that privileges are "exceptions to the demand for every man's
evidence [that] are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of
the search for truth"); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand,
J.) (declaring that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a "privilege...
to suppress the truth, but that does not mean that it is a privilege to garble it").
246. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
247. Professor Waits has noted that the argument for formal discovery of work product
disclosed to expert witnesses is even stronger than the argument for formal discovery of work
product disclosed to fact witnesses. Waits, supra note 32, at 441 n.198; see also infra note 268.
248. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997),
reprinted in ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 116, at 1101:132, :134 n.2 (discussing varied
court decisions regarding whether disclosure of work product to a testifying expert is a waiver
of work product protection); Waits, supra note 32, at 391; Jeff A. Anderson et al., Special
Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELLL. REV. 760,763 (1983) ("[W]ork product
protection is the most frequentlylitigated discovery issue." (citing4 JAMES WM. MOOREETAL,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.14, at 26-285 (2d ed. 1996))); Dan Nelson, Comment,
Discovery of Attorney-Expert Communications: Current State of and Suggestionsfor, Federal
and Missouri Practice, 57 Mo. L. REV. 247, 251 (1992).
Despite, or perhaps as a result of, the diversity of opinions and the unsettled state of work
product doctrine and attorney-client privilege law, many have taken on the task of attempting
to catalog or review the law. See, e.g., Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, in CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL
CILPRACTICE 1996, at 589 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. H-
540, 1996); see also August, supra note 232; Waits, supra note 32; Bryan Lewis, Note,
Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ofAttorney Work Product Provided to
an Expert Witness, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1159 (1985); Nelson, supra; Carlisle G. Packard,
Case Note, Opinion Work Product, Expert Witness Discovery, and the Interaction of Rules
26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4)(4): Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 1985 BYU L. REV. 573 (1985);
Katherine A. Staton, Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert
Witness, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 812 (1985).
249. For cases holding that disclosure of attorney-client communications or work product
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establishes that disclosure of materials or communications to a testifying expert
constitutes a waiver of some or all of the protection that previously attached to them.
In these jurisdictions, disclosure of work product or attorney-client items to a
testifying expert results in allowing the opposing party to demand access to the items
in the formal discovery process."
The decisions holding that disclosure to an expert witness of items previously
protected by the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege constitutes a
waiver are well reasoned" because the Federal Rules of Evidence' 2 and similar state
evidence-law provisions" give expert witnesses tremendous leeway.' Because
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to base her opinions upon information
that an attorney makes known to her, S an attorney may ethically and legitimately
provide her experts with most or all of the raw data that serves as the basis for her
opinions, outside the presence of her opponent. This feeding of data by the attorney
material to an expert does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the protections of these
doctrines, see infra notes 261,267.
250. See infra notes 257-67 and accompanying text.
251. See Easton, supra note 23, at 579-83, 592-97.
252. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 44, 45, 49 and accompanying text.
254. See Easton, supra note 23, at 483-91; supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
In addition to the Rule 703 issues discussed in the text, there are discovery issues arising
out of other Federal Rules of Evidence provisions. Under Rule 612(2), a court may provide for
an adverse party to receive a document reviewed by a witness "to refresh memory for the
purpose of testifying" if "the court in its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests
of justice." FED. R. EviD. 612. For discussions of the waiver issues related to Rule 612,
sometimes in a fact witness context rather than an expert witness context, see Intermedics, Inc.
v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384,386 n.I (N.D. Cal. 1991); 28 WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note
231, § 6188; Applegate, supra note 32, at 314-22; George A. Davidson & William H. Voth,
Waiver oftheAttorney-Client Privilege, 64 OR. L. REV. 637,657-58 (1986); Floyd, supra note
85, at 118-35; Joseph, supra note 23 1, at 102-03; Mickus, supra note 48, at 801-02; Plunkett,
supra note 63, at 462-64; William S. Blair, Comment, Intellectual Property-the Pitfalls of
Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver in Patent Law, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 769,779 (1998); Megan
McCrea, Case Note, Sporckv. Peil, 759F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985), 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1043 (1986).
Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits the exploration of the basis for an
expert's opinion during cross-examination, also has been cited by those considering issues
regarding expert witness disclosure. See Easton, supra note 23, at 530 n.186.
255. See FED. R. EVID. 703; supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
256. Often, an attorney provides the data that ultimately becomes the basis for the expert's
opinions in witness preparation meetings with the expert. As one observer noted:
[E]xpert witnesses require considerable preparation. They ordinarily lack the
personal knowledge required of other witnesses; without preparation, they could
not testify at all. Consequently, the Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate some
degree of preparation by the sponsoring party .... The basis of the expert's
testimony can be "facts or data ... made known... at or before the hearing."
Witness preparation usuallyprovides the foundational material for the testimony.
Applegate, supra note 32, at 295-96 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting FED.
R. EVID. 703); see also In re Air Crash Disaster, 720 F. Supp. 1442, 1444 (D. Colo. 1988);
Easton, supra note 23, at 495-96; Mickus, supra note 48, at 788-89.
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to her retained expert should notbe without consequences, however.' To adequately
cross-examine an adverse expert, an attorney must be allowed to discover"8 all of the
data that the expert considered in forming her opinion, including that which was
provided to her by the attorney who retained her. 9 The data that the expert
considered and "rejected" in the process of forming her opinion is often as important
to an attorney preparing for cross-examination as the data that the expert used as the
basis for her opinion.'
257. See B.C.F. Oil Ref., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 171 F.R.D. 57, 67
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]he adverse party needs to know the information [shared by an attorney
with an expert witness] in order to conduct an effective cross examination."); Applegate, supra
note 32, at 296 ("Because the expert's conclusions depend on the groundwork provided by the
preparer, the cross-examiner's access to the preparatory material is essential."); Waits, supra
note 32, at 440-41 ("The attorney's opinions are irrelevant only as long as they remain in the
attorney's head or files. Once those thoughts are shared with an expert witness, they may well
become part of the witness's thoughts about the case, a highly relevant subject." (emphasis in
original)).
258. Preparation for expert witness cross-examination is widely recognized as a legitimate,
if not necessary, reason to conduct formal expert discovery. See, e.g., Vaughan Furniture Co.
v. Featureline Mfg., Inc., 156 F.R.D. 123, 128 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (stating that opinion work
product documents considered by an expert "are necessary for appropriate cross-examination
and should be made available prior to trial because the pretrial deposition of expert witnesses
can be used to explore the witnesses' biases" (citations omitted)); Occulto v. Adamar of N.J.,
Inc., 125 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Meaningful discovery of an expert's opinions is
necessary to foster effective cross-examination... ." (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory
committee's notes (1970 amendments))); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404,407-08 (D. Colo.
1983) (holding that pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) provided for formal expert discovery "so that a
party may prepare for cross-examination and impeachment of any prospective witness');
Nelson, supra note 248, at 257 ("The fundamental purpose behind [pre-1993] Rule 26(b)(4)
lies in the need for counsel to cross-examine expert witnesses effectively." (citations omitted)).
259. See Kam v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633,640 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("Without pretrial access to
attorney-expert communications, opposing counsel may not be able to effectively reveal the
influence that counsel has achieved over the expert's testimony." (citations omitted));
Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 393-94; In re Air Crash Disaster, 720 F. Supp. at 1444 (holding
that because experts often get facts from attorneys, opposing counsel must be allowed to
discover attorney-provided data to effectively impeach them); Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 408;
Capalbo v. Balf Co., No. CV-90-0377507S, 1994 WL 65214, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 23,
1994); Waits, supra note 32, at 441 (discussing a party's interest in the work product
documents provided by opposing counsel to her experts). As Professor Waits noted, "It can
hardly be said that documents reviewed by the expert prior to his testimony are irrelevant,
particularly when theywere produced by someone so keenly interested in moving the witness's
testimony toward a particular conclusion." Id.
-260. Under the pre-1993 Federal Rules and equivalent state discovery provisions, some
jurisdictions held that disclosure of work product to expert witnesses is a waiver of work
product protection that renders all disclosed work product discoverable. See infra note 261.
Other jurisdictions held that disclosure of work product to an expert is not necessarily a waiver
of work product protections. See infra note 261.
There has been a third line of cases. Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which expanded formal expert witness discovery, several courts held that
disclosure of work product to an expert constituted a waiver of work product protection only
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Even before the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
similar state discovery provisions expanding expert witness discovery, some
jurisdictions considered an attorney's disclosure of work product materials261 or
when the expert based her opinion on the disclosed work product. See Dominguez v. Syntex
Labs., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 158, 164 (S.D. Ind. 1993); Occulto, 125 F.R.D. at 615; Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. v. Blackmon, 810 S.W.2d 438,440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Lieberman, supra note 231,
at 7-8. Although this appears at first blush to be a compromise between work product concerns
and an opposing party's need to prepare for expert cross-examination, in practice it severely
handicapped the opposing party by allowing the hiding ofproblematic information. Under this
system, an expert could ignore information in workproduct materials thatwas inconsistent with
her opinions and thereby protect the inconsistent information from disclosure to the opposing
attomeywho could have used the information to impeach the expert during cross-examination.
See Joseph, supra note 231, at 103-04 (noting "experts' burying relevant but adverse
information through the mental gymnastic of deciding that they did not rely on it"); Easton,
supra note 23, at 556-69.
In federal courts and state courts where the 1993 Federal Rules amendments expanding
formal expert witness discovery or equivalent state provisions are now in effect, there should
no longer be a distinction between work product and other information available to an expert
that she relied upon in forming her opinions and work product and other information that she
did not rely upon in forming her opinions. Easton, supra note 23, at 537-43. Under the post-
1993 version of the Rules, "data or information considered by the [expert] witness" is
discoverable. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2XB) (emphasis added). As even a court that entered a
decision that limited the effect of the 1993 amendments to formal expert discovery noted,
"[Post-1993] Rule 26(a)(2) specifically requires disclosure of factual information considered
but not relied upon, as well as information that was considered andrelied upon." Haworth, Inc.
v. Herman Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289, 296 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (emphasis in original); see
also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., No. 98-CV-838S(F), 2000 WL 1843258, at *8
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 2,2000) ("[A]ny information... provided to an expert for his consideration
in forming an opinion for trial is subject to disclosure."); Karn, 168 F.R.D. at 635-36
("Considered,' which simplymeans 'to take into account,' clearlyinvokes abroaderspectrum
of thought than the phrase 'relied upon,' which requires dependence on the information....
In this case, the experts reviewed the documents in connection with forming their opinions.
Thus, they 'considered' the information, mandating disclosure." (citations omitted)); Vaughan
Furniture, 156 F.R.D. at 128 ("Opinion documents which could have an influence on the
expert opinion could include ones discussing trial strategy, even if the opinions were rejected
as a basis for the expert opinion." (citation omitted)). In addition, as one author noted:
No longer are the [discoverable] documents limited to those upon which the
expert relied in forming her opinion, but, rather, also those merely 'considered'
by the expert. 'Consider' is defined as 'to think about seriously,' 'to regard,' 'to
take into account,' and/or 'to bear in mind.' Assuredly, 'to consider' is vastly
broader and more encompassing than 'to rely upon.'
Lieberman, supra note 231, at 10 (citations omitted).
261. See U.S. Energy Corp. v. Nukem, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 344,348 (D. Colo. 1995) (decided
under pre-1993 version ofRule 26(b)(4)); William Penn Life Assurance Co. v. Brown Transfer
& Storage Co., 141 F.R.D. 142, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 397; In re
Air Crash Disaster, 720 F. Supp. at 1444; Beverage Mktg. Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct
Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407 ("[TJhe
opinion work product rle is no exception to discovery under circumstances where documents
which contain mental impressions are examined and reviewed by expert witnesses before their
expert opinions are formed." (citations omitted)); Emergency Care Dynamics v. Superior Court,
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attorney-client communications262 to an expert a waiver of protection. In jurisdictions
with post-1993 Federal Rules or similarly expansive views of expert witness
discovery, 3 a party is now explicitly entitled to learn about all of the data that an
932 P.2d 297, 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (decided under Arizona's pre-1993 version of Rule
26(bX4)) ("We hold that alawyer foregoes work-product protection for communications with
an expert witness concerning the subject of the expert's testimony ... ."); Stearrett v.
Newcomb, 521 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) ("When plaintiffs forwarded those
documents to a prospective expert with the expectation that that expert might testify at trial,
plaintiffs waived any claim of privilege or benefit of work product."); Applegate, supra note
32, at 297 ("[T]he courts have been extremely reluctant to accord work-product protection to
communications between a lawyer and an expert.").
Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, decisions holding
that disclosure of work product to an expert constituted a waiver were far from universal. See
B.C.F. Oil Ref., Inc., 171 F.R.D. at 64-65 (outlining the conflicting precedent under the pre-
1993 Federal Rules); Rail Intermodal Specialists, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 154 F.R.D.
218, 219-21 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (similar); Waits, supra note 32, at 397-408 (outlining the split
in authority); Pretty, supra note 178, at 115-16 (similar); Lewis, supra note 248, at 1163-65
(similar); Nelson, supra note 248, at 258-63 (similar). Even after the 1993 amendments, some
courts have not required disclosure of all work product materials that had been disclosed to a
testifying expert. See infra note 267.
262. See McCue v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1450,1461 (T.C. 1983); cf. Capalbo,
1994 WL 65214, at *2 ("[A] waiver of the privilege exists where an agent of the attorney, here
an expert, is to testify-the client has impliedly, if not actually, consented to disclosure of the
information given to the attorney by way of the expert."); Easton, supra note 23, at 596-97
(discussing similar issues raised when a party's attorney later becomes a witness for that party).
It has been suggested that it is easier to waive the attorney-client privilege by disclosing
documents to experts than it is to waive the work product privilege by similar actions. See
United States v. 499.472 Acres of Land, CIV.A. H-79-1884, 1986 WL 13443, at "1-'2 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 21, 1986).
As with work product, the decisions regarding whether attorney-client communications
shared with experts were discoverable under pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) and similarruleswerenot
uniform. Some courts have found that disclosure of attorney-client communications to experts
does not necessarily constitute a waiver. See Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D.
627, 638-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 907-08 (Mont.
1993). Other courts found waiver only to the extent that an expert relied upon the attorney-
client communications in forming her opinions. See, e.g., Coyle v. Estate of Simon, 588 A.2d
1293, 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 810 S.W.2d at 440
("[Tjhe designation of Fernandez as an expert witness on Aetna's claims handling procedure
waived any privilege that Aetna might assert to the specific matters that Fernandez relied upon
as the basis of his testimony.'). But see supra note 260 (discussing the limited viability of
precedent suggesting that waiver depends upon expert reliance following the 1993 amendments
to the Federal Rules and similar state discovery provisions); infra note 266 and accompanying
text.
263. The 1993 Federal Rules amendments and similar changes in state discovery rules
significantly expanded the scope of information that a party could obtain in formal discovery
about expert witnesses. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. At a 1995 joint
American Law Institute and American Bar Association conference, U.S. District Judge Sam
C. Pointer, Jr. noted that the 1993 amendments provided for discovery of items provided to
experts, regardless of work product or attorney-client arguments. Judge Pointer stated:
The rules [as amended in 1993] make it clear that whatever you give to the expert
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expert received?" Therefore, when an attorney provides work product materials"
is subject to being disclosed... [. The rule says] whatever the expert relies upon
or considers. The lawyer's obligation, in order to preserve work product or
attorney-client privilege, is to not give it to the expert. If you give it to the expert
you have waived the privilege.
Lovein, supra note 89, at 263 n.216 (omission in original) (quoting WorkProduct Threatened
by New Expert Disclosure Rule, FED. DISCOVERYNEWS, Feb. 12,1996 (quoting U.S. District
Judge Sam Pointer, Jr.)).
264. The Advisory Committee, which drafted the 1993 amendments expanding the scope
of expert witness discovery, made it clear that these amendments were written to give opposing
- parties access, through required disclosures, to items provided by attorneys to their experts,
notwithstanding work product and attorney-client concerns. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)
advisory committee's notes (1993 amendments). In its report concerning the 1993 amendments,
the Advisory Committee explicitly addressed this issue:
The report [of the expert mandated under Rule 26(a)(2)(B)] is to disclose the
data and other information considered by the expert and any exhibits or charts that
summarize or support the expert's opinions. Given this obligation of disclosure,
litigants should no longer be able to argue that materials furnished to their experts
to be used in forming their opinions-whether or not ultimately relied upon by
the expert-are privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure when such
persons are testifying or being deposed.
Id. Professors Wright, Miller, and Marcus agree that the 1993 amendments "appear to require"
disclosure of materials provided by attorneys to experts. 8 WRiGHT ET AL, supra note 146, §
2031, at 439; see also W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *4 ("It is illogical that such
broad language, explicitly directed to privileges and other sources of protection against
disclosure, was intended to exclude any form of attorney work product.").
265. See W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 WL 1843258, at *3 ("Courts have held that comments and
questions from counsel to a testifying expert regarding the development ofthe expert's opinion
and reportmust be disclosed regardless ofwhether such communications contain attomeywork
product."); TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 194 F.R.D. 585 (S.D. Miss. 2000); B.C.F. Oil Ref.
Inc., 171 F.R.D. at 63; Karn, 168 F.R.D. at 639 (stating that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) "'trump[s]' any
assertion of work product or privilege" and "mandate[s] disclosure of all materials reviewed
by an expert witness"); Vaughan Furniture, 156 F.R.D. at 128 ("[An expert] witness must
produce all documents considered by him or her in the process of formulating the expert
opinion, including documents containing [work product] opinions." (citation omitted)); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997), reprinted in
ABA/BNAMANUAL, supra note 116, at 1101:132, :134 n.2 ("Some courts require production
of all oral and written communications by counsel with a testifying witness even though
ordinarily protected as opinion work product." (citing Intermedics, Inc., 139 F.R.D. at 384));
Lovein, supra note 89, at 263 n.217 (stating that "'if [work product] is given to the expert, the
privilege is waived [to that information]"' (alterations in original) (quoting Work Product
Threatened by New Expert Disclosure Rule, FED. DISCOVERYNEWS, Feb. 12, 1996 (quoting
U.S. District Judge Sam Pointer, Jr.))); ef. Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 194
F.R.D. 644,649 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding that intentional disclosure ofworkproduct materials
to an expertwitness is awaiver ofworkproduct protection, but inadvertent disclosure does not
necessarily constitute awaiver, particularlywhen disclosed documents had "essentiallynothing
to do with" the expert's testimony); Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr.
693, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that documents prepared by an expert consultant lose
their work product protection when expert is listed as a witness). But cf infra note 267.
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or attorney-client communications 2" to her expert in jurisdictions with post-1993
Federal Rules or similarly modernized state discovery provisions, she waives any
protection that previously attached to these items.26
266. See Johnson v. Gmender, 191 F.R.D. 638, 645-47 (D. Kan. 2000); Georgou v.
Fritzshall, No. 93 C 997, 1996 WL 73592, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1996) (holding that because
attorney-client privilege does not protect facts considered by an expert, these facts are
discoverable); Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361,362-63 (D. Mass. 1995)
(stating that, with regard to an attorney who allegedly provided advice relied upon by a party
pursuing an advice of counsel defense, "there is a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection at least to the extent of all information respecting communications
between the client and attorney up until the time the opinion is rendered" (footnote and citation
omitted)); see also 8 WRIGHT ET AI., supra note 146, § 2016.2, at 252 ("At least with respect
to experts who testify at trial, the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(c)(2), adopted in 1993,
were intended to permit further discussion and mandate disclosure despite privilege."); supra
note 264 (quoting Advisory Committee comments regarding 1993 amendments to the Federal
Rules); cf. Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Iowa 1995) (holding that Iowa
rule providing for broad expert discovery "requires disclosure of all facts known to the expert
and which relate to his opinions, not just the facts which form the basis for the expert's
opinion" (emphasis in original)); State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d 831 (Mo. 2000)
(similar result under Missouri law).
267. Not all courts agree, however. Before the 1993 amendment to Rule 26, some courts
held that providing attorney-client comments or attorney work product to an expert did not
necessarily render those items discoverable. See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587,
593-96 (3d Cir. 1984); All West Pet Supply Co. v. Hill's Pet Prods., 152 F.R.D. 634 (D. Kan.
1993) (decided just after 1993 amendments to Federal Rules, but based upon pre-1993
precedent); Hamel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 281, 284-85 (D. Kan. 1989); Bethany
Med. Ctr. v. Harder, No. CIV.A. 85-2415, 1987 WL 47845 (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 1987);
McKinnon v. Smock, 434 S.E.2d 92,93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Grubbs v. K Mart Corp., 411
N.W.2d 477,480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
Civil procedure aces Wright, Miller, and Marcus have contended that Bogosian has been
overruled by the 1993 Federal Rules amendments expanding expert witness disclosure and
discovery. See 8 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 146, § 2031, at 439 ("ITihe new disclosure
provision appears to require disclosure in such circumstances."); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407 (1997), reprinted in ABA/BNAMANUAL,
supra note 116, at 1101:132, :134 n.2 (citing Wright, Miller, and Marcus for the proposition
that "Bogosian probably was overruled by the 1993 amendments"); supra notes 263-66 and
accompanying text. This view is not universal, however. Several courts have refused to require
disclosure of all items shown to expert witnesses. See Krisav. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y,
196 F.R.D. 254,258-60 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that Bogosian prohibited discovery of core
work product, despite the 1993 amendment of Rule 26); Estate of Chopper v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 195 F.R.D. 648 (N.D. Iowa 2000); Estate of Moore v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 194 F.R.D. 659 (S.D. Iowa 2000); Ladd Furniture, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, No.
2:95CV00403, 1998 WL 1093901, at *12 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 1998); Magee v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 627,642-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); N.M. Tech Research Found. v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 37 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 971,978-79 (D.R.I. 1997); Haworth, Inc. v. Herman
Miller, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 289,294-95 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (reversing a magistratejudge's order
requiring expertwitness to answer deposition questions concerning expert's conversations with
retaining attorney); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-407
(1997), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at 1001:132, :134 n.2 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 141 (Proposed Final Draft No.
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If materials and communications previously protected by the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine can be obtained by a party in formal
discovery, concerns about the possibility of disclosure of materials and
communications in informal discovery cannot legitimately serve as the basis for aban
on informal information gathering, including ex parte communications. If a party is
entitled to demand certain data in the formal discovery process, the party should be
entitled to acquire it through her attorney's own efforts.' Therefore, work product269
and attorney-client concerns cannot serve as the bases for a ban on ex parte
communications in jurisdictions that consider disclosure to a testifying expert a
waiver of work product and attorney-client protection.270
1, 1996) as "adopting the Bogosian approach"); see also Maynard v. Whirlpool Corp., 160
F.R.D. 85 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (no discussion of Rule 26(A)(2)); cf. Smith v. Transducer Tech.,
Inc., No. Civ. 1995-28,2000 WL 1717333, at *3 (D.V.I. Nov. 2,2000) (allowing redaction of
core work product from communications between retaining attorney and experts); Smith v.
Transducer Tech., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 260,262 (D.V.I. 2000) (allowing retaining party to redact
attorney's legal theories from documents provided to experts); Ambrose v. Southworth Prods.
Corp., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 813 (W.D. Va. 1997) (warning parties that opinion work
product may not be discoverable).
268. Several ethics authorities state, usually with little or no analysis or support, that
attorneys must avoid discussion of work product and/or attorney-client information in ex parte
conversations with experts. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-378 (1993), reprinted in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11,
at 1101:209; Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1998-154 (1998), 1998 WL
717729, at *2; Nilles, supra note 127, at 20 ("Any discussion with an adverse expert of
attorney-client communications or an adversary attorney's work product may constitute a
violation of SCR 20:4.4.').
In any jurisdiction where formal discovery has evolved with the Federal Rules to provide
for discovery of all information provided by an attorney to her testifying expert, the rote
suggestion that ex parte communications cannot cover such information (including, where
applicable, information that was protected bythe attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine) is no longer valid. See supra notes 248-66 and accompanying text.
269. One court has even maintainedthatprohibiting ex parte communications with witnesses
would itself inhibit the principles behind the work product doctrine by requiring the attorney
seekinginformation to do so in the presence ofher opponent. See Felderv. Wyman, 139 F.R.D.
85, 90 (D.S.C. 1991).
270. In jurisdictions that do not consider disclosure to an expert a waiver of work product
or attorney-client protection, see supra note 267, the same rule would presumably apply to fact
witnesses. Actually, the argument forwaiver ofwork product or attorney-client protection upon
disclosure to a witness is stronger when the witness receiving the information is an expert,
rather than a fact witness. An expert witness is allowed to base her opinions upon "facts or data
... perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing." FED. R. EVID. 703. A
lay witness is only allowed to testify to opinions "rationally based upon the perception of the
witness." FED. R. EviD. 701. Given the fact that an expert, but not a fact witness, is entitled to
base opinions on information provided to her by counsel, the opposing party has a greater need
to discover information that the retaining attorney has made known to an expert, rather than
to a fact witness. Therefore, it is conceivable that ajurisdiction would allow formal discovery
of previously confidential items that an attorney provides to an expert, but would not allow
formal discovery of previously confidential items that an attorney provides to a fact witness.
The Model Rules and their state counterparts do not prohibit ex parte contact with fact
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c. Requiring the Retaining Attorney to Choose the Course of
Action That Appropriately Reflects Confidentiality Concerns
Indeed, the attorney 71 who controls the flow of data, confidential and otherwise,
into (and, at least to some extent, out of) the expert's head is in the best position to
manage the flow of that data.2' Given the ability of the retaining attorney to make
strategic decisions about the flow of data to the expert, there is no need to adopt
ethical rules prohibiting ex parte contact by opposing counsel.
The attorney has at least three ways to eliminate or reduce the possibility that
previously confidential materials or communications will be revealed by her expert
during an ex parte communication with her opponent The retaining attorney and her
client are in the best position to evaluate the costs and benefits of these three options
and one other option that will not reduce the risk of disclosure of previously
confidential items. These four options will be discussed in descending order of
effectiveness in reducing the possibility that previously confidential materials or
communications will be revealed by the expert to opposing counsel in ex parte
communications.
i. Refraining from Forwarding Confidential
Materials and Communications to the Expert
The attorney's first option is not sharing confidential materials and communications
with her expert.2' If the materials and communications are truly confidential, they
witnesses out of concern about the possibility of disclosure of work product materials or
attorney-client communications. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. Therefore,
the ethical rules as written, without distinctions between fact and expert witnesses, do not
prohibit ex parte contact with expert witnesses.
271. As noted previously, the term "attorney" is used as a shorthand term that includes both
the attorney and the client. See supra note 23. An attorney would presumably choose among
the options outlined here while consulting, or at least considering the wishes or needs of; her
client.
272. It would be a curious result indeed to outlaw ex parte communications out of concern
for the possibility of disclosure by an expert of work product materials or attorney-client
communications revealed to her by the attorney retaining the expert. The attorney who is
attempting to adequately prepare for cross-examination of an expert wants to know about all
of the data that the expert reviewed, including the data provided by the retaining attorney.
Under any analysis that overemphasizes work product and privilege concerns in these
circumstances, the attorney seeking this data would be punished for the tactical decisions made
by her adversary in forwarding previously confidential materials and communications to the
expert.
273. In light of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
expanded the scope of formal expert discovery, this option has been recommended to trial
attorneys who are concerned aboutprotecting the confidentiality ofwork product materials and
attorney-client communications. See Lieberman, supra note 23 1, at 7 ("I strongly suggest that
you assume that whatever you give or disclose to your expert is subject to pretrial discovery
and disclosure at trial and, therefore, limit any such communication to non-sensitive material,
to the extent possible, and to communicate orally, rather than in writing.'); supra note 263; cf.
Waits, supra note 32, at 445 ("I believe we should follow the rule, often mentioned in other
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shouldbe known only to the party, her attorney, andpersons working for the attorney.
If none of these persons, all of whom are under the control of the party and the
attorney, forwards confidential items to the expert, the expert should not learn about
them. If the expert never learns about work product materials or attorney-clent
communications, she cannot possibly reveal them in her communications with
opposing counsel, be they ex parte or in the presence of the retaining attorney.
Of course, this option is not without its downside for the retaining attorney.2 4 If the
materials or communications contain information that would be useful to the expert
in forming her opinions and attempting to persuade the jury, keeping that information
from the expert carries a strategic price tag. Who is in a betterposition to evaluate the
costs and benefits associated with forwarding otherwise confidential materials and
communications to the expert than the retaining attorney, however? If confidentiality
is more important than the potential benefit to be gained from forwarding the item to
the expert, the attorney, acting on behalf of her client, can keep the item confidential,
secure in the knowledge that their expert will not be able to reveal it. On the other
hand, ifthe benefit to be gained from forwarding the item to the expert outweighs the
cost of sacrificing the safeguards of confidentiality, the attorney can forward it to the
expert.275
areas of legal ethics, that the lawyer should only use expert witness preparation techniques that
she is willing to see exposed on the front page of the New York Times or revealed to her
opponent.").
274. Although withholding items from an expert to protect their confidential status has
drawbacks for the attorney, it can benefit the system as a whole:
Both tangible and intangible direct opinion work product shared with expert
witnesses should be discoverable .... This rule is necessary to avoid the strategy
of coaching/molding an expert witness through oral rather than written
preparation. I propose that the entire process ofexpert witness preparation should
be laid open to scrutiny.... [I]n Brandeis's words, "sunlight is... the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Discovery of opinion
work product would help ensure that the testimony truly belongs to the expert
witness and not the attorney.
Waits, supra note 32, at 444-45 (citations omitted) (quoting LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEoPLE's MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1st ed. 1914)).
275. As Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil noted in his watershed Intermedics opinion, a
bright-line rule that disclosure of work product to expert witnesses constitutes a waiver does
not interfere with the interests the work product doctrine was designed to protect:
[W]e must ask: how much harm is likely to be caused to work product interests
when lawyers know in advance that communications between them and testifying
experts will be discoverable if those communications are related to the matters
about which the experts will testify?
First, we note that such a rule would not interfere with counsel's capacity to
think dispassionately and creatively about his client's case in private. Lawyers
still would be able to ruminate and strategize freely, and to commit their
impressions, opinions, analyses, and strategic options to paper, all in the security
of confidentiality, as long as they did not share their thoughts with an expert they
would call to testify. This is an important point. It means that lawyers would be
able to preserve the privacy of their mental processes and to prevent others from
"leeching" off their work. This capacity to preserve their privacy and to prevent
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But fair is fair. The attorney cannot legitimately expect to have it both ways. Once
the decision is made to sacrifice confidentiality for the potential benefits of
forwarding the previously confidential item to the expert, the attorney should not be
allowed to complain that the mere possibility of exposure of the previously
confidential materials or communications precludes her opponent from contacting the
expert ex parte.
It is important to remember that the attorney will face this dilemma only when
making her expert aware of a certain piece of information would require her to reveal
the underlying work product materials or attorney-client communication containing
this information.' Wheneverthe piece of information is documented in some source
outside of work product materials or attorney-client communications,2' the attorney
can forward that piece of information to the expert by referring to this
nonconfidential source of information, without even letting the expert know that the
workproduct material or attorney-client communication exists. The attorneywill face
the choice of preserving confidentiality or revealing the work product materials or
attorney-client communication to the expert only when the underlying information is
contained only within work product materials, such as reports from the attorney's
investigator, or within an attorney-client communication.27 When this is the case, the
attorney and her client are in the best position to balance confidentiality concerns
against the potential benefit of forwarding the item to the expert. In these
circumstances, the forwarding of the previously confidential item is not, and should
not be, without cost
ii. Instructing the Expert Not to Participate in
Ex Parte Communications
Although an attorney should not expect that the mere possibility of exposure of
previously confidential materials or communications precludes expartecontactbyher
opponent, she may still try to prevent her opponent from learning about these items
in ex parte communications. Under the current versions279 of the Model Rules and
equivalent state ethics provisions, an attorney can instruct her client's agents not to
participate in ex parte communications with opposing counsel." 0 Ethics authorities
others from unfairly reaping benefits from their work should prevent the
demoralization of the profession that the Court in Hickaan v. Taylor appears to
have feared.
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384,392 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citation omitted);
see also Lamonds v. Gen. Motors Corp., 180 F.R.D. 302, 306 (W.D. Va. 1998); Musselman
v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 199 (D. Md. 1997); Easton, supra note 23, at 577-83; Mickus,
supra note 48, at 785.
276. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 239.
278. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
279. If the changes in the Model Rules advocated below, see infra Part V.B, are adopted,
the retaining attorney would no longer be allowed to consider this option.
280. Attorneys generally cannot attempt to interfere with their opponent's attempts to
interview witnesses. See infra note 341 and accompanying text. However, Model Rule 3.4(f)
allows attorneys to advise agents, including retained expert witnesses, to refrain from
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have generally interpreted the term "agent" to include experts retained by a party.2"'
Therefore, an attorney can advise the experts she has retained to refrain from ex parte
communications with opposing counsel.'
Once again, this option is not without potentially negative consequences because
instructing an expert not to participate in ex parte contact does not absolutely
guarantee that the expert will not participate in such contact. Like other human
beings, experts do not always remember and follow the instructions they are given.
If an expert talks to opposing counsel, it is possible that she will reveal previously
confidential materials or communications.
Even ifthe expert follows the attorney's instructions and informs opposing counsel
that she will not participate in ex parte communications, the attorney's forbiddance
of communications with opposing counsel is not without cost. As will also be
discussed more completely below, an attorney who is shunned in her attempts to
communicate with an adverse expert can use this shunning to demonstrate for the jury
that the expert is controlled by the attorney and therefore not credible.U
iii. Instructing the Expert Not to Disclose
Previously Confidential Materials or
Communications in Ex Parte Communications
The third option is to reveal .the previously confidential materials or
communications and instruct the expert that, if opposing counsel attempts to engage
her in ex parte communications, she should avoid disclosing these previously
confidential items. 5
participating in ex parte communications with opposing counsel. See infra notes 341-45 and
accompanying text.
281. See infra notes 341-49 and accompanying text.
282. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *1 (stating
that under the committee's previous opinion allowing ex parte contact, the retaining attorney
"could protect against disclosure of information by directing the expert not to discuss the case
with other persons").
283. Ofcourse, retained experts ordinarilywill attempt to follow the instructions ofretaining
attorneys, due to the control that retaining attorneys exercise over their experts, see supra notes
56-65 and accompanying text, including the authority to continue or discontinue the flow of
fees, see supra note 61. Failure to follow the instructions of an employer also perhaps could
damage an expert's reputation among fellow professionals and potential employers. It might
even be possible that failure to follow the attorney's instructions could result in a tort or
contract lawsuit against the expert.
284. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
285. Any attorney who is considering this option needs to give precise instructions to the
expert. Because it is permissible under the current ethics rules and interpretations to instruct
expert witnesses to refrain from participating in ex parte communications with adverse
attorneys, see infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text, it is presumably ethicallypermissible
for an attorney to instruct an expert witness to limit her ex parte communications by refraining
from discussing previously confidential (or other) items, as long as the attorney does not
suggest that the expert engage in deception.
However, an attorney probably cannot advise an expert to destroy previously confidential
items. The Model Rules provide: "A lawyer shall not... unlawfully obstruct another party's
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This option has rather obvious possible consequences. Despite, or in some
instances because of, an expert's best efforts not to reveal the previously confidential
materials or communications during ex parte communications,s 6 the expert may
reveal them. Itis also possible that an expert's refusal to answer certain questions will
highlight the existence of confidential materials or communications and provide
opposing counsel with clues regarding information to seek in formal discovery."
access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such
act." MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(a). Given the interest of a cross-examining attorney
decided in all information considered by an adverse expert, see supra notes 258-60 and
accompanying text, it would be difficult to argue that previously confidential items provided
by the retaining attorney have no "potential evidentiary value." Therefore, the retaining
attorney cannot advise an expert to destroy such materials if such advice is unlawful. In any
jurisdiction that has decided or might decide that work product materials and attorney-client
communications provided to an expert are discoverable, an attorney would be hard pressed to
argue that destruction of discoverable evidence is lawful. Although there is disagreement on
this issue, some have argued that destruction of evidence relevant to a pending proceeding,
even ifnot technically in violation ofa criminal statute, is unethical. See D.C. Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics and Grievances, Op. 119, at 4 (1983) ("[S]o long as a case is pending, destroying a
document which the lawyer knows is potentially evidence removes the judge's ability to
determine whether the potential evidence should be produced. Such displacement ofthe court's
authority would prejudice the administration ofjustice."), quoted in JAMIE S. GORELICKETAL.,
DESTRUCTION OFEVIDENCE § 7.8, at 262 (1989); see also I HAZARD &HODES, supra note 126,
§ 3.4:201, at 626-28. The ethical and cautious attorney who wishes to withhold previously
confidential documents from discovery would advise her expert not to destroy them, but to
retain them in a separate file and refrain from discussing them outside the presence of the
attorney.
For examples of more complete discussions of evidence destruction issues, see John M.
Fedders & Lauryn H. Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5 (1981); Steven W. Huang & Robert H.
Muriel, Spoliation of Evidence: Defining the Ethical Boundaries of Destroying Evidence, 22
AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 191 (1998); Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil
Litigation: The Needfor igorous JudicialAction, 13 CARDOZOL. REV. 793 (1991); R. Laird
Hart, Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
286. Some experts may have incentives to refrain from disclosing previously confidential
information in addition to their desire to follow the instructions from retaining counsel. See
supra note 283. Although the work product or attorney-client law of the relevant jurisdiction
may treat disclosure to an expert as a waiver of confidentiality, see supra notes 249-66 and
accompanying text, the expert may be a member of a profession that requires its members to
maintain confidences revealed to them, absent specific client consent to disclosure or a court
order or rule requiring disclosure.
287. Once the existence or even the possibility of work product materials or attorney-client
communications is revealed to the opposing attorney, that attorney may have at least two formal
discovery avenues to pursue in her attempt to obtain these items. First, she can argue that her
opponent's forwarding of the work product materials or attorney-client communications to the
expert was a waiver of the work product or attorney-client protection that previously attached
to these materials or communications. In several jurisdictions, this argument will result in
access to the underlying materials or communications. See supra notes 261-66 and
accompanying text. Even if the case is venued in ajurisdiction where disclosure to an expert
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iv. Revealing Confidential Materials or
Communications Without Related Instructions
The final option available to the attorney is to reveal the previously confidential
materials or communications without instructing the expert to avoid ex parte
communications or to avoid revealing the materials or communications in ex parte
communications. In jurisdictions where disclosure of work product materials or
attorney-client communications to the expert constitutes waiver of any then-existing
protection," this maybe the most realistic option for attorneys who chose to provide
experts with such items. If opposing counsel can demand the materials or
communications through formal discovery and if the attorney has decided not to
instruct her expert to avoid ex parte communications, there may be little to be gained
from advising the expert not to reveal previously confidential items in ex parte
communications. In addition, allowing experts to discuss matters with opposing
counsel without restrictions should eliminate any otherwise available suggestions
during cross-examination that an attorney is hiding certain subjects from her
opponent and, by implication, the jurors.8 9
Adoption of this option does not necessarily mean that the expert will reveal
previously confidential items in ex parte communications. The opposing attorney
might never contact the expert ex parte.' Even if she does, she may not ask about
whatever issue would otherwise result in disclosure of the previously confidential
items.
In weighing all of these options, the attorney is in the best position to evaluate the
costs and benefits. 9' Given the existence of an option that virtually guarantees that
an expert will not disclose confidential items in ex parte communications' and the
existence of other options that substantially reduce therisk that an expert will disclose
previously confidential items in ex parte communications, there is no need for a rule
prohibiting ex parte communications.
is not considered a waiver, if the underlying materials were work product, the opposing
attorney could argue that her client, in the words of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of [her] case and.., is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R.
Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
288. See supra notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
289. See infra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
290. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
291. Ofcourse, the attomeymayneed to consult her client in making this determination. See
supra note 271.
292. The option of not disclosing confidential items to experts has been described as a"sure
way to protect attorney-client/work product information and material" from disclosure.
Lieberman, supra note 23 1, at 10.
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3. The "Loyalty as Paramount" Assumption
Once the attempted, but indefensible, justifications about the discovery rules and
allegedly confidential information are negated, only one possible reason to prohibit
exparte communications remains. Thatpossiblejustification is loyalty. Indeed, when
the opinions finding ex parte contact impermissible are read carefully and critically,
it appears that concerns about an expert's loyalty to the party and attorney who hired
293. In addition to this reason, there is arguably one other explanation for opposition to ex
parte contact, but this explanation cannot really be called a reason for a ban. This explanation
is custom. With about fifteen years of experience in civil litigation, this author can attest that
many attorneys believe that contacting opposing experts is something that just is not done.
Another commentator has suggested that there may be "a tacit understanding among civil trial
lawyers that they will not look too deeply into each other's witness preparation." Applegate,
supra note 32, at 280 n.12. Professor Hazard and Mr. Hodes similarly note the existence of a
"well-established and well-known" litigator "practice norm" of using formal discovery rather
than "other forms of contact" with expert witnesses. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 126, §
3A:402, at 637-38. One court has suggested that an attempt to communicate with an adverse
expert ex parte "seldom happens." Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir.
1996).
Although some attorneys believe that there is an "I will not talk to your experts because I
know that you will not talk to mine" unspoken agreement, it is clear that this understanding is
not universal. The presence of written opinions outlining facts that include ex parte
communications between attorneys and adverse experts, see supra notes 119-29, demonstrates
that at least some attorneys believe that they are free to engage in such communications. Also,
while it is common for both parties to have expert witnesses who will testify concerning an
issue in dispute, see WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 12.4.6, at 652, this is not always the case. See
Easton, supra note 23, at 506; Graham, supra note 1, at 184-85; Lubet, supra note 25, at 465
& n.5 (discussing a study of California cases showing that opposing experts testified in fifty-
seven percent of civil trials, but at least one expert testified in eighty-six percent of civil trials).
In a case where only one party has retained an expert witness (sometimes because the other
party cannot afford to retain one, see Easton, supra note 23, at 506), it is beyond reasonable
to assume the existence of an unspoken mutual agreement to avoid an information-gathering
technique that will help the side without an expert in the cross-examination of the only expert
who will testify.
Furthermore, while custom may explain the reluctance of some attorneys to contact
opposing experts ex parte, it cannot, in and of itself, justify an ethical ban on such contact. If
the custom against ex parte contact with experts and the policy behind it (like the custom and
related policy of bans on ex parte contact with represented parties, see supra note 110 and
accompanying text) is to be considered controlling, it should result in the adoption of ethical
rules that explicitly and directly prohibit such contact (similar to the ethical rules that explicitly
prohibit ex parte contact with represented persons, see supra note 110). In the absence of any
such rules, ex parte contact is permitted by the rules, despite the distaste among some members
of the bar for the practice.
Finally, it is worth noting that any agreement regarding abstaining from ex parte contact
does not have to remain unspoken. If the opposing attorneys believe that it is in their clients'
best interests for all attorneys to refrain from ex parte contact with adverse retained expert
witnesses, the attorneys can verbalize this agreement and memorialize it in writing. In fact, the
parties could stipulate to the entry of an order of the court prohibiting ex parte contact with
adverse expert witnesses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(4).
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her are sometimes the primary reason for attempted prohibitions of ex parte
communications. After all, when a party hires and pays thousands or hundreds of
thousands of dollars for an expert's work, she should at leastbe certain thatthe expert
will not talk to the opposing party, right? Wrong.
a. A Brief Review of Expert Loyalty Concerns
Expert loyalty considerations permeate the opinions finding ex parte
communications impermissible. Sometimes these concerns are implied."4 At least on
occasion, however, they are openly stated. In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit noted
with obvious substantial concern that a party "did not know if he could trust" his
expert after the expert had a brief ex parte conversation with opposing counsel. 9 A
state bar ethics committee worried that exparte communication could "undermine the
right of [retaining] counsel, in our state court adversary system, to formulate his or
her case in confidence."' In the end, whether concerns about expert loyalty are
implied or openly stated in opinions finding exparte contact unethical, these concerns
trump any possible benefits of ex parte contact in the minds of trial-team-model
advocates.
294. For example, the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee's outrage was obvious
when it stated that in one incident of ex parte contact reported to it, the "expert, not as
sophisticated or experienced as the others, apparently sent the opposing counsel a copy of his
expert report and underlying factual data before these had even been seen by the attorney who
retained the expert." Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at
*2. In a similar vein, one commentator opposed to ex parte contact demonstrated his belief in
loyalty by stating, "Indeed, a question that a careful lawyer should ask when confronted with
a garrulous adverse expert is whether that lawyer is being set up by his or her adversary rather
than vice versa." Nilles, supra note 127, at 20.
295. See Erickson, 87 F.3d at 300-02. The court noted, "Erickson believed he could no
longer use Dr. Grimm because Erickson did not know what had transpired during the meeting
between Combs and Dr. Grimm." Id. at 302.
296. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1992-132, at 5 (1992), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122.
While this comment demonstrates that trial-team-model advocates have concerns about
expert loyalty, it does not necessarily reflect law outside of Oregon. As of the time of this
opinion, Oregon, unlike almost all other American jurisdictions, see supra note 147, had no
formal discovery regarding testifying expert witnesses. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 1992-132, at 3 (1992) (noting "the complete lack of express provision under
Oregon rules for formal discovery of expert witnesses retained to testify at trial"), summarized
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122. The Oregon
committee's concern for the possibility that ex parte contact would result in revelation of trial
strategy has more merit than would a concern in ajurisdiction where revealing such strategy
to a testifying expert renders the communications about the strategy discoverable. See supra
notes 261-66 and accompanying text.
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b. The Dangers of Loyalty
This belief in an expert's loyalty as paramount to all other concerns, including the
potential of ex parte communications to make the search for truth more effective,
perhaps results fromthe realities of the relationship between attorneys and the experts
they hire. Without a doubt, testifying experts are affected by the sometimes large
amounts of money that their clients pay them.2 Human nature dictates this. Without
a doubt, experts are often close to the attorneys who choose them and work closely
with them for months or years. 8 Human nature dictates this also. In other words,
without a doubt, experts are very loyal to the attorneys and clients that hire and pay
them. 9
The loyalty that experts have for their clients and attorneys is not a reason to
prohibit opposing counsel from communicating with experts, though. Instead, this
loyalty should cause the system to arm the opposingparty and her attorney with every
possi'ble weapon to fight the loyalty that the expert feels for the attorney and client.3
Loyalty is a form of bias, and a very powerful one at that" °0 Given the vast sums of
money they are paid and the reality that the flow of money will stop if the expert
297. See Easton, supra note 23, at 494,496; supra note 61.
298. See Easton, supra note 23, at 493-94, 497; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
299. See Langbein, supra note 58, at 835 (noting the "psychological pressure" that is exerted
upon expert witnesses).
300. As one court reasoned:
The trier of fact has a right to know who is testifying. If it is the lawyer who really
is testifying surreptitiously through an expert (i.e., if the expert is in any
significant measure parroting the views that are really the lawyer's), it would be
fundamentally unfair to the truth finding process to lead the jury or court to
believe that the background and personal attributes of the expert should be taken
into account when the persuasive power of the testimony is assessed.
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritrex, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 384, 396 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (emphasis in
original).
301. Cf Benny Agosto, Jr., Should Clinical Medical Testimony Be Subject to Daubert
Analysis?, TEx. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 30, 34 (noting "the unfortunate fact that experts are nearly
always biased toward those who pay their fees").
The loyalty ofretained expert witnesses to the advocates who employ them is not auniquely
American problem. For one Australian perspective, see Hon. Justice H.D. Sperling, Supreme
Court of New South Wales, Expert Evidence: The Problem of Bias and Other Things, Speech
at Supreme Court ofNew South Wales Annual Conference, at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/
sc/sc.nsffpages/sp_030999 (Sept. 3-4, 1999). Justice Sperling quoted an 1873 Australian
decision where the judge reported: "'Undoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something
serviceable for those who employ you and adequately remunerate you. It is very natural, and
it is so effectual that we constantly see persons, instead of considering themselves witnesses,
rather consider themselves as the paid agents of the person who employs them.' Id. (quoting
Lord Arbinger v. Ashton, 17 L.R.-Eq. 358,374 (Ch. App. 1873)). He also reported the results
of a survey of Australian judges who had handled civil trials without ajury that indicated that
eighty-five percent "had encountered partisanship in expert witnesses." Id. (citation omitted).
Despite this data, Justice Sperling opined: "The problem ofbiased evidence is much more acute
in the United States than here. Most civil suits are tried by jury there and juries are more likely
to be duped by 'junk science' than judges' Id.
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reaches conclusions that do not advance the cause of the attorney and her client 3°
experts are often the most biased nonparty witnesses in a trial.3 3
Attorneys preparing to cross-examine these biased, financially motivated, and
skilled witnesses face an often monumental task. If the attorney retaining the expert
chose carefially,"' the expert will be a strong witness who will make a good
302. One experienced expertwitness franklyoutlined how economic pressures caninfluence
expert testimony:
Nobody likes to disappoint a patron; and beyond this psychological pressure is
the financial inducement. Money changes hands upon the rendering of expertise,
but the expert can run his meter only so long as his patron litigator likes the tune.
Opposing counsel undertakes a similar exercise, hiring and schooling another
expert to parrot the contrary position. The result is our familiar battle of opposing
experts. The more measured and impartial an expert is, the less likely he is to be
used by either side.
Langbein, supra note 58, at 835 (footnote omitted).
303. Many have noted that retained expert witnesses are controlled to a dramatic extent by
the attorneys who retain them. More than four decades ago, a commentator contended: "[T]here
is no such thing as a neutral, impartial [expert] witness.... [The expert] is bound to be biased
and partial, and strongly motivated towards advocacy of his particular prejudiced point of
view." Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES OF CRIM.
PSYCHODYNAMIcS 221, 229-30 (1959), reprinted in DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 842, 846 (5th ed. 1983).
One commentator who serves as an expert noted that many refer to experts as
"'saxophones,"' because "the lawyer plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though the
expert were a musical instrument on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes." Langbein,
supra note 58, at 835. A federal district judge echoed this thought with the observation that
expert witnesses "are nothing more than willing musical instruments upon which manipulative
counsel can play whatever tune is desired." Kam v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639 (N.D. Ind.
1996) (citation omitted).
Another commentator. observed that "the use of experts has led to some of the most
notorious abuses ofthe adversary system" because experts often lack "any hint of impartiality."
Applegate, supra note 32, at 295. This observation is supported by the comments of an expert
witness who noted that, when he serves as an expert, he feels pressure to "join the team" by
letting himself be convinced "to shade [his] views, to conceal doubt, to overstate nuance, to
downplay weak aspects of the case that [he] has been hired to bolster." Langbein, supra note
58, at 835; cf. Lubet, supra note 25, at 468 ("[S]ome lawyers will be tempted to see the expert
as simply another member of the litigation team.").
Similarly, a federal judge has observed that "expert testimony has often been subject to
improper influences, and that counsel can all too easily color the expert's opinion." Karn, 168
F.R.D. at 639 (citation omitted); cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 58, § 12.4.6, at 652 ("The tarnished
ideal of expert testimony is testimony based entirely on the witness' honest scientific data and
opinion. In truth, however, many expert witnesses are as much hired-gun advocates as are the
lawyers for whom they work." (footnotes omitted)).
Even a court that limited formal expert witness discovery admitted that an attorney can have
tremendous influence over the expert she retains when it noted that an "expert's view may have
originated with an attorney's opinion or theory." Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587,
595 (3d Cir. 1984).
304. Of course, another aspect ofchoosing experts carefullyis finding experts who are likely
to reach opinions favorable to the choosing attorney's case. See WOLFRAM, supra note 58, §
12.4.6, at 652 ("Lawyers are expected to seek out experts whose testimony will favor their side
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impression on the jury and will be skilled at defending herself during cross-
examination."5 Nonetheless, given the economic and loyalty pressures on the expert,
she may reach incorrect conclusions that the attorney has, in one commentator's
words, "more or less" told her to reach.3" If trials are to be a search for truth,"°7 the
justice system should not unnecessarily handicap the attorney who must take on the
daunting task of impeaching a biased, but important, witness.3°s
Certainly the system should not place greater restrictions upon an attorney in her
efforts to prepare forthe cross-examination or other impeachment of expert witnesses
than it places upon her in her effort to prepare for the cross-examination or
impeachment of fact witnesses. Ifexparte communications with testifying experts are
disallowed, the system is doing just that, because attorneys are generally" allowed
to contact fact witnesses without advising their opponents or seeking their
approval, 10 regardless of how loyal they are to one of the attorneys or parties.3 ' If
.... ); infra note 306 and accompanying text.
305. See United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963) ("[Uit
needs no citation ofauthority to say that an expert is the most difficult witness to cross-examine
.... "); Wrobleski v. de Lara, 727 A.2d 930, 934 (Md. 1999); Hallahan, supra note 41, at 61.
306. One observer noted that "it is generally recognized that the lawyer explains to the
expert more or less exactly what needs to be said." Applegate, supra note 32, at 348 n.368.
307. Courts have recognized the importance of ex parte interviews in promoting the search
for the truth. In a passage quoted and adopted by the Second Circuit, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York observed, "A trial is a search for the truth.... A lawyer
may properly interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil
or criminal case without the consent of opposing counsel." Coppolino v. Helpem, 266 F. Supp.
930,935 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), quoted in Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 44 (2d
Cir. 1975); ef. Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Colo. 1966)
(rejecting the theory that a party's investment in an expert witness is more important than the
systemic interest in finding the truth), cited in Norfin, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 74
F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo. 1977).
308. See Karn, 168 F.R.D. at 639 ("[I]t stands to reason that useful cross examination and
possible impeachment can onlybe accomplished bygaining access to all of the information that
shaped or potentially influenced the expert witness's opinion."); Emergency Care Dynamics
Ltd. v. Superior Court, 932 P.2d 237, 300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("Just as an expert witness's
sources remain a proper subject of cross-examination.... so do the expert's relations with the
hiring party and its counsel."); Stearrett v. Newcomb, 521 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Super. Ct.
1986) ("It is inherent in the testimony of the expert that he would be called upon to divulge all
facts and information upon which he bases his opinion, and any limitations placed upon his
retention as an expert.').
309. For a discussion of the exceptions to this general rule, see supra notes 110-16 and
accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Coppolino, 266 F. Supp. at 935-36, quoted in Int 7iBus. Machs., 526 F.2d at
44; Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-132, at 2 (1992), summarized in ABAIBNA
Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; see also supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
311. See supra note 110-14.
Perhaps the best example of an unpaid witness who is loyal to one side, short of one who
is actually represented as a party in an action, is a crime victim or other prosecution witness in
a criminal case. Despite the rather intense loyalty that many crime witnesses feel for the
prosecutor, criminal defense attorneys are free to contact them ex parte. See Gregory v. United
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ex parte contact with fact witnesses is allowed and even encouraged,3 restrictions
upon attorney contact with witnesses based upon their status as retained experts
cannot be justified,3 13 particularly when the Model Rules do not distinguish between
expert and fact witnesses.3 4
In fact, those who wrote the Model Rules and adopted them into state professional
responsibilityprovisions believe so strongly in the value ofex parte communications
with witnesses that they did more thanjust allow such contact The Model Rules take
a significant additional step in support of ex parte contact, by forbidding an attorney
from asking a witness to avoid ex parte contact with opposing counsel.3t5
Furthermore, with the exception of some circumstances involving a client's relatives,
employees, or agents,31 6 this prohibition against asking a witness not to participate in
ex parte communications applies to witnesses who are very loyal to the attorney's
client, including such persons as the client's close friends and colleagues. The
inclusion of this prohibition in the Model Rules documents a belief in the benefits of
ex parte contact with witnesses for the adversary system, including the acquisition of
information that could lead to either settlement or more informed cross-
examinations,31 and a concern about the problems that would result from allowing
States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966); ExparteNichols, 624 So. 2d 1325, 1326-27 (Ala.
1992); Jones v. Georgia, 520 S.E.2d 454, 456 (Ga. 1999); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal
Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-134 (1998), 1999 WL 516727, at *2 ("[Ut
is improper for an attorney for the Commonwealth to tell a victim not to speak with a defense
attorney, under Pa. R.P.C. 3.4, let alone attempt to interfere with [a defense attorney's] attempt
to interview other witnesses."): As the law regarding crime witnesses, including victims,
establishes, a witness's loyalty to one of the attorneys or parties is not recognized as significant
enough to render ex parte contact by the opposing attorney unethical.
312. See McMoran, supra note 88, at 999.
313. If anything, the dollar-induced loyalty that experts feel for their clients should result
in giving attorneys more methods to prepare for expert impeachment than are allowed for fact
witness impeachment, not less. See Easton, supra note 23, at 489-90, 565.
314. ABAComm. on Ethics andProf' Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208 ("No
Model Rule... treats expert witnesses differently from fact witnesses.'); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 577 (1986), 1986 WL 68786, at *1 (stating that the committee
is "unaware of any ethical rule or policy which would justify a distinction between a retained
expert witness and an ordinary witness").
315. Under Model Rule 3.4(f), an attorney cannot "request a person other than a client to
refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party." MODEL RULES, supra
note 8, R. 3.4(f); see supra note 143 (citing state professional responsibility rules). But see
infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to the rule). An attorney
would violate this rule by asking a witness not to participate in ex parte contact with the
attorney's opponent because such contact could involve the conveying ofrelevant information
to another party through the opposing counsel.
316. Model Rule 3.4(f) does allow an attorney to ask a nonclient not to voluntarily give
information to the attorney's opponent when "(1) the person is a relative or an employee or
other agent of the client; and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will
not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information." MODEL RULES, supra
note 8, R. 3.4(o.
317. An attorney's purposes in seeking to communicate ex parte with fact witnesses would
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one party to quarantine witnesses, including an interference with the truth-seeking
process."" If these benefits and problems are present with fact witnesses, they are at
least equallypresent with retained experts,319 who are given special advantages32 and
are often among the most important witnesses in a given case.32'
IV. ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON ATTORNEYS
CONDUCTING Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
This does not mean that there should be no ethical restrictions upon attorneys
conducting exparte communications with adverse retained experts. Instead, it simply
means that the ethical restrictions that have been developed for ex parte
communications with fact witnesses3" are sufficient for ex parte communications
with expert witnesses. Some of these restrictions will be briefly catalogued here.
A. Abstaining from Contact with Represented Persons
Because this Article concerns contact with retained expert witnesses, Model Rule
4.2 generally will not apply. Nonetheless, this fundamental "no contact" rule bears
repeating. Model Rule 4.2 prohibits an attorney from contacting persons who are
represented by counsel in the case at hand.3" With regard to corporate parties and
presumably be the same as her purposes in seeking to communicate ex parte with expert
witnesses. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
318. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text.
319. One court noted:
As a general proposition,.., no party to litigation has anything resembling a
proprietary right to any witness's evidence. Absent a privilege no party is entitled
to restrict an opponent's access to a witness, however partial or important to him,
by insisting upon some notion ofallegiance. Even an expert whose knowledge has
been purchased cannot be silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground
alone. Unless impeded by privilege an adversary may inquire, in advance of trial,
by any lawful manner to learn what any witness knows if other appropriate
conditions the witness alone may impose are satisfied, e.g., compensation for his
time and expertise or payment of reasonable expenses involved ....
Doe v. Eli Lilly& Co., 99 F.RID. 126,128 (D.D.C. 1983) (citations omitted), cited in Donako
v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Mich. 1991).
320. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 18.
322. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11,1001:207, :208 ("There are
... ethical limitations that apply to contacts with any witness.. . ."); McMoran, supra note 88,
at 992 (similar).
323. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.2.
Of course, the attorney who "close[es her] eyes to the obvious" fact that a witness is
represented could be guilty of misconduct. See id. at cmt. [6]; see also McMoran, supra note
88, at 998. The Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed removing a provision from the Model
Rule comment stating that an inference of knowledge of representation "may arise in
circumstances where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom
communication is sought is represented in the matter to be discussed." MODEL RULES (Final
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other entities, the forbidden zone generally includes employees who are members of
an entity's control group or are otherwise authorized to make statements on behalf of
the entity.3 ' Because most employee experts would presumablybe within the scope
and authority of their employment when making statements about the issues that an
opposing attorney would like to discuss with them, attorneys probably should assume
that most or all experts who are employees of represented entities generally cannot
be contacted. s
B. Acknowledging the Attorney's Role
Under Model Rule 4.3, an attorney who is "dealing" with an unrepresented person
cannot state or imply that she is disinterested.3" Furthermore, an attorney must
attempt to correct any misunderstandings held by an unrepresented person about the
attorney's role32 Therefore, when an attorney contacts or interviews a witness ex
parte, she must be candid about her role in the case."
C. Avoiding False Statements
Pursuant to Model Rule 4.1(a), an attorney can not "make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person.""3 This prohibition applies to ex parte
communications with witnesses.330
D. Refraining from Suggesting the Witness
Must Communicate Ex Parte
Because Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibits false statements of law, attorneys must be
careful in approaching witnesses. In the absence of a subpoena requiring attendance
Draft), supra note 110, R. 4.2 cmt. [8], http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-rule42.htnil.
324. See supra note 116.
325. Nilles, supra note 127, at 19.
326. MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 4.3; Ethics Digest, supra note 114, 94-48.
327. See supra note 326.
328. ABAComm. on EthicsandProf'lResponsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993),reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208 ("When
a lawyer contacts anywitness, lay or expert, actual or potential, the lawyer must not knowingly
leave the witness in ignorance of the lawyer's relationship to the case that gives occasion to the
contact.'); Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm, Op. 1992-132, at 6 (1992) ("[A]n Oregon
attorney cannot misrepresent the identity or motive of the interviewer."), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; McMoran,
supra note 88, at 997; Nilles, supra note 127, at 19 ("If the expert is considered to be
unrepresented by counsel, the lawyer cannot state or imply that she or he is disinterested.
Further, ifthe lawyer reasonably should know that the expert misunderstands the lawyer's role,
the lawyer must take reasonable steps to correct the misunderstanding."); cf Morrison-v.
Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 19-20 (D. Mass. 1989) (requiring counsel to disclose her
capacity at the beginning of ex parte interviews with witnesses).
329. MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 4.3; accord RESTATEMENT, supra note 101, § 98(1).
330. Nilles, supra note 127, at 19.
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at a formal proceeding, a witness does not have to talk to an attorney.3 ' Therefore,
an attorney cannot suggest that a witness must participate in exparte communications
with her.332
E. Avoiding Harassment'
An attorney's intensity in preparing for cross-examination of a witness must be
tempered by a respect for the witness and her rights. Model Rule 4.4 states, "a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person. '3 3 In other words, an attorney cannot harass a witness.
F. Protecting the Integrity of Evidence
Model Rule 3.4(b) provides that an attorney shall not "falsify evidence, counsel or
assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited
by law."334 These prohibitions apply not only to an attorney's "own" witnesses, but
also to those friendly to her opponent.3 5
G. Refraining from Persuading Witnesses Not to Testify
Under Model Rule 3.4(a), an attorney cannot obstruct another party's access to
evidence.3' This prohibition is viewed as an incorporation and expansion of the old
Model Code provision that an attorney "shall not advise or cause a person to secrete
himself.. . for the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness ... Pursuant
to these provisions, ethics authorities have determined that attorneys cannot attempt
to persuade witnesses not to testify,33 but they can attempt to convince themthat their
331. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208; Alaska
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 84-8 (1984) ("An expert witness.. . is obviously free to refiain
from discussing his opinions or the basis for such opinions with anyone."), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1980-1985 Ethics Opinions, supra note 127, at 801:1203.
332. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208 ("[Ihe
lawyer may not, consistent with Rule 4.1(a), convey the message, directly or indirectly, that the
witness must speak to the lawyer." (emphasis in original)); Nilles, supra note 127, at 19; see
also Kaveney v. Murphy, 97 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93 (D. Mass. 2000); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics
Comm., Op. 85-2 (1985), 1985 WL 301273, at *2 (noting with disdain an instance where
"opposing counsel had contacted several of the attorney's retained experts and repeatedly
asserted to them that they were 'required' to discuss their testimony with him").
333. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 4.4.
334. Id. R. 3.4(b).
335. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208 ("[T]he
prohibition of Model Rule 3.4(b), on counseling or assisting a witness to testify falsely,
necessarily applies to an opponent's witnesses as well as one's own.").
336. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(a).
337. MODEL CODE, supra note 139, DR 7-109(B).
338. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-132, at 6 (1992), summarized in
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memories or opinions are in error.339
If these restrictions are adequate to protect the justice system from improper
conduct by attorneys in ex parte communications with fact witnesses, they are
adequate to protect the system from improper conduct by attorneys in ex parte
communications with experts. Of course, the restrictions outlined in the Model Rules
and state ethical provisions are subject to revision.' If new restrictions are needed
and are enacted regarding ex parte contact with witnesses, these restrictions should
apply to both fact and expert witness contact
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; Va. State Bar
Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1678, at 2 (1996) ("The committee believes... that it
is not ethically permissible for a lawyer directly to advise the other party's expert witness not
to testify, or indirectly through another acting at the lawyer's request to cause the other party's
expert witness not to testify."), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116, at
1101:8703; Trial Conduct, Fairness to OpposingParty, ABA/BNA Manual, supra note 116,
at 61:701 ("With respect to witnesses, Model Rule 3.4(a)'s prohibition against obstructing
access to evidence bars a lawyer from procuring the absence of a witness. More subtle efforts
to dissuade a witness from testifying may also violate Rule 3.4(a), as well as other professional
conduct rules.").
The Oregon State Bar Legal Ethics Committee also opined that an attempt to convince a fact
or expert witness not to testify "would be prejudicial to the administration ofjustice," even if
the attemptproved unsuccessful. Or. State BarLegal Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-132, at6 (1992),
summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 1 l, at 1001:7122;
cf. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990) ("Wilt goes without saying that efforts
to persuade the expert against testifying are. .. improper."), summarized in ABA/BNA
Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106.
339. Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 1992-132, at 6 (1992), summarized in
ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:7122; Or. State Bar
Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 530 (1990), summarized in ABA/BNA Manual, 1986-1990 Ethics
Opinions, supra note 116, at 901:7106.
340. The Ethics 2000 Commission has proposed changes in the text of several of the Model
Rules limiting the conduct of attorneys conducting ex parte communications discussed in this
section. See supra note 116 (outlining Ethics 2000 Commission's proposed revision to Model
Rule 4.2); MODELRULES (Final Draft), supra note 110, R. 4.3 (adding provision regarding the
giving oflegal advice to unrepresented persons), http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule43.html;
Id. R. 4.4(b) (adding comments regarding privileged and inadvertently sent items),
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule44.html. The text of, though not necessarily the comments
to, the other Model Rules discussed here would remain unaffected by the Ethics
2000 Commission's proposals. See id. R. 4.1, Reporter's Explanation of Changes,
http://www.abanet.orgfcpr/e2k-rule4l.html; supra note 143 (regarding Model Rule 3.4).
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V. ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS ON RETAINING ATTORNEYS CONCERNING
Ex PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
The attorney who wishes to communicate with an opposing witness is not the only
lawyer whose behavior is constrained by professional responsibility considerations
regarding ex parte contact. Instead, the Model Rules also restrict the conduct of the
attorney who will call the witness to the stand at trial, by limiting the circumstances
in which she can advise the witness not to participate in ex parte communications
with opposing counsel.
A. Current Law: Attorneys May Advise Their Retained Experts
Not to Participate in Ex Parte Communications
with Opposing Counsel
Unlike the restrictions on the attorney conducting ex parte communications with
an adverse witness, the restrictions on attorneys advising witnesses about whether to
participate in ex parte communications sometimes operate differently for fact
witnesses and experts.
1. Application of Model Rule 3.4(f)
Model Rule 3.4(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not... request a person other than a client to refrain from
voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.3"
As applied, this Model Rule has resulted in differences in the permissible advice that
attorneys can give to fact witnesses and retained experts.
Attorneys cannot admonish factwitnesses who are neitherrelatives, employees, nor
agents of parties to refrain from ex parte communications with opposing counsel.f 2
Attorneys are allowed to inform fact witnesses that they do not have to participate in
ex parte communications."3 In addition, professional responsibility authorities
341. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(f). Many states have adopted professional
responsibility rules based upon Model Rule 3.4. See supra note 143.
The predecessor Model Code did not contain an equivalent provision:
With regard to paragraph () [of Model Rule 3.4], DR 7-104(A)(2) provided
that a lawyer shall not "give advice to a person who is not represented... other
than the advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client."
See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4, Model Code Comparison (omission in original). The
Model Code did state that an attorney "shall not advise or cause a person to secrete himself
... for the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness." MODELCODE, supra note 139,
DR 7-109(B).
342. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(f).
343. See Exparte Nichols, 624 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Ala. 1992).
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generally conclude that attorneys can tell fact witnesses that they are allowed to insist
that opposing counsel allow them to participate in interviews.'
Under the existing rules, as interpreted by ethics authorities, an attorney's advice
to retained expert witnesses is allowed to go one step further. The question of
whether an attorney can advise a retained expert witness not to participate in ex parte
communications with opposing counsel turns on whether retained experts are
"agents" of the parties that pay them under the Model Rule 3.4(0 provisions quoted
above. Most ethics authorities have found that experts are agents, for purposes of
Model Rule 3.4(f) and its state counterparts, and retaining attorneys are therefore
allowed to ask them to refrain from ex parte contact with opposing counsel.11
Although these holdings do result in some differentiation between fact and expert
witnesses, they are defensible interpretations of the existing Model Rules and similar
state ethics provisions. Although the term "agent" is an imprecise one,345 it is
probably correct that retained experts are agents, at least to some extent.347 Clients
hire them to review data and reach conclusions on their behalf. If the presence of
any 8 type of agency is sufficient to bring Model Rule 3.4()(1) into effect, the Rule
344. See id. at 1327; cf. Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14,20 (D. Mass. 1989)
(noting that a witness is permitted to insist upon the presence of his or her own attorney as a
condition to participation in an interview with the other party's attorney).
345. ABA Corm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-378 (1993), reprinted
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1991-1995 Ethics Opinions, supra note 11, at 1001:207, :208 ("[Ihe
opposing party or its lawyer may properly have asked the expert not to discuss the case with
the inquiring lawyer." (emphasis in original)); Alaska Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 84-8
(1984) ("[A]n attorney may, as a term of the engagement for such expert, obligate the expert
to refiain from discussing his opinions regarding the subject in controversy unless previously
authorized by the attorney or through applicable discovery or trial procedures.'), summarized
in ABA/BNA Manual, 1980-1985 Ethics Opinions, supra note 127, at 801:1203.
346. Although the agency course is no longer a staple ofthe standard law school curriculum,
see Robert C. Clark, In Memoriam: LouisLoss, 111 HARv. L.REv. 2135,2136 (1998); Robert
B. Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study of Methods and
Content, 48 . LEGALEDUC. 438,446 n.10 (1998), the fact that it once took an entire semester
to discuss and digest agency law demonstrates that the term "agent" has many different
meanings.
347. In an opinion that did not deal directly with expert witnesses specifically, but agents
generally, one ethics committee opined that "communication with [an opposing party's] agent
may be permissible depending upon the scope and extent of the agency." Phila. Bar Ass'n
Prof I Guidance Comm., Guidance Inquiry 88-30, at 1 (1988). If this logic applies to an
attorney's ability to instruct expert witnesses not to participate in ex parte communications with
opposing counsel, the instruction not to participate should only be as broad as the scope of the
agency. Therefore, to the extent that the expert has information acquired before she was
retained, an attorney instructing noncooperation may arguably be required to note that she can
only advise noncooperation on matters developed for the litigation at hand. See supra note 183.
348. Viewing experts as agents of clients has interesting implications. For example, under
Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "a statement by [a] party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence
of the relationship" is an admission. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2). An admission is admissible
against the party whose agent made the statement, because it is not hearsay. FED. R. EVID.
801(d). If experts are the agents of parties for purposes of both Model Rule 3.4(f) and Federal
Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2), parties presumably cannot raise hearsay objections to statements
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does allow attorneys to instruct retained experts not to participate in ex parte
communications.' 9
2. Practical Implications of Model Rule 3.4(f)
Trial-team-model advocates might seize upon Rule 3.4(f) as a reason for
disallowing ex parne communications altogether. Ifattorneys can ethically advise their
retained experts not to participate in ex parte communications, why bother letting
adverse attorneys make ex parte contact in the first place? The answer, like the
question, involves practical realities of ex parte contact.
First, the existence of an information-gathering technique for attorneys should not
and does not depend upon that technique being universally or even usually effective.
Ex parte communications with fact witnesses provide a prime, but certainly not the
only,3 example of an information-gathering maneuver that often results in the
gathering of little or no information. Like experts, fact witnesses are free not to
participate in ex parte communication. 5' No attorney can force any witness to talk to
her without serving a subpoena upon her and thereby engaging in a decidedly non-ex
made by their experts. Compare McKitty v. Bd. of Educ., Nyack Union Free School Dist., No.
86 Civ. 3176 (PKL), 1987 WL 28791, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987) (equating the group of
employees ofa party who could not be contacted under the predecessor to Model Rule 4.2 with
the group of employees who could make statements that would be considered admissions of
their employer (citing Frey v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 37-38
(E.D.N.Y. 1985))), with Morrison, 135 F.R.D. at 16-18 (finding that the group ofpersons who
could make statements that would be admissible as admissions under the Federal Rules of
Evidence is even larger than the group of persons who are considered represented parties for
purposes of the no-contact professional responsibility rule). As long as the expert's statements
are relevant, they should be admissible, unless some provision of evidence or other law renders
them inadmissible. Some courts have held that expert witnesses are agents whose statements
therefore are admissible as admissions against the parties who hire them. See Collins v. Wayne
Corp., 621 F.2d 777, 780-82 (5th Cir. 1980); Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, No. CIV.A. 14514,
1998 WL 67123 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1998). On the other hand, other courts have rejected the
idea that experts are agents who can make binding admissions. See Kirk v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 162-64 (3d Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467, 468-69 (Il. 1994).
The latter holdings suggest that expert witnesses arguably also are not agents for purposes of
Model Rule 3.4(f), at least in these jurisdictions.
349. In this Article, I have argued that attorneys should not be subject to allegations of
ethical impropriety when they act in conformance with the language in the Model Rules. See
supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. An attorney reviewing Model Rule 3.4(f), as it is
currently constituted, would certainly be reasonable in concluding that she could permissibly
advise a retained expert to avoid ex parte communications with attorneys representing other
parties. To be consistent, I cannot now suggest that attorneys who give such advice to retained
experts are violating Model Rule 3.4(f), even though I am obviously an advocate of ex parte
communications and I believe that allowing attorneys to instruct their retained experts not to
participate in ex parte communications is not in the best interests of the truth-seeking process.
See infra Part V.B.
350. See Hayes &Ryder, supranote 1, at 1123 n. 116,1123-24,1138 (noting theinadequacy
of interrogatory answers).
351. See supra note 332.
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parte communication.352 Fact witnesses often exercise the option of not talking.353 In
other words, ex parte communications with fact witnesses often do not result in the
acquisition of new information." In similar fashion, many other information-
gathering efforts, including many formal discovery devices,35 often do not result in
the acquisition of much (or any) useful information.356 Nonetheless, attorneys are
allowed to attempt to engage in these information-gathering efforts, because such
efforts, at least occasionally, do lead to the acquisition of significant information.
Furthermore, ex parte contacts with retained experts that do not result in a
meaningful dialogue are not necessarily "ineffective," or, at least, not totally
ineffective. Even if the expert slams the phone down almost immediately after an
attorney calls her, the attorney has gained something from her attempt to discuss the
case with the expert. When the expert refuses to talk to an attorney based upon the
advice of the attorney who hired her, the expert's cross-examination might include
an exchange along the following lines:3"
352. See Johnston v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 356 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[A]ny
witness has the right to refuse to be interviewed if he so desires."); cf. Kaveney v. Murphy, 97
F. Supp. 2d 88, 89 (D. Mass. 2000) (requiring attorney conducting ex parte interviews to
remind witnesses that they have the right to refuse to participate); Exparte Nichols, 624 So.
2d 1325, 1327 (Ala. 1992); Gulley v. State, 519 S.E.2d 655, 664 (Ga. 1999) (stating that in a
criminal case, "[w]itnesses cannot be compelled to submit to interviews with the defense").
353. See McMoran, supra note 88, at 991-92.
354. As a practical matter, the allowable parameters for advising expert and fact witnesses
about whether to participate in ex parte communications may not be as different as one might
first believe. While it is true that attorneys usually cannot advise fact witnesses not to talk to
their opponents, a carefully emphasized and perfectly allowable "you do not have to talk to my
opponent" or "you have the right to demand that I be there when you talk to my opponent," see
supra notes 343-44 and accompanying text, may be enough to end any realistic hope that
opposing counsel has of conducting an ex parte interview of a fact witness.
355. A classic example of a formal discovery device that did not yield much useful
information was the pre-1993 Rule 26(b)(4) expert witness interrogatory, which typically did
not produce enough data to allow an attorney to adequately prepare for cross-examination of
the witness. See Day, supra note 102, at 51-52; Graham, supra note 1, at 172 ("[The Rule
26(b)(4) interrogatory] overwhelmingly is recognized as a totally unsatisfactory method of
providing adequate preparation for cross-examination and rebuttal.").
356. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
In 1980, then Professor Wayne D. Brazil published the results of a survey that established
that formal discovery does not always result in the acquisition of all the information sought by
the requesting party. See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its
Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 198Q AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980).
Over half of the responding attorneys indicated that "[e]vasive or incomplete responses" to
discovery requests impeded their acquisition of the information they requested in formal
discovery. See id. at 833.
Brazil reported several comments of attorneys that help to explain why so many attorneys
felt that discovery responses were evasive or incomplete. One attorney outlined an approach
to discovery that rested on the tenet "'[n]ever be candid and never helpful and make (your)
opponent fight for everything."' Id. at 832. Another indicated, "'The purpose of discovery...
is to give as little as possible so [your opponents] will have to come back and back and maybe
will go away or give up."' Id. at 829 (alteration in original).
357. Professor Imwinkelried, who is renowned for his mastery of both trial techniques and
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Q: You talked to Attorney Jones, who hired you, about this case dozens of
times, right?
A: Sure.
Q: But when I called you and asked you to discuss your theories with me, you
refused to do so, right?
A: Right.35
Q: In fact, our conversation lasted about thirty seconds, right?
A: About that.Q: You did not talk to me because Attorney Jones told you not to talk to me,
right?359
expert witness law, suggests a similar set of cross-exasnination questions as a way to establish
bias. See IMWINRELRIED, supra note 159, § 9-7(b), at 247.
358. In some circumstances, the attorney may want to be in a position to add: "Q: I offered
to reimburse you for your time in speaking to me, at the same rate as you are charging my
opponent, right?" See Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting that
an expert could condition her participation in ex parte communications upon counsel's
payment for her time and expenses).
Some have suggested that an offer to compensate an adverse expert is inappropriate. In a
case where an attorney asked an adverse expert to conduct an inspection in a matter unrelated
to the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit rather remarkably declared:
In layman's terms, Erickson [the pro se plaintiff] labeled the employment offer
[by defense counsel] to Dr. Grimm as a bribe. This may not be a fair
characterization. However, attorneys must use their common sense to avoid
conduct which could appear to be an improper attempt to influence a witness who
is about to testify. We will never know Combs' actual motivation in making an
offer of employment to Dr. Grimm. Regardless of Combs' motive, at a minimum,
the offer of employment put Dr. Grimm in the position of having divided
loyalties. Quite simply, this court chooses to abide by the ageless wisdom that a
person cannot serve two masters.
Erickson v. Newmar Corp., 87 F.3d 298, 303 (9th Cir. 1996).
If the goal is a search for the truth, these sentiments are misplaced. Following the logic of
the Ninth Circuit, any possible payment to an expert affects the expert's biases. While this is
almost certainly true, it applies just as readily to the payments by the party retaining the witness
as to the adverse party who suggests the possibility of retaining her in another case or paying
her for time spent in ex parte communications. Any balancing out of the bias created by the
original payments should therefore be encouraged, not discouraged. The Ninth Circuit's
suggestion that any possible negating of the effects of the payments from the initially retaining
party constitute "witness tampering," see id., demonstrated just how distorted the present
system has become. In the view of the Ninth Circuit and other trial-team-model advocates, the
paramount value to be protected is the right of attorneys to buy experts on the open market,
with no fear that the power of the dollars they spend will be offset by other forces like dollars
spent by their opponents. The ultimate goal for the system should be truth, not the
unchallengeable power of the market for opinion testimony. See Norfln, Inc. v. Int'l Bus.
Machs. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo. 1977) ("[We cannot accept this 'oath helper'
approach to discovery. It is inconsistent with our basic assumption that the trial is a search for
truth and not a tactical contest which goes to either the richest or to the most resourceful
litigant." (quoting Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 39 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Colo. 1966))).
359. If the expert decided on her own not to talk to opposing counsel, either because an
attorney did not instruct her to avoid ex parte communications, see supra Part V.A.1, or
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A: That's right.'
Q: You did not make that decision, because AttorneyJones made the decision
for you, correct?
A: Correct.36
because the adoption of an amendment to Model Rule 3.4(f) prohibited the attorney from so
instructing the witness, see infra Part V.B, the attorney should refrain from asking this
question. The absence of a question establishing the expert's refusal to participate in ex parte
communications presumably will somewhat weaken the cross-examiner's efforts to establish
that the expert is controlled by the attorney, but this is a reasonable result. After all, if the
attorney does not explicitly instruct her expert not to participate in ex parte communications
she is indeed exercising less control over the expert than an attorney who does give this
instruction.
An experienced or otherwise savvy expert witness might, and presumably often would,
avoid participating in ex parte communications with her future cross-examiner even if her
retaining attorney does not instruct her to do so, because she might believe that there is little
to be gained from such communications. Even when the expert herself decides not to
participate in ex parte communications, however, a series of cross-examination questions
establishing the numerous "ex parte" communications between the retaining attorney and the
expert (i.e., those outside the presence and knowledge of opposing counsel) and the expert's
refusal to participate in any such communications with opposing counsel will help the cross-
examiner establish the expert's loyalty to retaining counsel.
As with any cross-examination questions, an attorney may wish to determine the answers
to these questions before asking them at trial. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
Therefore, the attorney may wish to examine the expert about her willingness to participate in
ex parte communications during the expert's deposition. A deposition inquiry about these
matters should limit the opportunity for the expert to present unexpected damaging answers to
the cross-examination questions that cast the attorney in a negative light for attempting to
engage in ex parte communications. An attorney who proceeded with cross-examination
questions like those suggested here without learning the expert's answers to these questions,
including an attorney who tried to use a last minute call to an adverse expert to cover up the
attorney's inadequate discovery and preparation efforts, could be unpleasantly surprised with
answers to these questions that cast the attorney's attempted ex parte contact in the appropriate
negative light.
360. If ex parte communications are not permitted, the witness could answer (on cross or on
redirect, after appropriate coaching from her retaining attorney) with, "No. I did not talk with
you because it was unethical for you to even try to talk to me." As long as there is a possibility
of such an answer, a wise attorney might not pursue this line of questioning during cross-
examination. Therefore, the possibility of such an answer means that one part of the truth (i.e.,
the full extent of the retaining attorney's control over the expert witness) will be kept from the
jurors. If the trial is to be a search for the truth, this hiding of the truth should not be tolerated.
361. Some attorneys might add:
Q: Let's get this straight. When Attorney Jones tells you to do something or not
do something regarding this case, you are at least on occasion willing to follow
her instructions without making decisions for yourself, right?
A: Maybe sometimes, but not always.
Others, who believe that they should avoid questions that might lead to arguments with
witnesses during cross-examination, see ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG, TRIAL:
ADVOCACYBEFOREJUDGES, JURORS ANDARBrrRATORS § 10.1(e), at500 (2d ed. 1991), would
forego this question, but make the same point in final argument.
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An attorney who has the right to contact retained witnesses ex parte and exercises that
right can use such a series of cross-examination questions to establish the strong ties
between the adverse expert and the attorney who retains her. Given the tendency of
experts and the attorneys who hire them to try to suggest that they are far more
impartial than they actually are,362 these questions help the jury understand the real
dynamics of the expert-attorney relationship? Therefore, even if an attorney
instructs her experts not to talk to opposing counsel and the expert follows this
instruction, allowing the opposing counsel the chance to try to engage the adverse
expert in an ex parte discussion still contributes to the truth-seeking process.
At least on occasion, retaining attorneys will conclude that the potential negative
implications of the line of questioning outlined above are greater than the downside
of allowing their experts to talk to their opponents.3 Trial attorneys may come to this
conclusion most often when they are confident that their experts will be able to
handle themselves in ex parte conversations. When they are correct, ex parte
communications may convince the opposing attorneys who engage in them that they
should actively pursue settlement.
Also, as noted previously, even when attorneys advise their experts not to
participate in ex parte communications with opposing counsel, some experts will not
follow this advice. Experts who truly believe that their role is to educate the parties
and jurors may believe that they can best accomplish this goal by talking freely with
attorneys for both parties. Although the ingrained combative nature of litigation
makes such a concept a difficult one for attorneys to consider, much less accept,365
362. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 139 F.ILD. 384, 395-96 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("When experts testify, they present opinions and reasoning as their own."); supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
363. See Intermedics, 139 F.R.D. at 395 ("Knowing that some or all of the reasoning and
opinion that is being presented by an expert is not her own, but is a lawyer's, might well have
an appreciable effect on the probative value the trier of fact ascribes to the expert testimony.").
The court explained:
[I]t would be fundamentally misleading, and could do great damage to the
integrity of the truth finding process, if testimony that was being presented as the
independent thinking of an "expert" in fact was the product, in whole or
significant part, of the suggestions of counsel. The trier offact has a right to know
who is testifying.
Id. at 395-96 (emphasis in original); cf. TV-3, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 194 F.R.D. 585, 588 (S.D.
Miss. 2000) ("[W'hen an attorney hires an expert both the expert's compensation and his
'marching orders' can be discovered and the expert cross-examined thereon.').
364. Trial attorneys sometimes conclude that providing information to opponents is
preferable to trying to hide it. See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL § 6.3, at 191 (4th ed. 1999)
("It is often sound strategy to provide broad disclosure to other parties.).
365. One trial-team-model advocate outlined what may be a fairly typical attorney-based
view of the "proper" attitude for experts to have about ex parte contact:
Seasoned trial lawyers may wonder what expert witnesses would knowingly
engage in any contact with opposing counsel. In most cases, people identified as
expert witnesses are sufficiently knowledgeable about legal proceedings that they
will seek to avoid contact with opposing counsel. There are exceptions, however,
consisting primarily of those experts who are retained because of knowledge they
have gained of the issues underlying the litigation in advance of litigation. There
[Vol. 76:647
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it is hard to argue that these experts are wrong. If the expert's ultimate purpose is to
increase the knowledge of the jurors, her chances of success in this endeavor are
increased ifnot just one, but both, attorneys are given every opportunity to learn from
her.
B. A Modest Proposal: Prohibiting Attorneys from Advising
Retained Experts to Refrain from Ex Parte
Communications with Opposing Counsel
Although Model Rule 3.4(f)'s granting of permission to attorneys to ask retained
expert witnesses not to participate in ex parte communications does not render
attempts to engage in such communications purposeless, removal of this permission
would presumably increase the probability of actual ex parte communications about
relevant issues.3" Because such communications would benefit the justice system by
increasing the flow of information leading to settlement and making cross-
examination more effective,36 this is a change worth making.
368
also are some experts who either are so naive or so arrogant that they fail to
perceive the hazards of affording opposing counsel unchecked inquiry into their
thought processes.
Nilles, supra note 127, at 18.
From the standpoint of a given trial attorney in a given case, this perspective is
understandable. After all, ex parte contact is undertaken, in the main, in an effort to gather
information to be used at trial to cross-examine and otherwise discredit the expert witness.
From a broader systemic view, however, ex parte communication can help attorneys overcome
the strong inherent bias of retained expert witnesses and therefore assist in the search for the
truth. Formal discovery is designed, at least in part, for the same purpose. See supra note 80
and accompanying text. Therefore, the fact that a given information-gathering technique arms
an attorney opposing an expert witness with information that can be used to impeach the expert
is not a reason to outlaw the technique. Indeed, that very purpose is one that should be
advanced in a process that purports to seek truth.
366. Notwithstanding the existence of some expert witnesses who will fail to follow advice
given by retaining attorneys to avoid ex parte communications, see supra text accompanying
notes 283-84, a good many retained experts would follow the advice of their employers. Of the
experts who are willing to follow advice given by retaining attorneys, there are surely some
who would choose to engage in ex parte communications if they were not told not to do so,
particularlywhen theybelieve this would expand the knowledge of key persons involved in the
litigation and lead to a more just result. See supra text accompanying note 365.
367. See supra notes 105-06, 190-92 and accompanying text.
368. In the related context of determining whether to allow defense attorneys to contact
plaintiff's treating physicians ex parte, see supra note 25, one court warned about the dangers
of allowing one party to try to control access to a witness:
The inchoate threat implicit in refusing or qualifying permission to speak to
awitness... operates to intimidate the witness, who is then placed in the position
of withholding or divulging what he knows at his peril, and is itself a species of
improper influence. It also enables the party so wielding the privilege to monitor
his adversary's progress in preparing his case by his presence on each occasion
such information is revealed ....
Doe v. Eli Lilly& Co., 99 F.R.D. 126,128-29 (D.D.C. 1983), quoted in Felder v. Wyman, 139
F.R.D. 85, 89-90 (D.S.C. 1991). Current law allowing an attorney to control access to her
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A relatively simple edit of Model Rule 3.4(f) would bring about this change.
Adding the phrase "not including any person who has been retained to present expert
testimony" after the term agent in Model Rule 3.4(f) would remove retained expert
witnesses from the list of persons369 who can be advised by an attorney not to
participate in ex parte communications. 70 Given the recent amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that might fortify an attorney who is considering
trying to initiate ex parte communications with a retained expert, a change in the
Model Rules that would increase the probability that this encounter would result in
the acquisition of information is quite timely.37'
retained experts raises similar concerns.
369. As currently in place, the list of persons who can be asked by an attorney to refrain
from ex parte communications includes "a relative or an employee or other agent of a client."
MODELRULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(f). At least at first blush, this list seems, for the most part,
to be persons who have a relationship with the client outside of the litigation. A relative of the
client certainly has a nonlitigation relationship with her. Likewise, although it is possible to
hire a person as an employee solely to assist in a particular litigated matter, this would be
unusual. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that the vast majority of employees of clients have
a relationship with the client that exists outside of the litigated matter at hand. Indeed, if the
term "agent" is to be interpreted expansively enough to include retained expert witnesses, see
supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text, certainly many, if not most, agents have some
relationship with clients outside of the litigated matter at hand. A retained expert witness has
no such relationship in many instances, because she was retained for the specific purpose of
working on the case at hand. Therefore, removing retained expert witnesses from the Model
Rule 3.4(f) list would not do a disservice to what would appear to be the spirit of the rule,
which is allowing an attorney to advise persons who have a relationship with the client outside
ofthe litigation at hand to refrain from ex parte communications because such communications
might do damage to the interest of the person with whom they have this relationship.
370. If this change was adopted, Model Rule 3.4(f) would read:
A lawyer shall not...
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party unless:
(1) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent, not including any
person who has been retained to present expert testimony, of a client; and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be
adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.
MODEL RULES, supra note 8, R. 3.4(f) (with suggested additions shown in italics).
As written above, this change would apply to both civil and criminal cases. Because this
Article analyzes only the issues involved in civil cases, further analysis is warranted before a
change affecting criminal cases is adopted, even though much of the analysis here should be
relevant in criminal cases. Of course, the addition of the words "in a civil proceeding" at the
end of the addition suggested above would limit the scope of the proposed amendment.
371. Although this suggestion ideally would have been directed to the Ethics 2000
Commission, the Commission has already released a report that does not change the text of
Model Rule 3.4. See supra note 143. However, assuming that state committees and courts will
eventually revieW the Ethics 2000 Commission's suggested changes and consider whether to
adopt them or other modifications to their rules of professional responsibility, this suggestion
of a relatively minor change in the language of Model Rule 3.4 could still be enacted in some
jurisdictions in the relatively near future. Cf Hellman, supra note 6, at 326-27 ("It is typical
for a state's set of rules, even when based on one of the ABA models, to contain material
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VI. CONCLUSION
With or without this suggested modification of Model Rule 3.4(f), ex parte
communications are not a panacea that will instantly overcome the potentially
substantial witness bias inherent in a system where attorneys and parties retain and
pay expert witnesses. In some instances, ex parte communications will provide little
information to an attorney who attempts to use them, but is thwarted by opposing
attorneys who instruct againstparticipation and experts who follow those instructions
or independently choose not to participate. At best, exparte contact is simply another
arrow in the quiver ofattorneys who seek to overcome the problems of expert witness
bias.
Given the pervasive power of the money-fueled bias of retained experts, though,
that quiver needs to be stocked with every reasonable arrow. When read and
interpreted reasonably, no Model Rule prohibits attorneys from attempting ex parte
contact. Moreover, trial-team-model advocates have not made a case on policy
grounds for adoption of a rule prohibiting ex parte contact. Instead, ex parte contact
has the potential to enhance the truth-seeking process, by making cross-examination
more effective. As a result, the ex parte arrow, imperfect as it is, should be at the
disposal of attorneys who can make effective use of it, at least on occasion. Other
arrows that will make cross-examination more effective should also be added to the
trial attorney's quiver.3 The system needs to do more to overcome the dangers of
retained expert loyalty, not less.
variations from the relevant ABA document.").
372. For example, as I have previously argued, the cross-examiner should be given access
to everything considered by an adverse retained expert witness, including all communications
between the retaining attorney and the expert. See supra note 55.
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